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To the
Doughboys and Leathernecks
of Seven Divisions
in whose support it was our privilege
to strive mightily for two years.
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lst Marine Division
(New Britain)

32d Infantry Division
(Saidor, Aitape)

40th Infantry Division
(New Britain)

\

37th Infantry Division
(Luzon)

31st Infantry Division
(Mindanao)

43d Infantry Division
(Aitape, Luzon)

Sixth Army
(December 1943-Aprill945
August-November 1945)

24th Infantry Division
(Mindanao)

Eighth Army
(April-July 1945)

Foreword
In these pages will be found the story of our own
53 3d in the greatest of all the wars of the world. It
is a story of toil and hardship and danger mixed
with happy interludes and comradeships made the
dearer thereby, a story of great deeds in the face of
great obstacles, of reverses and disappointments but
of pride and glory in the end.
This book is not written to impress others with
our deeds. In the many commendations of high
commanders is found the testimony to our success in
an unusual and most important role in many landings on enemy-held shores. In our own minds and
hearts are the priceless memories of our great adventure and the pride that comes from the knowledge
of a job well done. May these pages help to keep
them fresh through the years to come.

(/lC;i3?J~: ~
W. S. MOORE

..._...)

Colonel, Corps of Engineers
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CHAPTER I

Origins of the Engineer Amphibian Brigades
The fortress island of Corregidor quivered under the relentless pounding of the
Jap bombers and the heavy batteries massed on recently subdued Bataan. The weary
defenders, safe only in the depths of its tunnels, knew they could not hope to repulse
the final assault that would strike them any day. The last effective barrier to complete Japanese conquest of the Philippines was doomed.
A tiny Aussie garrison in the mountains above Port Moresby, the last impertinent
Allied foothold on the second largest island in the world, wondered when the J aps on
the north coast of New Guinea would decide to rub them out.
The bitter rear-guard action in Burma was drawing to an ignominious close as
the remnants of the British, Indian, and Chinese forces stumbled over the trackless
mountains into India, and the victorious J aps seized the Burma Road and pressed on
into isolated China.
Between New Caledonia and the Solomons roamed the scouting planes of a small
American naval task force seeking to locate the Japanese fleet that was about to sally
forth for an attack on the Australian mainland.
On the other side of the world, Germany and her satellites bestrode Europe
unchallenged from Gibraltar to the North Cape, from the Channel Islands to the
African desert. The Russian winter counteroffensive, having hurled the Germans
from the suburbs of Moscow, had bogged down in the ooze of spring. The Germans
were attacking at Kharkov and in the Crimea, and their Afrika Korps was coiling for
a deadly lunge at Egypt. German submarines stalked ships in the delta of the Mississippi and within sight of the New Jersey coast.
So began the month of May, r 942.
In these darkest moments of World War II, the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff
were nevertheless grimly preparing offensives to regain the ground lost and bring the
Axis ultimately to abject surrender. One fact stood out: there was no land route of
approach, and so the British and American forces could come to grips with the Germans and Japanese only by amphibious attack. Not only would strong armies have
to be raised, trained and equipped, but those armies would also have to be provided
with ships and boats and trained beach parties in order to assault the fortress of
Europe and the vast island empire of Japan.
Both the British and American navies were doing all they could to procure ships
and small landing craft and to train crews for them, but the U. S. Navy in particular
was necessarily preoccupied with meeting the menace of German submarines in the
Atlantic and the threat of the now superior Japanese naval forces in the central
Pacific. In order better to distribute the burden of preparing the amphibious forces,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned to the Army the task of creating a major amphibious
training center and of recruiting and training specialized units capable of operating
landing craft and handling the engineering work on beachheads.
This decision was reduced to orders on May 9, 1942 directing General Somervell,
10
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commander of the Army Service Forces, to establish an amphibian training center
at Camp Edwards, and to procure equipment and personnel for the specialized
amphibian units.
As had been its lot throughout its long history, the U.S. Corps of Engineers
received this new and unique assignment. After a briefperiod of study, the Engineer
Amphibian Command was activated on June 5, 1942, with the mission of organizing,
equipping and training eight engineer amphibian brigades, each capable of transporting and supporting a reinforced infantry division in a shore-to-shore amphibious
attack. Colonel Daniel Noce, an engineer who had had much to do with the organization of the original air-borne units took command, and opened his headquarters at
Camp Edwards, on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Ten days later the rst Engineer
Amphibian Brigade was activated, using two engineer combat regiments as its
nucleus. Five days later the 2d Brigade came into being.
To procure personnel with appropriate civilian background as officers and noncommissioned officers for this work, an intensive recruiting program was inaugurated
with headquarters in Washington. Employing extensive publicity and cooperating
with the U.S. Power Squadrons, yacht clubs, and other organizations concerned with
maritime activities, this drive resulted in many hundreds of civilians being enlisted
or commissioned during the summer of r 942.
Procurement of boats was handled through the Navy Bureau of Ships in order
not to duplicate effort. In accordance with the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the engineer amphibian units were restricted to craft less than roo feet long, on the
general theory that these would be adequate for the short distance across the English
Channel, where the brigades were initially expected to be employed.
Each day brought a fresh influx of personnel and equipment to Cape Cod.
Veteran Coast Guard and Marine officers, battle tested· Britishers with experience in
commando raids, experts in civil engineering, navigation, boat repair, and communications formed the nucleus of the training command at Edwards. Camps were opened
at Waquoit and Cotuit, and docks were built to provide appropriate training bases
for the boat units.
During June and early July 1942 the Allied situation throughout the world grew
more perilous. The Afrika Korps routed the British Eighth Army and reached within striking distance of the Nile; von Bock's great group of armies started its rooo-mile
plunge from Orel to Stalingrad; and the Japanese, despite the naval battles of the
Coral Sea and Midway, still threatened Australia.
To the Combined Chiefs of Staff, meeting in London early in July, the most
serious danger appeared to be that the German summer offensive would succeed in
knocking Russia out of the War. In order to do what little they could to relieve the
pressure on the hard pressed Red armies, they agreed to launch, if necessary, a crosschannel invasion of France, even though the forces at their disposal were pitifully
small. To do this they would need more landing craft and crews than were available
in the British Isles; so the rst Brigade on July 23 was ordered to England as fast as it
could be moved. The Brigade was in a sad state of confusion, with almost no equipment and all ranks barely oriented as to their technical missions and training objec-
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tives. Nevertheless, equipment was rushed from all parts of the country to the
Brigade, and it was brought to full strength and sailed from New York on August 5th.
Hardly had it debarked in England when it became apparent that the German drive
was slowing down in the Caucasus and was being fought to a standstill at Stalingrad,
and that it would not be necessary to launch the major attack across the channel during that year. Given this breathing spell, the navies of both Great Britain and the
United States set about reversing the decision made in May to have the Army run the
small landing craft, and in England they actually took away the 1st Brigade's boats.
Back in the United States a bitter wrangle ensued, and the understandably
inexpert performance of some of the engineer boatmen in their first maneuvers lent
weight to the Navy's argument that only 'boys in blue' could satisfactorily handle
boats. Colonel Arthur Trudeau, the Chief of Staff of the Engineer Amphibian Command, made a flying trip to visit General MacArthur in Australia during the early
part of October to see if he was interested in continuing the development of the
amphibian brigades. Just at this time MacArthur was engaged in his "Battle of the
Marne" in the passes of the Owen Stanley Mountains and in the steaming jungles and
plantations of Milne Bay. Though he had been successful in driving the Japanese
back toward their bases on the northeast coast of New Guinea, lack of water-borne
transportation had caused him to rely almost exclusively on his pitifully few airplanes,
and he was, necessarily, in a most receptive mood. He promptly informed the War
Department that he would like one engineer amphibian brigade immediately, to be
follbwed in 1943 by a second one. The War Department, therefore, reduced the
number of brigades to be created by the Engineer Amphibian Command to three.
Thus, the Navy's campaign to keep the Army out of the boat business succeeded
to the extent that the amphibians in the European theater were henceforth to be
nothing more than shore party engineers, while in the portion of the Pacific under
Admiral Nimitz's control there would be no specialized amphibian engineers at all.
Only in the Southwest Pacific were the amphibian engineers to be given a chance to
operate in the manner originally contemplated in the dark days of May, 1942.
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Both !'ides paid dearly for Buna -

the Japs paid more, yet lost.

CHAPTER II

•

Massachusetts
While the Ist Brigade was crossing the Atlantic to England, its place at Camp
Edwards was taken by the 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade activated on August 8,
1942 under the command of Colonel David A. D. Ogden. Its principal components,
activated simultaneously, were the 533d Engineer Shore Regiment, the 593d Engineer
Boat Regiment, the 263d Medical Battalion, the 563d Quartermaster Battalion, and
many smaller service units. This form of organization persisted for three months
before both boat and shore elements were integrated at the regimental level to form
engineer amphibian regiments. So, to develop the early history of the 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment as it ultimately came to be known, it is necessary to
look separately at the initial days of what were to be its principal components- the
Boat Battalion and the Shore Battalion.

Boat Battalion
This section is the story of the 2d Battalion of the 593d Engineer Boat Regiment
which was to become the Boat Battalion of the 533d EB&SR. The 593d, from which
all of the boat elements of the 3d Brigade initially stemmed, was activated with a
cadre of noncommissioned officers from the 7 I st Field Artillery Brigade, a New York
National Guard unit. Although its tables of organization and equipment provided
for a strength of over 3,ooo men, principally composed of three identical engineer
boat battalions and a fleet of 500 -landing craft capable of embarking an entire infantry division, the 593d EBR never reached full strength, and throughout the three
months of its existence it operated primarily as a flexible training command.
From the date of activation until the last day of August, the 2d Battalion remained in the east block of Camp Edwards. Its few score men and officers were
barely sufficient to take care of administration and preparation for receiving the
anticipated recruits. When a few could be spared from these routine duties, they
attended specialist classes in piloting, seamanship, and marine maintenance. When
Colonel Oliver W. van den Berg, a Regular Army officer who had, appropriately,
matriculated at Annapolis, took command of the Regiment, he instituted an intensive
training program designed to prepare the Regiment for large-scale combined arms
exercises, which, it was expected, would take place in a matter ofweeks.
Camp Edwards was located nearly in the center of Cape Cod, and the several
miles which separated it from the landing craft delayed the training program. Accordingly, on August 31, the 2d Battalion moved to a tent camp at Cotuit, Massachusetts, which was conveniently close to the landing craft pool. The camp had been
established by the 592d Engineer Boat Regiment and was, in fact, little more than an
inferior bivouac. Hot water was for some weeks a rarity, which presented problems
not only of personal hygiene, but of a military nature in maintaining proper cleanliness of uniform. Located as it was in a pine gully, drainage was difficult and sand
13
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was ever present. Transportation to the neighboring towns was difficult, and on the
whole the camp furnished a rude awakening to the recruits who arrived fresh from the
reception centers. But it was undoubtedly a comparatively accurate forecast of what
life overseas would be like. Ingenuity in providing refinements was soon developed
to such an extent that the camp was given the name Candoit.
Training with the landing craft was soon interrupted by a brief flurry of excitement over the reported approach of German bombers from Brittany. The embryo
Battalion was hastily deployed as antiaircraft gunners on .50 calibre machine guns
in the Falmouth-Woods Hole area. Higher authority has yet to explain what profit
transatlantic raiders would find in bombing a summer resort and how . 50 calibre
machine guns could inconvenience heavy bombers. While the Battalion was still
widely scattered on this questionable assignment, Headquarters, Engineer Amphibian
Command, stripped it of all enlisted men except the original cadre of noncommissioned officers. For the next three weeks, the Battalion existed with a bare 100 men.
Its real :fimction during this period was the operation of a casual officers' camp and
school, for the influx of officers was greater than that of enlisted men, and at times the
ratio between them was about equal. It was the general rule that NCOs were the
instructors and inexperienced officers were the students in the classes which were held,
covering all manner of subjects from semaphore and telephone to the use of the
bayonet and the identification of naval vessels.
At the same time, the officers were being given intensive training afloat. Thanks
to the facilities and personnel of the Amphibian Command's Boat Unit Detachment,
which was well seasoned with experienced sailors and navigators from the Coast
Guard and the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the officers learned to beach and retract
LCVs, LCPRs and LCMs, * to pilot and do dead reckoning, and to control " waves"
ofboats. Night after night missions put to sea to make surprise landings on Martha's
Vineyard and Chappaquiddick, with senior officers acting as wave leaders and lieutenants as coxswains. On at least one occasion, the landing was a surprise to the
guardians of the beaches, and more than one officer found himself held at the point
of a tommy gun by an aroused coast guardsman or civilian defense watcher. During
this period the officers who were commissioned direct from civilian life on the basis
of their nautical experience learned soldiering, the officers from Fort Belvoir, trained
as combat engineers, learned boating, and both groups learned much of the eccentricities and shortcomings of the landing craft. When the task of training the
1,ooo men who were to make up the Battalion was undertaken, this personal experience was to prove invaluable to the officers.
Early in October, enlisted replacements flowed in again in substantial numbers,
and by the 5th of October the companies at last assumed the semblance of military
entities. All of the original boat company commanders were transferred within a
few months, but ten lieutenants who were assigned from battalion headquarters to
letter companies that day continued with their companies throughout the war.
During the early fall months, the shortage of men and ofboats furnished an excellent opportunity to use specialists' schools for the training of all ranks, and full advan*Explan ation of abbreviations of landing craft a nd description of the differen t typ es will be found on pages 276-295.
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Top: Doughboys dash out of an LCPR in maneuvers on Martha's Vineyard.
Bottom: Fuel and water cans are unloaded from LCVs of a later wave.

tage was taken of their facilities. Officers spent three-week periods at Harvard studying celestial navigation; maintenance officers, mechanics, and enginemen studied
their field at General Motors and Gray Marine Diesel schools in Detroit and at the
Hall-Scott school in Berkeley, California; and noncoms and coxswains learned the
refinements of operating landing craft properly at the Higgins school in New Orleans.
Those who remained at Camp Candoit divided their time between boat training
and the fundamentals of general military subjects. All men in the Battalion learned
elementary boat handling with the Boat Unit Detachment, making cold, wet trips up
and down Vineyard Sound and chewing up the beaches of Martha's Vineyard and
Waquoit with their blunt-nosed boats.
Three general aspects of military training were emphasized ashore: communications, weapons, and conditioning. Commands shouted from one boat to another
over the roar of Diesel engines result in confusion and sore throats, so all personnel
were trained again and again in semaphore and blinker. The passing of a test in the
former was made a condition precedent to a pass. In addition to learning to fire
their basic shoulder weapons, all men were trained in machine gun fire against aerial
targets in preparation for the day when the .3os or .5os on their craft might be their
only protection against hostile aircraft. Finally, to prepare the men for grueling
work with little rest, speed marches were held over the heavy sand roads. The short-
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ness of time and the necessity of training both on land and sea led to the not-regretted
result that spit and polish and close-order drill were definitely skimped.
On October 2 5, the Battalion finally received its first boats - only 2 7 badly
abused LCPRs and LCVs. They had been the training aids for many others and
showed the result of the earnest efforts of beginners, but they did provide a means of
training as a unit and also furnished valuable experience to the maintenance personnel in putting them into satisfactory condition and keeping them that way. On the
same day, a warning order came down from higher headquarters, indicating a prompt
move was in the offing for large-scale amphibian maneuvers to take place at Carrabelle, Florida. There was no time to waste, and maximum use was made of the
boats. Officers and boat crews of each company as a unit operated boats together for
the first time. Mechanics started what was to prove a three-year uphill struggle to
reduce the "dead line" of boats that always seemed a little too frail for the punishment
they received.
On November 3, after the companies had been running their own exercises for a
week, the Battalion ordered its first formal problem. Shortly after midnight, thirty
boats with carefully selected crews slipped out of Cotuit Harbor and proceeded down
to Hyannisport. A provisional rifle battalion composed of surplus boatmen marched
from Camp Candoit to the Hyannisport beach where they swiftly and silently embarked on the landing craft. The little convoy ran back to the westward, and as
dawn was breaking, landed in three waves at Waquoit. It was far from a perfect
combined operation, but it presented on a small scale examples of the problems
which could be expected in actual operations, and set the pattern for future intensive
training. As soon as the problem ended, all the boats were run to Falmouth where
they were loaded on flat cars for shipment to Florida.
The next four days were the turmoil that is always associated with a long rail
movement by an inexperienced organization. To the usual packing, crating, and
loading was added an emergency program of range firing of shoulder weapons.
Even the men who had never had preliminary marksmanship training were required
to fire for record, and the best that can be said for the resulting scores is that they
showed the need for such training.
At dawn on November 10, Camp Candoit was struck, and during the afternoon
the Battalion embarked on two trains, happy to exchange the frigid waters of Vineyard Sound for the reaches of the Gulf of Mexico, which all fondly expected to be
balmy and semi-tropical. Simultaneously, the 593d Boat Regiment ceased to exist,
and its 2d Battalion became the 1st Battalion of the newly-activated 533d Engineer
Amphibian R egiment under the command of Colonel Charles T. T ench. Companies
D, E, and F were renamed A, B, and C respectively, but there was no change in their
personnel, organization, or primary mission.

Shore Battalion
On August 8, 1942, the 533d Engineer Shore Regiment was activated at Camp
Edwards, Massachusetts, under the command of Major Bruce Russell. At the start,

Top: Shore engineers erect beach
markers and unroll strips of Somervell matting to provide a temporary
road for vehicles soon to be landed.
Bottom: The matting, of chicken wire
stiffened with soft iron rods, is
further strengthened with steel edge
strips and staked down to prevent
curling under the weight of the
heavily loaded trucks.

the Regiment was made up of but a dozen officers and no enlisted men, but by the
end of the month sufficient cadremen had been received to man the key posts in a
headquarters and in three shore battalions. Of these three battalions, the first was
later to become the Shore Battalion of the 53 3d EB&SR.
At the end of August, Colonel Charles T. Tench, a graduate of West Point in
1929, took command of the Regiment and Major Eldon F. Ziegler, also a Regular
Army man, was appointed his executive officer. In the middle of September, all of
the 1st Battalion of the 533d ESR was transferred to activate another regiment and
the Battalion had then to be built up anew. Capt. DeWitt L. McLallen, a West
Pointer who had been out of the service for more than fifteen years, took command
of the 1st Battalion, which by then consisted of five officers and sixty enlisted men who
had been transferred from the 532d Engineer Shore Regiment. Both officers and
men were comparatively new in service and were completely lacking in knowledge of
amphibian warfare. Their training in the branch of service in which they were to
serve went little further than the identification of the colored pieces of cloth known as
beach markers. With great enthusiasm, however, the cadre entered its new organization, and received the exalted ratings which generally fall to the lot of a cadre.
The training at Camp Edwards was primarily basic, but some conditioning,
engineer construction, and orientation in beach operations was included. Many in
the Battalion had received their first M-1 rifles, and a thorough course in rifle marksmanship with range firing was given priority. Interest in range firing, competitive
spirit, and pride in the respective companies was stimulated when the regimental
commander offered a three-day pass to the company making the best showing.
Since no general passes or furloughs were being allowed at that time, the offer was
18
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greatly appreciated and personnel showed great zeal. Company C proved to be the
winner, and it was not surprising that when the day upon which the passes ended
arrived, Company C also led the Battalion in number of men AWOL.
Training in construction was for the most part limited to carpentry, for heavy
equipment had not yet been drawn. Materials were scarce, but a fair knowledge of
their use was gained by building miniature models and by repairing existing camp
facilities. Instruction in driving and care of vehicles was given to all potential motor
pool personnel, and a limited number of drivers learned to operate tracked-type
equipment through the use of small tractors. Physical conditioning was not ignored,
for swimming and hikes were scheduled regularly. Most of the hikes were made to
Ranger Camp, seventeen miles away, where the men learned the advantages and
disadvantages of life in the open.
Beach training also was stressed, despite the lack of equipment and satisfactory
terrain. Many "dry runs" were held in which beach landings were simulated and
beach markers were set up, roads staked, dump sites selected, advance positions
established, aid stations located, and experiments made in many other phases of the
operation of a beachhead. Early knowledge of cargo handling was gained by the
Battalion in helping with experiments conducted at Sandy Neck. LCTs were decked
over, and a workable facsimile of a cargo ship was produced by using a Quickway
crane as a cargo boom. By this means familiarity was attained with ships' gear, cargo
gear, stowing of cargo, and discharge of cargo with both DUKWs and alligators.
Schools were put to full use, and cooks, bakers, and cobblers studied appropriate
courses. Approximately twenty men were sent to amphibian tractor school in
Florida, while others went to boat or navigation school. Special lectures and demonstrations in crew-served weapons filled out the courses of instruction.
For some time rumors had been rife of an impending reorganization and a possible move to a winter training site, and these rumors came true early in November.
The 533d Engineer Shore Regiment became the 533d Engineer Amphibian Regiment, of which the 2d Battalion had been the Ist Battalion of the 533d ESR. The
companies were redesignated as Headquarters 2 d Battalion, D, E and F, and the
Battalion prepared to become part of a regiment that apparently would be even more
unorthodox.
The move, it developed, was to Carrabelle, Florida, which caused general jubilation except for those who were familiar with northwestern Florida. It seemed that
the unit was being unusually well taken care of - Cape Cod in the summer and Florida in the winter - and there was some doubt as to whether Sherman was right.
Before moving out, the usual orders to clear all sick soldiers were received, and the
usual confusion of packing, crating, building of kitchen cars, and loading of vehicles
took place. It was the first major move for both battalions, and everything was done
the hard way. M ess sergeants and cooks later learned that their duties while aboard
a troop train were not insurmountably difficult, but at that time the consensus of
opinion was that no one would eat well enroute. Security regulations also were n ew
to the troops and caused some irritation, as when contact with civilians on platforms
was rigidly banned. Some trains were all Pullman, others largely coaches, but the
trip lasted only 48 hours and spirits were generally high.

CHAPTER III

Florida
The 533d Engineer Amphibian Regiment soon learned that Camp Carrabelle
was an orphan of the resort state of Florida. The terrain was flat and covered with
jack pines. The water had a high sulphur content. Snakes were numerous, and it appeared as if every farmer in the region used the roads as a playground for his hogs.
It was a rude shock to find that the balmy weather that had been anticipated was
very much absent, and many mutterings were heard that November was warmer in
Massachusetts than at Carrabelle.
The camp was more livable than the Ist Battalion had been accustomed to at
Cotuit. The barracks were standard 100-foot by 20-foot tar paper shacks with kitchens and showers nearby. There was not always enough hot water, and plumbing was
a thing of the past, but on the whole the facilities were adequate, and after mess halls
and day rooms had been dressed up, Camp Carrabelle became a satisfactory home.
Those northerners in the Regiment who had thought of Florida as a state completely filled with resorts, recreation, and bathing beauties suffered a rude disappointment. The nearest town, Carrabelle, was dismal proof that Tobacco Road was not a
figment of its author's imagination. To the north one passed through Sopchoppy and
other towns made up of a few shacks and a swarm of hogs, until Tallahassee was
reached, sixty miles away. There was a highway which ran in front of the camp,
connecting Apalachicola to the west with Tallahassee. The traffic was light and
bus service was, for all practical purposes, non-existent. It was soon obvious that
the Florida Board of Commerce would not be flattered to hear the opinion of the
newest residents of its northwest section.

, -----

Pier 2, Carrabelle, looking shorewards; boats of Boat Battalion Headquarters Company
in the foreground.
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A wave of LCPRs hits G Beach, Carrabelle, as a Shore Battalion bulldozer stands by; the
lower picture was snapped only 20 seconds after the upper, yet in that time the boat in the
foreground was completely emptied and its ramp raised ready to retract.
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The 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade, of which the new Regiment was a part,
was attached to the Amphibious Training Command with the principal mission of
training infantry divisions in amphibian warfare and a subordinate mission of gaining
as much training for its own units as it could on the side. When the Regiment moved
into camp, there was no infantry division present to be trained, which was most
fortunate, for much work had to be done.
The Shore Battalion was detailed to construct a suitable landing beach for the
loading and unloading ofvehicles. The best site available was low and marshy, and
required a great deal of fill. Since only native materials were available, the battalion
commander decided to corduroy the entire area. The work was divided among the
companies, and under supervision of the battalion engineer officer the first major
construction job began. One platoon of each company was set to work felling
and trimming logs. Another loaded and hauled the logs to the beach area, and the
third laid the logs and wired them. It was the Battalion's first coordinated effort, and
it worked out well considering the rough materials and the unsatisfactory nature of
the area. This loading beach stood up well in the suceeding weeks and proved that
the Battalion, after whose commander the beach was named, was capable of accomplishing much with few tools and materials.
In the middle of November the Boat Battalion drew a battered fleet of about 100
assorted LCPRs, LCPLs, and LCVs, powered by every known type of Diesel and gasoline engine, and the boat companies soon learned that there was nothing subtropical
about northwest Florida. The temperature averaged around 40 degrees during most
of the winter and occasionally dropped below 20, and these temperatures, while
afloat, were made to seem many degrees lower. Dog Island Sound, on which most of
the boat training took place, was extremely shoal, and all but a few beaches were so
flat as to be unthinkable as targets for a landing force. Even more important, there
was no surf except during high winds, so coxswains easily became over confident and
lax in their beaching and retracting. Among the assets of Carrabelle from the point
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Doughboys n1ove on the double from their assembly area to board a waiting wave of

LCPRs.
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Right: LCVs landing various
types of equipment - .from
top to bottom: Shore engineers
with beach markers and sled;
antitank gun section; 105
mm howitzer; jeep with radio.

Left: An LCVP "with a bone
in her teeth" towing a barrage
balloon.

ofview of the Boat Battalion were the three 1000-foot piers, one of which was assigned
to each letter company, and which made an ideal arrangement for boat administration and maintenance. It is true that some problems came near to failure before they
were even begun because of low tide, for some of the boats moored to the piers were
found to be high and dry, but on the whole the piers proved to be workable and satisfactory.
Before the maintenance sections had an opportunity to give the boats some sadly
needed maintenance, the ATC issued orders under which the boats were employed
to capacity in training exercises. In late November, combined training with the 38th
Infantry Division began in earnest, with the 533d working with the 14gth Regimental
l\1en from a heavy weapons company land sn1artly from an LCPR.

'•

' I

'I

26

HISTORY OF 533d EB&SR

D-4 dozer slithers down the ramp of a Bureau-type LCM; note emergency tow line
already fastened in case the dozer bogs down.

..

Combat Team and Division Troops. Generally speaking, the mission of the Boat
Battalion was to transport troops in accordance with prearranged problems, and the
Shore Battalion was to provide facilities, instruction, demonstrations, and advice.
Preliminary training instruction was given in chocking and lashing of vehicles in
landing craft, and through demonstrations and assistance the infantry soon learned
the best method ofloading, securing, and unloading their own equipment. They also
became familiar with the mission of the Regiment and its organization.
The Boat Battalion was also engaged in basic training for the infantry, and the
fact that the boats were called upon to train a regiment, whereas there were barely
enough to train a battalion, made the pressure pretty heavy. The usual schedule was
for a departure at o6oo, two hours before dawn, forK beach, and a return at 2000,
well after dark. During this time, the troops were instructed in the types of boats,
their general characteristics, and the number of troops each could carry. The next
step required troops to embark in the boats, take a turn on the Sound, and then to
make a simulated landing at the place where they had embarked. Full attention was
given to boat discipline, and to the requirement that the coxswain was in full command of his boat and all personnel aboard regardless of rank. This aspect of boat
discipline was one that caused trouble as long as the Regiment was active.
The second phase of the training consisted of running small problems, usually
consisting of an infantry battalion supported by a shore company. In these exercises,
the shore companies perfected their organization and technique in laying out and
marking beaches and supply dumps, construction af roadways using various types of
wire matting, directing the orderly movement of troops and equipment, and serving
as an information center, while the boat companies perfected their wave discipline,
navigation, piloting and maintenance. Each of the two battalions became familiar
for the first time with the work of the other, and it was soon learned that the closest
cooperation between them was essential in landing operations. Small exercises were
followed by larger ones, and from day time the operations were moved to night.
After about the third week, the confusion and the wet, cold misery of night landings
were unhappily familiar to all. The shallow water of the Sound produced a sharp,
Right: A small tractor gets a thorough
dunking as an LCV grounds on a
sandbar. Plenty of man power manages to extricate it.

After a cold Dog Island
dawn landing, a pair
of beach control men
check in by phone with
the Beachmaster's
CP as the crew of
a water-cooled .50 calibre antiaircraft machine gun scans the
sky for hostile planes.
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choppy sea, and the spray deluged the boats and their occupants. The necessity for
waterproofing became painfully evident to both battalions, and warm, dry clothing
reached a popularity never before attained by the uniform.
The boats had been in poor condition when received, and the lack of opportunity
for a complete overhaul gave them a bad start. Once in use, the boats had no rest,
and this virtually ceaseless operation on beaches protected by steep, hard sandbars,
placed an almost insupportable burden on the maintenance section, to which adequate tools and parts were unknown. The 533d met this situation by concentrating
as much responsibility as possible on the boat companies, and gave them all possible
personnel and facilities to do their own work, even if that meant infringing on the
sacred 3rd echelon reserve of the 563d Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion. The
other regiments of the Brigade complied with the echelon set-up, and there thus commenced a battle between the 533d and the rest of the Brigade that was not finally
resolved until the Regiment had been overseas for six months. By that time, the need
for unified control of operations and maintenance at the company level could no
longer be denied. The tremendous pressure that was cast upon the company mechanics at Carrabelle unquestionably developed in them an ingenuity and a resourcefulness which was the salvation of their companies when they were forced to operate
separately overseas.
In mid-December came the first large-scale maneuvers, in the first of which the
Regiment distinguished itself in landing the 149th Regimental Combat Team. The
big reinforced divisional problem was scheduled for the 17th, 18th, and Igth of
December, in which two full regimental combat teams were to be loaded during the
evening on the boats of the 53 3d and 59 3d, to move thirty miles down the coast under
the strictest blackout, and to land on a peninsula an hour before daybreak. The
embarkation of IO,ooo troops in nearly 300 craft went well; the beach was well
organized, all things considered; and the problem was off to a good start. In the
darkness between moonset and dawn, the Boat Battalion slipped badly. The Boat
Battalion commander in the lead boat had no information as to the effect of the
currents in the area, and relied too implicitly on an untested ancient radio homing
device, and he led the column past the peninsula before turning toward land. Once
on the prescribed last leg of the. course the flotilla could not be diverted. Daylight
disclosed a most appalling mess. Most of the boats had shot into the bay beyond R ed
Beach and were busily discharging their troops on islands and in mangrove swamps
in the vicinity of Live Oak Point. Some wave leaders realized the error and tried
28

Testing the beach
wire net as a barrage balloon and
its winch are unloaded from a
Higgins-type

LCM .

to unsnarl the tangle, but they were considerably hampered by an extremely effective
smoke screen which had been laid down by the amphibian chemical units. Some of
the doughboys who had plunged ashore with such elan that they could not be recalled andre-embarked had to march 25 miles to get back into the problem.
At the objective, Red Beach, a group of international brass hats, headed by the
late Lieutenant General McNair, commanding Army Ground Forces, awaited the
landing, stop watches in hand. At H hour plus an hour and a half, the anguished
liaison officers from the Brigade saw the first wave appear over the horizon, but when
the wave had beached and the troops had debarked, it was discovered that the shock
troops spearheading the landing were parts of a medical battalion and an ordnance
company which were promptly annihilated by the enemy. The second wave delivered the medium artillery of the Division, which was not only annihilated but had
its weapons turned to sea to await the arrival of the remainder of the landing force.
This was more than the brass hats could appreciate, and they left in disgust, thus
saving themselves the sight of even worse confusion.
The prestige of the Boat Battalion suffered a severe blow as a result of this fiasco.
But it had a healthy effect on the overconfidence of its leaders, and it convinced
higher authority that something more than a compass and a lead line was necessary
An umpire checks beach layout during landing exercise.
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Night loading; Top: a 2:Y2-ton truck climbs the ramp of an LCT; Bottom: a wave of LCPRs
with ramps up awaits the signal to retract.

On Red Beach a beach
control man "rogers"
for a signal from a
boat approaching an
ammunition landing
point.

if a pin-point landing under cover of darkness was to be made. From this debacle
stemmed allowances of taffrail logs, radio compasses, peloruses, night glasses, and
ultimately even radar. It further became evident that special navigation officers with
appropriately equipped boats were necessary, whose sole function would be to lead
the mission along a prescribed course, while the commander of the mission and others
in free boats could ride herd without concern for navigation. This system, born of
chaos, was used successfully throughout the war.
The maneuver was repeated a week later on a clear night in a strong northwest
wind with the temperature just above freezing. For many it was as miserable a night
as they had spent in the service, but despite the hazards of the weather, the problem
was a reasonable success and did much to rehabilitate the spirits and reputation of
the unit.
Meanwhile, Christmas had come and gone, and it cannot be said that the Yule
spirit was entirely rampant. The small city of Tallahassee, ill equipped to handle a
large body of men, was forced to close its restaurants to service men, and thousands
of men with passes in their pockets found themselves left at camp for lack of transportation. The Christmas dinner was good, however, and the break in the strict
training routine was most welcome.
During the month of January, the 38th Division moved away and the 28th
Division moved in. The break in divisional training was utilized fully for unit training. The Shore Battalion, whose confidence had not suffered a jolt in the divisional
problem, was shaken out of any semblance of overconfidence by innumerable
assaults on Dog Island, a flat, undesirable stretch of sand located in the Gulf just off
the coast of Carrabelle. No one could understand why any self-respecting program
would require the capture of the island. Nonetheless, problems went on and on
until the men claimed that they knew every grain of sand on the island and on the
beaches and bars which protected it. The Shore Battalion took turns in being shore

Another view of Red
Beach showing tractor
standing by to aid
stranded vehicles.
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Shore engineers quickly lay beach matting over the soft sands of Red Beach.

party and infantry, and although the problems lacked excitement and required that
all personnel wade ashore in water ranging as high as their armpits, much benefit
was derived by everyone - with the probable exception of Dog Island.
The Boat Battalion was also taking part in the daily attacks on Dog Island
and was learning valuable lessons in making up waves of boats, in handling waves in
narrow channels, and in timing the last run from the point of departure to the beach.
It should be added that prior to this time the shortage of boats was such that a wave
leader, in order to meet his commitment, was forced to steal a boat from another
wave that had already been made up. This practice, which was the father of tremendous confusion, finally disappeared during the Dog Island days. Of particular
value during this period to the Boat Battalion were the teachings of Lt. Peter R. G.
Worth, R.N., whose familiarity with the work of the commando beach parties in
France and Norway gave solid foundations based on actual experience to the beach
control sections, especially in salvaging stranded boats. To the Regiment as a whole,
this unit training period was invaluable, for it gave an opportunity to rectify the
deficiencies in training and standard procedures which had been mercilessly disclosed during the training with the 38th Division.
At the end ofJanuary, the Regiment furnished a cadre to form the 4th Engineer
Amphibian Brigade. The regimental commander stated, in handing out to the
subordinate units the requirements they would have to fill, that he demanded a good

High ranking French officers observe
the landing of the 28th Division on
Red Beach. Tear gas sprayed from
planes caused the donning of gas
masks.
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cadre and that it was not to be considered as an opportunity to dispose of misfits. This
order was obeyed in letter and spirit, and the Regiment felt ever after that it showed
exemplary generosity.
Shortly after the cadre had left, training began with the 28th Division, and it
progressed rapidly and smoothly throughout February, as the men and officers of the
Regiment had profited by the experience with the 38th Division. As far as the Shore
Battalion was concerned, training of this division was pretty much routine except for
the final divisional problem. To make sure that there would be no flaws in the final
show on Red Beach, a two-day rehearsal was held on the site. The dry run worked
out smoothly, and the Shore Battalion felt that it was ready for almost any emergency.
The Boat Battalion, remembering the Ides of December, was reasonably confident,
but determined to redeem itself. The rehearsal for the divisional problem produced
the only potentially grave accident when the LCPRs of the Boat Battalion commander
and the commander of Company C had a head-on collision while running at high
speed in the dark. One of the boats was completely demolished, and a high-ranking
observer was sent back to Washington with a fractured hand and a bilious opinion of
night aquatic maneuvers.
On the 4th ofMarch the divisional problem began with 181 boats. The embarkation of thousands of troops and hundreds of vehicles in blackout and the dark of the
moon left little to be desired. Each of the boat companies had a navigation boat, and
the executive officer of the Boat Battalion led the way. This time, thanks to the lessons learned in December, the first wave was but a few minutes late and directly at
the appointed spot on Red Beach, and the succeeding waves emerged from the blackness on schedule. During the day the boats returned to the near shore where they
reloaded, and the Shore Battalion proceeded efficiently to organize the far shore,
despite an early morning tear gas attack which resulted in considerable sneezing and
embarrassment on the part of those caught without their gas masks.
The boats left G Beach for the second time carrying the reserve combat team
on what looked like an easy routine mission. Shortly after sunset, however, the wind
backed from southwest to south and began to freshen sharply. By 2 I 30 the surf was

Colonel Tench (left) confers with
Brigadier General Ogden (center) and
Colonel Trudeau, Chief of Staff of
EAC, during the maneuvers on Red
Beach.
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the highest the Regiment had ever encountered. Prior to midnight, by use of lessons
learned from Lt. Worth, beached and partially swamped boats were pulled into deep
water. By this time a moderate gale was blowing on shore in gusts of 40 miles per
hour. The rain came down in sheets and torrents, and visibility was zero except
during bursts of lightning. The barrage balloons which floated above the landing
barges were an inevitable target for the lightning, and the flaming hydrogen and the
white-hot steel cables produced an eerie effect that few will ever forget.
As they retracted from the far shore, some of the boats lacked the power to

A mixed wave of LCVs and LCMs talies on its second load at G Beach a few hours before
the big storn1 broke up the 28th Division's n1aneuvers.

breast the seas and were forced back and driven ashore. Anchored cabin cruisers
becam e unwilling landing craft. Those boats that continued to struggle back to the
near shore were kept afloat only by pumping and bailing. Some passed inside Dog
Island, counting on the record high tide to clear the bars, and reached the shelter of
the Carrabelle River. Others more prudently stayed to seaward of the island, but as
sometimes happens to prudent men, the western point of the island could not be
weathered and many boats piled up there. By 0400 the wind had reached a force of
50 miles per hour and the breaking seas in the shallow sound were 20 feet high.
As the Boat Battalion fought during the night to keep its boats from destruction,
the Shore Battalion was pressed into service saving men and equipment from the
storm. At dawn the storm had subsided to a flat calm, dying as dramatically as it
had come to life, but the extraordinary fury of the seas left a souvenir in the form of a
large bell buoy, bottom side up, its dangers entangled in its mooring chains, mute
evidence of the storm's violence. Search parties were organized to patrol the shore,
lending aid to boat crews and passengers, and the boats that had survived wer e
formed into patrols to search the sea for disabled craft. Not a man was lost from the

AFTER THE BIG STORM
A power cruiser command
boat is shored up as a canal
is dug to get it back into
the water.

Landing craft and ex-yacht
strewn helter-skelter on the
sands of Dog Island.

Shore Battalion dozer cutting the canal to the boat
in the top picture.

A Coast Guard patrol craft
also wound up high and
dry.

~·'
J:.
-'-.,

~"'"''"""

=·../'

At D Beach troops practice passage of beach obstacles as a mine explodes at the water's edge.
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Regiment's boats or on the Regiment's beaches, but strewn along 27 miles of coast
line by ones and by groups were 39 boats of the 53 3d, some up among the trees, others
wedged against cottage porches, and still others just heaped together on the sand like
driftwood. As the two battalions and the 563d Maintenance Battalion worked together with tractor cranes and tackle, another valuable lesson in cooperation was
learned. It was more than 48 hours before all the boats were salvaged.
That same week the Amphibious Training Command was abolished and its
activities turned over to the Navy. A period of rumor-packed suspense followed,
during which the boatmen had visions of being transferred bag and baggage to the
Navy, and the shore engineers considered worriedly the possibility of becoming
infantrymen. But this suspense was soon ended when word came down that the
Regiment would move shortly to the West Coast and be committed to the Pacific
theater. After the storm, a few demonstration problems were held, mostly for the
benefit of directors of training films, and the boats were laid up and shipped back
to Cape Cod by rail.
Meanwhile, the training of two divisions had resulted in neglect ofbasic military
subjects, and major effort was turned to arms qualifications. The Shore Battalion
aided in the construction of a firing range and the entire Regiment went through a
thorough course of preliminary instruction, qualification, and range firing. The
highest individual score in the Brigade up to that time went to the honor of the Shore
Battalion, and the general improvement in percentage of qualification was gratifying.
Training for jungle warfare was also undergone, and the Shore Battalion put in considerable time on general engineer construction, especially fixed bridges.
The last seagoing exploit of the Boat Battalion in eastern waters came early in
April when a heterogeneous fleet of ex-power yachts from 50 feet to 23 feet over-all
were sailed to Fort Pierce on Florida's east coast and delivered to the Navy. There
was no time to make a series of leisurely daylight trips from port to port, so the little
flotilla cut straight across the corner of the Gulf to Clearwater thence down the coast to
Fort Meyers. A complete lack of spare parts and limited fuel capacity caused much
towing, but the boats were finally maneuvered through the Lake Okeechobee Canal
and up the inland waterway to Fort Pierce, 445 miles in four days.
On April 2, Colonel Tench relinquished command of the Regiment to Lt.
Colonel Zeigler, and departed for duty with the G-3 section at General MacArthur's
headquarters.
The next fortnight was again filled with the chores attendant upon a move.
Show-down inspections were frequent, and their necessity was evidenced by the length
of the lists of missing items. Unit training continued until the last possible moment,
but it was dovetailed efficiently with intensive packing, crating, chocking, and blocking. The lessons first learned on the move from Massachusetts to Florida simplified
the preparations considerably, and when at the end of the third week of April the
Regiment entrained, it was with far less confusion and followed by less complete
exhaustion than had been the case the previous November. It is quite possible that
the move was made the more easily because of the conviction of everyone that the
future station could not be anything but an improvement over Carrabelle.

CHAPTER IV

California
Easter week, the last week in April, 1942, found four trains rolling westward by
different routes, carrying the entire Regiment. Despite the variety of routes, all
elements required six days for the trip. It was a pleasant journey on the whole, and
the rest was enjoyed and well deserved by all. If boredom was occasionally experienced during the last day or so on the train, it was not surprising, but there was no
audible complaint on that score.
From the moment the Regiment detrained at Ford Ord, it became apparent
that it had moved to a far, far better place. The East Garrison was an exclusive
outpost of the Fort located a few miles to the east of the main post. If it was farther
from Monterey than the main post, it was nearer to Salinas and to San Francisco, so
there was little to complain about. The area itselfwas not unattractive; the cantonment barracks differed little from those at Carrabelle, but the mess halls, latrines,
post exchanges, movie theatres, and recreational facilities in general were a vast
improvement. After the isolation of Carrabelle, the proximity of Salinas, Monterey,
Carmel, San Jose, and even San Francisco made passes for the first time a real opportunity for enjoyment.
The Regiment had been given an alert date of July r, which permitted only two
months in which to correct as far as possible the deficiencies that had been made so
painfully evident at the last station. As a result, the time allotted for organizing the
new area was cut to the barest minimum. Although facilities were generally excellent,
those appropriate to our special requirements were distinctly lacking at Fort Ord and
when to this lack was added the uncertainty as to the future disposition of the Regiment, the establishment and carrying out of a realistic and comprehensive training
program was extremely difficult.
The entire tables of organization and equipment of an engineer amphibian regiment had been drastically revamped. Some of the changes were needed and intelligent, but many more removed essential equipment and personnel, and the over-all
result was so far below what experience showed was the minimum that it was hard to
believe that Washington had given any serious consideration to the lessons of Casablanca and the maneuvers in Florida. That was a bitter pill which could be charged

Left: the infiltration course at Harbeson City near Carrabelle provided as
realistic aforetasteof combat as could
be conceived without inflicting casualties on the trainees.

Right: Road march at Fort Ord as
seen from a liaison plane.
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off to army "snafu," but even more bitter was the change in name. The 53 3d
Engineer Amphibian R egiment had felt that its name reflected to some extent its
duties, but now the War Department dropped the word "Amphibian" and redesignated it the 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. This tongue-twisting title was
to be a source ot confusion and embarrass~ent throughout the war, leading as it did
to such corruptions as "Boot and Shoe" and "Boar and Shoat" Regiment. The
Brigade too was given a new name, h ereafter being known by the mysterious title of
3d Engineer Special Brigade. One rumor, perhaps the illegitimate offspring of the
navy rumors in Florida, had it that the Navy h ad forced the Army to drop the word
"Amphibian." More probably, however, the n ame was changed to assist certain less
40
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brilliant headquarters in Washington which continually found themselves confusing
engineer amphibian brigades with engineer aviation battalions.
Colonel Wayne S. Moore, a West Pointer with 23 years of service in the Corps of
Engineers, arrived at Fort Ord to take command of the Regiment. At this time he
found that heavy equipment for training Shore Battalion operators was in desperately
short supply. And the Boat Battalion boasted the occasional use of something over
sixty battered LCPRs and LCPLs, composing the entire fleet available for training
all the boat battalions of the Brigade - slightly more than one-tenth of their authorized strength. As a result, training programs directed to primary missions had to be
staggered by regiments, and a large portion of the time was devoted to secondary
matters or improvised substitutes. The field expedient and the simulated substitute
were called upon for assistance far too often to produce substantial results.
Conditioning was stressed throughout the stay at Fort Ord. Battalion speed
marches were an almost daily affair. Few will forget the five-mile-per-hour saunters
The training areas of Fort Ord dotted with scrub oaks had little in common with the
jungles for which the Regiment was trying to prepare.

~~~--~~~---------------~·
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Ship carpenters of C Company learn the rudiments
of boat building by constructing a dory in the
company street. At Saidor,
New Guinea, this dory was
traded to a PT squadron
for gunboat armament and
Inaintenance supplies.

along the dusty, steep trails that wound through the canyons of the training area, and
a ten-mile wading trip down the bed of the Salinas River is no less memorable. Physical fitness programs were initiated with such zeal that there might be some question
as to whether ultimately they built up the collective physique of the Regiment or tore
it down. An intensive swimming program was pursued throughout the summer and
well into the fall with the result that all but a handful of the men could swim fifty
yards. This was a considerably greater accomplishment than it would be thought
because of the surprisingly high percentage of non-swimmers that were found in the
Regiment. For this purpose, the pools at the Monterey and Watsonville Schools were
used to capacity with officers and men from college swimming teams giving expert
instruction; the out-of-doors pool at the Mission Ranch in Carmel was sometimes
used, and it was probably coincidental that the out-of-doors pool was employed
on the coldest days.
Specialists schools covering the subjects most essential to regimental operations
were carried on, but no longer could men be spared to be sent to distant schools, and
regimental or battalion classes were organized. Shore Battalion men took turns on
the few available tractors, graders, and shovels, and survey crews were given intensive
work - outs. Some explosives were available, and demolition men gained necessary
confidence in their tools. In the Boat Battalion, coxswains were drilled in compass
adjustment, dead reckoning, and piloting; enginemen tore down and rebuilt all
types of Diesel and gasoline engines which they might have to use in the future, and
tune-ups, emergency repairs, and temporary expedients were practiced and developed
on engines coG.led from barrels of salt water. All communications personnel spent
almost all free time b ecoming high-speed operators, and boat crews were trained
toward a target of at least six words a minute on blinker and semaphore.
For the first time an opportunity was had for an unhurried course of preliminary
marksmanship, and proficiency with all weapons was brought to a high level. Not
only did the Regiment qualify virtually roo per cent with the M-r rifle, but also gave
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every man familiarization firing with the carbine and '03 rifle. Every man also had an
opportunity to throw live grenades. Those to whom rifle grenades and bazookas
were issued under the current table of equipment had an opportunity to fire their
Desert antiaircraft range; Top: the firing line; center and lower left: the pup tent bivouac;
lower right: same during sand storm.
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weapons, and the Shore Battalion's platoon of 37 mm antitank gunners developed
into crack shots and learned to accomplish maximum mobility in difficult terrain.
The principal effort in training with weapons, however, was devoted to machine
guns. Three-quarters of the Regiment fired for record with a .30 calibre light machine gun, and as many also qualified on the .50 calibre as the limited supply of
ammunition would permit. Since indications were that the primary use of the
Regiment's automatic weapons would be antiaircraft or antiboat, much time was
devoted to shooting from ring-mounted guns on rolling landing craft at water-borne
sleds and towed kites.
The climax of weapons training came in the beginning of June when the bulk
of the Boat Battalion and approximately one-quarter of the Shore Battalion moved
by truck convoy 450 miles to the desert, just south ofDeath Valley. Those who made
that trip will remember it as a very vivid experience. The single firing line with
200 water-cooled machine guns stretched impressively for two miles in the sand, and
when a bomber-towed sleeve or a rocket swept down the line at speeds as high as 400
miles per hour, the roar of firing guns reverberated throughout the valley. In five
days of firing, the taxpayers' burden was increased to the extent of nearly a million
rounds of ammunition.
The firing, however, was probably the less memorable experience when compared
with life on the desert. The nearest water point was 35 miles away over a boulderstudded track that was open only once a day due to firing regulations, and so to each
man daily there was doled out one and one-half quarts of water for all purposes.
This meant precious little for shaving and bathing in view ofheat that reached as high
as 140 degrees during the daytime. To return after a day's firing to the bivouac and
to find that a sand storm whirling down the valley at a mile a minute had caused pup
tents to vanish and had filled with sand those which, by virtue ofbeing weighted down
with 200 pounds of rock, had withstood the blast- this was a cause of great discouragement, to put it mildly, and the language employed on those occasions was far from
mild. A trip to the mess line did nothing to raise the morale of the homeless, for his
chow was encrusted with sand and his coffee was halffilled with it. Nor was it any
comfort to retire to the blankets, for on many uncomfortable occasions a scorpion or
perhaps a "sidewinder" was found to be a willing, though uncongenial, bedmate.
The experience in the desert was valuable not only for the unquestionably fine
opportunity it presented to improve machine gunnery, but also for the training in selfdiscipline and self-preservation under difficult conditions. As the convoy moved
back from the desert to Fort Ord, a deep appreciation was felt by all for the "desert
rats" of the British Eighth Army who lasted four years in the African Desert.
-, The East Garrison was far from the sea, and to engage in periods of continuous
boat training it was necessary for the Boat Battalion to make several moves. Late in
May the entire Battalion moved into the tent area at the Presidio of Monterey for
their initial training on the Pacific. The Presidio is a beautiful post located only a few
hundred yards - most of them straight up - from the inner harbor of Monterey
where the landing craft were moored at the municipal wharf. Facilities for the maintenance sections were very unsatisfactory - one small shed which was almost com-
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pletely filled by even as scanty a supply of parts as was then available. Propellers,
shafts, and rudders could be serviced only by means of chain hoists hung from the
dock above a floating platform for the ship-fitters. The boats, in accordance with a
tradition which had become all too familiar, were in very poor condition when turned
over to the Battalion, and there were only about fifty of them after designating necessary salvage and control boats. There was only one boat left per section, so it was
necessary for each staff sergeant to take his four or five boat crews together in one boat,
and for each of the fifteen or twenty men to take turns beaching and retracting -_;:m
obviously unsatisfactory expedient.
The very first landing was enough to prove that the calmness of Dog Island
Sound had given no preparation for the surf that was found in the Pacific. The waves
reared up ten feet or more in height and fell forward with crushing power, pounding
the boats every time they retracted. There were three or four lines of breakers which
began several hundred feet from the beach, and it was necessary to retract stern first
with no turning until outside the outer breaker. The unfortunate boat that veered
too soon and was caught broadside was utterly helpless, and her deck was usually
stove in or her coaming torn off. Not even perfect handling was a guarantee of safety,
for frequently the engine hatch was stove in and the gasoline engine drowned out.
The beach control section had more than enough practice on salvage problems, and
the damage to the fleet was so great that even round-the-clock work by the maintenance crews was hardly sufficient to keep up.
On the next trip to Monterey a month later, thorough-going tests were given to
each platoon separately, each test lasting a day and a night. Each coxswain was
required to plot a different dogleg course of about 25 miles to Santa Cruz and then
follow that track alone. About midnight the platoon was given a skeleton field order
requiring a pre-dawn landing twenty miles away. The oral order of the platoon
leader and the execution of the problem were checked in detail, and after the initial
LVTs maneuvering on the dunes above :M onterey Bay.

Amphibian scouts at Moss Beach battle the surf in pneun1atic boats.

landing, the test was completed with operations in salvage technique, signalling, and
formation running. The results of these tests were most gratifying, particularly as the
daylight individual runs were all made against heavy seas and 20- to 30-mile winds,
with compasses that were an object of suspicion rather than of confidence and boats
that were badly mauled.
The only joint boat and shore exercises conducted by the Regiment were staged
during this period as part of a War Department training inspection of the Brigade.
Sixty boats left Monterey after sunset and bucked a vicious northwester for 25 miles to
Santa Cruz. Mountainous seas held the speed down to less than four knots, and the
condition of the boats was such that only 37 reached Santa Cruz, which was the near
shore. Among the boats that failed to reach the near shore, were three-quarters of
the wave leaders' boats and all of the salvage boats. With coxswains taking over the
waves and a couple of lieutenants handling everything else, the run to the point of
departure for the far shore went off smoothly. To save the day completely, a light fog
obscured the line of departure so that as the first wave retracted and headed towards
sea, enough of its boats could join the inbound third wave to make it complete. By
this means 35 boats made eight complete seven-boat waves, and the rather gullible
observers on the dunes were completely satisfied with the performance.
Thereafter, the sixty boats were permanently divided among the three regiments
of the Brigade. In order to use its twenty to the maximum, and also to simulate to
some slight degree the conditions that were expected to be encountered in the Southwest Pacific, the 533d abandoned Monterey Harbor with its wharves and gas pumps
and established a bivouac for one company on Carmel Beach under the shadow of
Pebble Beach Golf Course. Under those circumstances the bivouac could hardly be
called roughing it, and each boat company spent three enjoyable weeks on Carmel
Beach. Maintenance sections developed their own marine railroad construction
technique and actually performed all echelons of maintenance for the first time. The
only contact with battalion or regimental headquarters was by radio, and the communications section received valuable training in that way. Mess personnel too had
an opportunity to work without the benefits of a modern army kitchen, and the companies acquired an invaluable feeling of self-reliance. Taken as a whole, those three
weeks at Carmel Beach were at the same time as pleasant and as profitable as men in
any army ever spent.
Not far away at Moss Beach on Point Pinos the heavy surfbeat down upon a few

Left: Airviews of the camp built by
B Company on the beach at Carmel
under the Pebble Beach Golf Course.
Note the wakes of maneuvering landing craft in the upper picture and the
the dike of sand bags to keep the
spring tides out of the tents.

Night and Day on the Infiltration Course at Fort Ord.
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dozen volunteer amphibian scouts from all companies of the Regiment. Equipped
with small rubber boats that tilted with the surf dangerously day after day, these men
had all the tricks of the trade of the commandos and Marine raiders drilled into them.
By the end of the summer they were ready for any reconnaissance of enemy shores, for
demolition work, or for hydrographic surveys.
While the Boat Battalion was learning the eccentricities of the Pacific, the Shore
Battalion was polishing up phases of its training that were either completely new or
had been given insufficient attention previously. The shore companies had had such
a thorough work-out in beach work in Florida, especially during their innumerable
assaults on Dog Island, that their training could well afford to emphasize other aspects
of their expected mission. For instance, word filtered back from the 2d Brigade in
Nassau Bay, New Guinea, that amphibians were not infrequently required as reserve
infantry in repelling attacks or recapturing lost ground, and so platoon problems in
infantry tactics, both offensive and defensive, were practiced throughout the summer.
Particular emphasis was placed on target designation and fire control. In common
with all other troops all men of the 53 3d wriggled through the barbed wire and under
the whining machine gun bullets of a so-called infiltration course.
Though engineer troops may be given specialized functions, and though their
name may reflect that specialty, nevertheless, task force commanding officers consider
that engineers are engineers, and with lofty disregard of their specialty expect them to
solve any and all construction problems. To give the shore companies the groundwork of general construction and engineer planning, and, incidentally, to get their
hands for training purposes on certain rare and choice items of construction equipment held by the post engineer, arrangements were made for the Shore Battalion to
undertake certain portions of the post construction program. Company D took over
the grounds and swimming pool at the huge service club, completing rapidly and
successfully all-weather roads, parking areas, and a large concrete pool. E Company
built the difficult "Engineer Canyon" road in the rugged terrain south of the East
Garrison, while F Company built the so-called "Skyline Drive" in the same area.
From these and many other smaller jobs, the shore engineers acquired flexibility and
efficiency in handling equipment of all types. The primary mission of the Shore
Battalion was not, however, ignored, and at the same time continuous experiments in
sand stabilization and in beach marking technique were kept up.
The new tables of equipment included 12 DUKWs for the Shore Battalion, and
though only a few were available at Fort Ord, drivers and maintenance men worked
hard to develop the necessary skill to handle these truly amphibian truck-boats in the
rough surf at Monterey Beach and to repair the frequent failures in their complicated
mechanisms.
As a side line, the cargo platoons and their officers, along with a few men from the
Boat Battalion, were sent to Oakland for six weeks training in cargo handling at the
port-of-embarkation docks. Billeted in the grandstand of the Albany Race Track,
the m en received steady, on-the-job training in all phases of stevedore work. For the
first time they made the acquaintance of slings and pallets, winches and jumbos, and
at the end of the training the detachment contained many really competent hatch
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foremen, winch 'o perators, and signalmen. Some months later the Battalion was
unexpectedly assigned to ship unloading at Cape Cretin, and as a result of the training
at Oakland it made a fine record which could otherwise never have been achieved.
During this time, high hopes of early shipment overseas and discouragement
from postponement and delay were alternating in raising and lowering the morale
of the Regiment. The original alert date of July r was put off until September 15,
and thereafter it crept week by week into November. The main reason was shortage
of shipping. But inevitably it was rumored that the assignment to the Southwest
Pacific had been canceled or that the Regiment was to be converted to port companies. It was unavoidable that the Boat and Shore Battalions pursued separate training
programs and lost, to a certain degree, the cooperation that had developed in Florida.
The Boat Battalion had no craft larger than 36 foot LCPRs, and so could not carry
a single vehicle. There was, therefore, no feasible combined work with the Shore
Battalion that could be found.
In the early fall, the Boat Battalion was loaned to the 4th Marine Division to
expedite its amphibious training at Oceanside, California, nearly 400 miles to the
south. Flat cars were not available, so there was no way to avoid patching up the old
wrecks as well as possible and moving the boats on their own bottoms around Point
Conception, the Cape Horn of the North Pacific, to Oceanside. In the middle of a
black night made darker by a thick fog, 65 boats manned by A and C Companies
plowed and puttered out of Carmel Bay and headed for Port San Luis, r6o miles
down the coast. The shortage of equipment was the same old story; only a few boats
DUKWs maneuver in the surf of Monterey Bay.
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had charts and some had no compasses; three had taffrail logs and some lacked even a
tachometer. All of the boats, however, were well equipped with horseshoes or rabbits' feet, for by groups or separately they all turned up in Port San Luis. The next
day, the convoy rounded Point Conception, blessed by unexpectedly calm seas, and
made Santa Barbara without event. The rest of the trip via San Pedro to Oceanside
was easy, and the flotilla arrived in perfect formation and on schedule.
For two weeks there followed a constant grind of day and night landing problems,
carrying a battalion of Marines at a time. Everything was done according to the
Navy's ship-to-shore standard operating procedure. It was strange and troublesome
at the time, but later when the Battalion was called upon to operate under navy
jurisdiction, this training proved invaluable. The beach there was as bad or worse
than Monterey, for although the surfwas not generally as high, beach work was complicated by a four-knot current which flowed parallel to the beach and swung the
craft so that retracting was very difficult. The pressure on the salvage and maintenance crews was enormous but by working around the clock they kept their end up.
At the end of the first week 50 out of the 65 boats were operating, while the navy
boat group doing the same work had only eleven out of its 54 in operation.
In mid-September new alert orders were received which necessitated an immediate return to Fort Ord. It was a source of great reliefthat time did not permit a
return by water, so the boats were turned over to the Navy and the return to Fort
Ord was made by motor convoy. The Oceanside training was the last general work
afloat until the Regiment reached its first overseas station.
One additional nautical activity is worthy of note. As a climax to the longrange navigation training, three landing craft, two LCVPs and one LCM converted
to quarter nine men each and manned with crews from each of the three regiments of
the Brigade, took off from Monterey, California, for Cedros Island, Mexico, 700 miles
away. The purpose of this mission was to establish the feasibility of navigation in such
small craft and their adaptability to weather and to continuous operation over a long
period. The boats proceeded in convoy, but each was equipped with a complete
navigation set including radio compass, and each crew was made responsible for its
own navigation. It was fortunate that weather and sea conditions were perfect, for
the LCVPs, in order to carry enough fuel, were overloaded to the extent of a ton.
At the tiny Mexican fishing village where the boats paused to refuel, considerable
excitement was caused, but the four-day, non-stop trip was uneventful. The tour
finished at San Pedro, California, 500 miles from Cedros Island, making a grand total
of r 200 miles with only one brief pause to refuel. This dramatic demonstration of the
endurance of a small landing craft earned a "well done" from the Commander,
Western Sea Frontier and gave the Regiment a feeling of confidence that was much
needed on some of the first long-range missions overseas.
Back at Fort Ord the tempo of preparations for overseas movement increased
daily, although numerous delays and postponements continued to cause disappointment. In August a secret warning order directed that one boat company be alerted
for early movement to Cairns, Australia. At that time it appeared that the only way
the 3d Brigade could acquire landing craft when it reached New Guinea was to move
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them from the plant at Cairns, 500 miles across the Coral Sea and thence 200 miles
to Port Harvey. Company B was nominated for this mission and was brought to full
strength, reinforced with medics and an advance detachment from Boat Battalion
Headquarters and the other boat companies. Early in October the movement order
for the entire Brigade arrived from Washington. It broke the Regiment into four
shipment groups: B Company, Shore Battalion, Boat Battalion less B Company, and
Regimental Headquarters Company, with priority in that order. Final packing and
crating thereafter required the greater portion of the time and effort of the Regiment.
But some time was found for orientation lectures, command post exercises, and conditioning marches.
At last the total inadequacy of the tables of equipment had been appreciated in
the Pentagon Building, and authority was granted to draw or purchase innumerable
essential items ranging from course protractors to sawmills, and carloads of special
equipment began to flow in. This did nothing to simplify the packing and crating;
nor did the arrival of last-minute personnel replacements, who were as bewildered
and surprised to find themselves in a strange outfit as last-minute replacements generally are. By the time the Regiment departed it was overstrength and reasonably
well equipped, but it had not by any means acquired or been authorized all the equipment that past experience indicated was necessary.
Shortage of shipping continued to produce exasperating delays, and the stay at
Fort Ord was extended a few more weeks until at last on the 21st ofNovember, 1943,
the Shore Battalion and B Company entrained for Camp Stoneman and overseas,
while the balance of the Regiment left early in December.
The period between activation and embarkation had included only fifteen
months, of which barely a year had been spent in training of any sort. The sequence
of what training the Regiment had had would be grounds for a Section VIII discharge
for any conscientious plans and training officer: three months oflarge-scale combined
maneuvers at the outset; then eight to ten weeks of individual basic training; and
finally, improvised small-unit training with hardly an item of major equipment that
would be used in the theatre of operations. This training nightmare might be explained on the grounds that there was a pressing need to give infantry divisions amphibious training early in 1943, and that there was a desperate shortage of landing
craft and heavy equipment in the combat zones during that year. Yet, those explanations are not convincing in view of the fact that the divisions which the Regiment
trained in Florida did not see action until more than six months after the 533d did.
That operators and coxswains were able to familiarize themselves with D-8 bulldozers
and 5-ton crawler cranes and with LCMs and LCVPs in the very midst of their first
combat assignment is a tribute to their ingenuity and native ability. But the need
for such training under such conditions is a sad commentary on the schedule given the
Brigade in its state-side training, and led to the conviction that the engineer special
brigades were the illegitimate children of the War Department's training program.

CHAPTER V

At Sea, Outward Bound
It was a sobering day, that Sunday, November 21, 1943, when the Shore Battalion and B Company entrained for Camp Stoneman, California, staging area for
the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. It had been a comfortable stay at Ford Ord,
and most of the personnel of the Regiment had enjoyed themselves as far as life in the
Army can be enjoyed. Now, however, the first step had been taken toward separation
from family and familiar scenes and from the comforts of Western civilization and a
temperate climate.
Upon arrival at Camp Stoneman "processing" began immediately, and everyone
endured a sleepless, nerve-racking 48 hours. All personnel were required to have
physical examinations; a show-down inspection was had, and the shortages were
drawn and issued; censorship lectures were a necessity; and numerous odds and ends
had to be completed. At the same time, company clerks and headquarters clerks
were swamped in making out and completing final passenger lists and partial payrolls. The processing was completed in less than 36 hours, but everyone was too
exhausted to appreciate that a record had been set for Camp Stoneman.
At Fort Ord the rest of the Regiment, temporarily under the command of its
executive officer, completed all duties preparatory to moving to the port of embarkation. On December 2 Regimental Headquarters Company, and 8 days later the
Boat Battalion moved by train to Camp Stoneman. Immediately upon arrival, all
men went through a physical examination which was notable for its speed but not its
accuracy. The Boat Battalion remained at Camp Stoneman for twelve days, during
which a well-organized program was arranged, which when combined with the steps
of processing through which the Shore Battalion and B Company had passed in two
days, kept everyone constantly on the go. It was the general consensus of both the
Shore Battalion and the Boat Battalion, the former having been rushed through in
record time and the latter having remained for twelve days, that the port of embarkaUSS West Point, in peacetimes the SS America, which carried the Shore Battalion and
Company B from San Francisco to Milne Bay.
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tion was a bright spot in an army where efficiency and intelligent handling, trammeled only by the minimum of red tape, were all too rare.
The Shore Battalion, B Company, and elements of regimental headquarters
sailed on the West Point on the 23rd of November, 1943· The Boat Battalion with
Regimental Headquarters Company sailed on the Cape Perpetua on the 23rd of
December. The West Point was the former America of the United States Lines, the
largest ship built in the United States, 38,ooo tons of luxury liner. But that was in
peacetimes. Now, everything pertaining to luxury had been stripped from her and
every available foot of space, plus a few feet that were not available, was used for
troops and their equipment. In the same way, the Cape Perpetua, a C-3 type Kaiser
ship, was far from the cruise ship of which many had dreamed. She had made one
or two trips to the South Pacific as a cargo ship and had just returned from the Kaiser
yards after having been converted to a troop carrier.
In the absence of enemy attack, the crossings to New Guinea differed only to a
slight extent. Once aboard the ship, strict discipline was the rule and had to be, in
order that so many men could be efficiently handled in space designed for so few. On
the West Point were representatives of all branches of the service: sailors, soldiers,
marines, nurses, Red Cross workers. On the Cape Perpetua the personnel were all
from the 3d Brigade. But on both ships the story was the same, crowding and more
crowding.
The first duty, once aboard ship, was the billeting of personnel. After this,
especially difficult on a ship with inexperienced transportation corps personnel,
came the establishing of necessary details. A guard had to be organized, with scores
of posts mostly to keep the army passengers from trespassing on the choicer regions of
the ship. KP was, of course, inevitable. Compartment cleaners, garbage disposal,
safety watches in all compartments, a medical detachment, a PX detachment, gunners to assist the skeleton navy gun crews - these and many other details had to be
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selected and organized. The location of companionways, lavatories, latrines (aboard
ship only the most dogged GI refused to refer to these as "heads"), the location oflife
rafts, and general orientation were more tasks that had to be disposed of immediately
upon embarkation.
The Golden Gate is a beautiful sight, but not a happy one when outward bound.
The decks were lined with Gls already homesick, wondering when and if they would
see those friendly coasts again. Long after the mountains of California had dropped
below the horizon, many men could be seen leaning on the rail looking astern, silent.
With so many men in such cramped quarters, however, introspection could not long
survive, and it was not long before conversation was loud and general, with particular
emphasis placed on rumors. Destination, of course, was the great question mark, and
there were those who insisted that the ship was bound for China or Africa or Attu;
one rugged individualist had it direct from headquarters that the ship was bound for
Dog Island Sound where further amphibious training would take place on G Beach.
Rumor mongering was probably the first extra-duty activity, but it was soon
replaced by that most favorite of all army sports-shooting craps. There is very
little to do for the men who are not on detail, and very little room to do it in, and very
little to do it with. Most of the time was spent on deck reading, playing cards, swapping rumors, or, most frequently, rolling dice. It was too hot after the first day or so
out to stay below decks. Occasionally a rumor of a threatened Japanese attack would
bring everybody on deck, and at those times even the most stubborn would conscientiously strap on his life jacket. A diversion of particular interest was experienced on
the West Point when in a radio broadcast the Japanese announced the sinking of the
USS West Point with a tremendous loss oflife. This report was most amusing at first,
and everyone looked around smiling until someone happened to notice that the
Japanese had announced the sinking at the ship's exact location. With or without
such reports, however, frequent abandon ship and air raid drills were held throughout
the voyage.
At night, when all portholes and hatches were secured, the heat below decks was
terrific - I 26° in some holds - and many chose to lie on the hard steel deck rather
than endure the heat on the bunks below. Everything on shipboard was accomplished by standing in line. Fresh water was available for limited periods twice a
day, and the man who happened to be reasonably near the head of the line would be
assured of some water. The food was not plentiful, but then, under such inactive
conditions in such heat, appetites were not great. There was a post exchange
aboard, but in that case the line was almost prohibitive, and on the Cape Perpetua the
PX itself was closed down for some days as a punitive measure, a procedure which
caused considerable justified hard feeling on the part of all passengers.
The days passed slowly, and even the celebration traditional upon crossing "the
line" could not break the boredom for long. Ennui was worse on ;the Cape Perpetua
which took 23 days for the crossing, whereas the swift West Point was a I 2-day ship.
The R egiment almost welcomed the little yellow atabrine tablets when they first put
in appearance, for they indicated that the end of the voyage was nearing and also
conclusively spiked all incorrect rumors as to its destination. The pills were bitter
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to those who insisted on tasting them, and after a few had been swallowed, many of
the men acquired a dislike for them that was to cause trouble to them and to their unit
for the next two years.
Two to three weeks at sea with no diversions, no deck tennis, no swimming pool,
no dancing, no school teachers on vacation are a far cry from peace-time cruising,
and there were few who were not up early on the morning the ship entered the China
Straits leading into Milne Bay. New Guinea is lovely when seen from a distance, and
the series of small islands, mountainous and heavily jungled, through which the narrow channel winds into Milne Bay, are noted for their beauty. Those who looked for
"plantations" reminiscent of the old South were disappointed, for only one or two
buildings worthy of the name could be seen. As the ship entered Milne Bay, admiration of the natural beauty of the place gave way to awe at the extent of the American
war effort. Milne Bay is a 20-mile long inlet whose water is deep almost to the shore,
and it was filled with literally hundreds of ships. Many a landlubber found it hard
to believe that there were that many ships in the entire world, much less in one desolate harbor in the Southwest Pacific. As the ship worked carefully along the shore,
ships could be seen moored so close as to be partly concealed by the jungle foliage
behind them. Moving behind could be seen the familiar army vehicles of all sorts,
throwing up clouds of dust, the same dust which in the heavy tropical rainfall became
the mud which was to make life miserable in months to come. To those troops who
stayed aboard ship for a night or more, it was a surprise to find that when darkness
fell the entire base was lighted as brightly as any city in peace-time. They had left a
blacked-out San Francisco a few days before and now, with the Japanese within easy
bomber flight, blackout was a thing of the past. As the 53 3d became more experienced in the theatre, it too learned that the time lost by blackout was not justified.
Base A representatives came aboard the West Point with instructions for debarkDense jungle and deep water join to provide excellent concealment for landing craft.

PT crews supplement the jungle concealment with camouflage nets at their base on the
southern shore of Milne Bay.

ing troops and with information on bivouac areas. Early on the r rth of December,
DUKW s came alongside and transported the Shore Battalion to an area which
had been designated for their camp. In accordance with the standing Base policy,
the site was virgin jungle, the theory being that engineer troops can improve such
areas more easily than others. In this case, however, the lack of equipment presented
some serious problems. Fortunately, the 563d Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion
was comparatively well established nearby, and they cooperated to the extent of
landing hand tools, and the work of creating a camp site began. It had been hot
aboard ship, but it soon became apparent that nothing could compare with the heat
of heavy jungle when one is wielding an axe or machete. Troops were cautioned to
take frequent breaks, but despite this there were some cases ofheat exhaustion. Orientation lectures had pointed out the frequency of heavy downpours of rain, and so
every effort was made to clear tent space and by nightfall the entire Battalion was
under canvas.
"C" rations were issued for three days pending unloading ofthe TAT equipment,
and the improvement of the camp continued, as kitchens, latrines, and the area in
general had to pass rigid inspections by higher echelons. The troops soon learned
that the pictures they had seen in magazines and newsreels of unshaven, half-dressed
soldiers did not depict troops of General Krueger's Sixth Army, and proper uniform
and adequate mosquito defense were emphasized.
Speculation as to how and where the Battalion would be employed was widespread, and since the engineer equipment was not expected for several weeks, there
was some thought that it might be used as infantry. Orders were soon received to
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construct a water system to supply the section of Base A in which the bivouac was
located, the plans calling for erection of a 20' x 20' x 6' concrete reservoir, installation
of a pumping station and the laying of 4IOO feet of line with necessary plumbing
fixtures. Work began immediately upon this project and, as might be expected,
progress had just begun when on December I 8 orders came down directing the
Battalion to draw equipment from the local depot and prepare to move forward as
soon as shipping could be arranged. The order did not relieve the Battalion from
working on the water system, so a deal was made to have troops from the 543d take
over the project in case the movement should take place before it was completed.
The regimental commander with an advance party flew to Finschhafen where it was
learned that the Battalion would be employed at Sixth Army's advance shipping
point from which supplies would go forward to the Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and
Saidor operations. More precise information was not then available, but an area was
designated for the Battalion on Cape Cretin, a few miles south of Finschhafen, and
the immediate future seemed to have been settled.
Meanwhile, B Company had been able to obtain little or no information as to its
future. The original task of moving LCVPs 500 miles across the Coral Sea from the
assembly plant at Cairns to New Guinea was canceled because the Navy regarded
such a trip as impossible for craft as small as LCVPs, and there is little doubt that it
would have been not only dangerous but extremely wearing on both men and boats.
Furthermore LCVPs were not in as great demand as they had been a few months
previously because LCMs were at last being assembled at Milne Bay. GHQ without
looking into the needs of the Brigade yielded to the request of Seventh Fleet and
ordered B Company to Cairns, Australia, to train with the 6th Australian Division, but
copies of the order never reached Base A or Sixth Army; so a wall of indifference met
all attempts to get shipping for the Company. After two days aboard ship in the harbor,
the Company was debarked and instructed to put up a temporary camp. In the
absence of specific orders, it seemed best to shop around for transportation to Cairns,
and it was not long before a ship, the Cape M eers, was discovered which was bound
for Cairns and which could and would embark the Company ifits I500 cases of equipment could be loaded by I 500 the next afternoon. As usual the transportation corps
could not offer any assistance, but a DUKW company was located and agreed to loan
a few DUKWs to transport the equipment to the ship. A further headache arose
when the first DUKW-load of equipment reached the ship a quarter of a mile off the
shore and it developed that neither the ship nor the transportation corps could
furnish winch operators. Men were quickly found in the Company to man the
winches and to operate the crane ashore by which the equipment was lifted into the
DUKWs. Loading of all the equipment and troops was completed ten minutes before
sailing time, and on December I 6 B Company headed out to sea, Australia bound.
A month later the Cape Perpetua dropped anchor in Milne Bay. She remained
just long enough for A Company to debark in a rush without a solitary item of equipment outside of the men's barracks bags and then sailed out through the D 'Entrecasteaux Islands to Melauna Bay, Goodenough, wher e on January I 6, R egimental
and Boat Battalion Headquarters Companies and Company C were set ashore.

The Shore Battalion's Command
Post at Milne Bay, December 1943.

CHAPTER V I

Company B in Australia

I·

Fair weather blessed B Company on its trip from Milne Bay to Cairns, but a
storm blew up aboard ship which caused considerable inconvenience. The day
before the ship was due at Cairns, the Captain disclosed that his orders actually were
to go to Brisbane, which would mean a 1200-mile train ride for his passengers. Luckily the Boat Battalion CO who had proceeded to Cairns by air learned of this and
through Colonel Tench at GHQhad the Cape Meers reordered to Cairns. The Captain, however, was a man of strong will and decided to split the difference by putting
into Townsville 220 miles south of Cairns. On December 19 troops and equipment
were unloaded and transferred to Armstrong Paddock, a former race track converted
into an Army casual camp. The unloading was not expedited when the Australian
stevedores threatened to strike the whole port because the troops, confident after their
successful initial stevedoring venture at Milne Bay, undertook to work the ship during
the frequent tea and luncheon breaks, without which the stevedores were lost.
After a day or so in the paddock, B Company loaded on to an Australian train
bound for Cairns, and, after a trip of nearly fourteen hours at a brisk speed of about
fifteen miles per hour, Cairns was reached at 4 o'clock in the morning. Army trucks
were available, which completed the journey to the bivouac area fourteen miles north
of Cairns, where the troops were unloaded and settled down to wait for the sunrise.
In a few days, Camp Wallaby, the first and only home of men of the 53 3d on Australian soil, was reasonably well settled. On Christmas Eve, boat crews were sent to
Cairns, where they took over sixty brand new and fully equipped LCVPs from the
41 1th Engineer Base Shop, which had been assembling boats there since mid-1943.
It is an interesting commentary that the first boats which the Regiment obtained in
new condition were received after it had arrived in the theatre of operations. The
boats were brought from Cairns around to the B Company anchorage, a small bay
about a mile and a half from Camp Wallaby, and were made ready for heavy use.
New Year's Eve soon rolled around and brought with it a generous beer issue.
For the first time, the Aussies began to drop in, pay their respects, and, perhaps incidentally, to enjoy an American cigarette and a free beer. As the evening wore on and
the beer supply began to dwindle from determined onslaughts, slight differences of
opinion began to crop up between B Company and its "down under" allies, with the
result that customers began to straggle in to the dispensary, and the straggle became a
flood about midnight. It was noted that the victor and victim of these affrays would
go together to the dispensary and then return good friends to the tent for further
debate and beer. From that night on, the medics were convinced that Australian beer
was not conducive to quiet, philosophical discussions.
The first training was with the Ist Australian Beach Group, a unit new to the
Australian Army and somewhat similar in purpose to the original Engineer Shore
Regiments of the U.S. Army. After several weeks ofbeach training work consisting
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ofloading and unloading equipment and supplies, a practice dawn landing was held,
on the basis of which Australian I Corps headquarters decided that the training of
the Beach Group had progressed sufficiently for them to undertake combined exercises
with an infantry division. Similar beach training was then started with the 6th
Australian Infantry Division, veterans of Greece, Syria, and North Africa, culminating in maneuvers in which the Company and several Australian transports embarked
and landed the r 6th Brigade on Bramston Beach, sixty miles south of Cairns. The
maneuver required several days and was most successful.
The final problem involved a landing of the r gth Brigade at Port Douglas after
a night run of some forty miles. This maneuver again was highly successful, although
shortly before H Hour it was discovered that an error had been made in the exact
location of the target beach, but the miscalculation was discovered in time and a
landing was made on schedule.
Meanwhile word had come from Brisbane that three LCMs and three 45-foot
picket boats were available there, so personnel were flown, as soon as air priorities
were available, to take them over before they should be assigned elsewhere. On the
return voyage, the fair weather that had favored the Company ever since they left
the Golden Gate deserted them, and they had to ride out a hurricane at McKay.
No damage was suffered by the boats or the crews, and they arrived safely at Camp
Wallaby.
The Company was alerted for movement to New Guinea on March 2 r, and by
the 28th packing and crating were completed. There followed, as usual, a long and
exasperating series of delays. Although ships were leaving Cairns periodically, the
transportation corps could not find space for one company. It became necessary
to set up a training program with refresher courses in communications, weapons firing,
navigation classes etc. Boat formation practice was held, and the maintenance section had an opportunity to try some of the improvements that time had not permitted
in the past. There was time too for some swimming or fishing on the Great Barrier
Reef and for baseball games between platoons and with the Aussies. Week-end
recreational convoys were made up, which carried troops to Innisfail and to the
beautiful mountain resort at Kurranda, the Hotel Fitzpatrick. On some occasions
beer and fried chicken were available, bringing a very welcome bit of home.
In May there was still no shipping space available to New Guinea and the Company, as befitted its apparently permanent status, moved into barracks in Cairns
that had been formerly occupied by Base Section personnel. At last in June the
Company was ordered to store the LCVPs in a warehouse. This not inconsiderable
feat was accomplished neatly and tidily and was completed just in time to r eceive
orders to transfer them to another warehouse. Although irritating, it seemed as if at
last the move to New Guinea was drawing near. This optimistic conviction found
support in a radio message from Brigade stating that an F boat was enroute to Cairns
to transport the Company. When the transportation arrived, however, and was
discovered to be a gg-foot ship with no troop accommodations, spirits hit a new low.
But realizing that this might be the only m eans of getting up to the combat zone, the
men quickly built bunks for approximately roo men, and thus the entire Company
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could be moved in about four round trips. It was decided also to send two of the
picket boats and an LCM under their own power across the Coral Sea in convoy with
the F boat. The convoy encountered heavy going on its 455-mile open sea trip, but
arrived at Milne Bay in New Guinea in good order.
After a trip by the F boat and a C-4 7 transport plane had moved a quarter of the
Company, a Liberty ship put into Cairns enroute to New Guinea. Higher headquarters advised that there was no space on the ship, and among the lower echelons
of command it was felt that a 4th of July dance at the Red Cross was even stronger
reason for not loading on the Liberty. Disregarding both, the balance of the Company
finally completed loading on the ship about midnight ofthe 4th of july. On july 13,
the Liberty ship dropped anchor at Finschhafen and B Company had returned to the
regimental fold. The days of B Company as an independent detachment were at an
end, but many retained very pleasant memories of Australia.

Our Allies from. " Down Under" unloading supplies at Green Island.

CHAPTER VII

Cape Cretin, Goodenough Island
and Milne Bay
It is necessary now to pause and make some explanation of the distribution of the
Regiment at various spots throughout the Southwest Pacific. In mid-December of
I943, B Company was enrou te to Australia; the Shore Battalion was at Milne Bay;
and the Boat Battalion was about to set sail from the port of embarkation. It was
several months before the Regiment was concentrated within the space of a few miles,
and it will be necessary to follow separate elements and then return, in point of time,
to review the activities of other units.
In the latter half of I943 the Japs were driven from New Georgia and from the
Lae-Finschhafen area of New Guinea, and their main line of defense then became the
line running from Wewak through Madang and Cape Gloucester and Rabaul to
Bougainville. It was MacArthur's consistent policy to by-pass strong Japanese concentrations, but this line stood squarely across his path and there was no way to avoid
piercing it at some point. As he progressed westward along the New Guinea coast,
the Vitiaz Strait between the western end ofNew Britain and Finschhafen would have
to be hi~ main supply route. To make this route safe, the Japs on the western half of
New Britain had to be destroyed or driven eastward, and so it was decided to pierce
the line at Cape Gloucester, whereas Wewak, Madang, and Rabaul could be bypassed, ultimately to become nothing more than self-managed Jap prison camps.
Part ofBougainville and the Admiralties and Emirau were to be seized to seal the trap
in the eastern Bismarcks and to bring our patrol aircraft within the range of the
Carolines. The offensive, in accordance with this strategy, began in November,
I943, with the Marine landing at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville, cumulated
strength early in December when the I I 2th Cavalry seized Arawe on the southwest
coast of New Britain, and moved into its climax when the Ist Marine Division swept

A Jap battle flag is
inspected outside the
Shore Battalion CP at
Cape Cretin.
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ashore on Cape Gloucester on the day after Christmas and the I 26th Regimental
Combat Team ofthe 32d Division secured Saidor, Ioo-odd miles beyond Finschhafen
on the New Guinea coast early in january.
The comparative ease with which these objectives had been seized caused MacArthur to accelerate his schedule for seizing the Admiralties and for starting his drive
toward the Philippines via Hollandia. To meet the accelerated schedule it was
essential that the 3d Brigade units be employed without waiting for full equipment
or normal orientation in their new climate and surroundings. Accordingly, on the
4th of February, the 533d was assigned the mission of taking over the beaches and
the water-borne support of the Saidor and Cape Gloucester task forces, which mission
was to begin on or before March I. Considering that these areas were 425 miles
forward of Goodenough Island where the equipping was less than half accomplished
and that little more than three weeks was allowed within which to begin that mission,
the Regiment was confronted with a rather difficult problem. Colonel Moore decided that the best way to handle the situation was to move his command post to
Finschhafen and to give the assignment at Saidor to the Shore Battalion less F Company, with C Company for a boat unit. Since the Gloucester mission entailed more
long distance small-boat supply and less tonnage across the beach, that job was given
to the Boat Battalion less Companies B and C and with F Company added.
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Cape Cretin
The Shore Battalion at Milne Bay was alerted for forward movement, and on
December 21 E and F Companies plus detachments from D and Headquarters boarded the Liberty ship Josiah Earle headed for Cape Cretin. On Christmas Eve, the
ship steamed into Dreger Harbor and the troops disembarked at once. The first
night was spent in a coconut grove opposite the future headquarters of Sixth Army
where the usual insects, the propensity of jungle hammocks to turn over, and an air
alert contributed little to a restful night.
Christmas Day was not as the songs and stories would have it. The troops were
awakened early so that the maximum use could be made of the daylight, and some
returned aboard the ship to unload. The balance were faced with a two-mile hike
which was to be followed by a day devoted to clearing the jungle for the battalion
area. Turkey, eggnog, Christmas trees, and the other inseparable adjuncts to December 25 were simulated; members of the Battalion ate their lunch on the ground in
the shade of coconut trees and·substituted cans ofmeat and beans for the more elegant
repast. For those who were not too tired to take the trouble, coconuts could be
opened, providing milk and an enjoyable dessert.
Fortunately, several days were allotted for making the camp, an experience
which was extremely rare, for as a general rule the Regiment found that it was
expected to move into a virgin area late one night and begin efficient operation at
daylight. Two D-4 tractors cleaned the area and improved the native trail leading
to the site. Two major problems were immediately encountered- water and latrine
facilities. A temporary answer to the water problem was found in a neighboring
detachment of Seabees, the 40th, who very kindly loaned a water trailer to the Battalion. The second problem was not as easily solved, for the water table was so near
the surface of the ground that every hole dug for a latrine filled rapidly with water.
Finally, coconut log cribs were built and dirt filled in around them to provide storage
space. At first the cribs were sprayed with Diesel oil and burned out daily, but this
scheme had to be abandoned when someone, more zealous than thoughtful, burned
out the latrine when it was in use, seriously injuring three occupants. By frequent
moves, careful spraying, and thorough screening, however, this problem too was
satisfactorily solved.
One water trailer did not go far among several hundred men, and so efforts to
obtain a better supply continued. A well was dug in the hope of locating an underground stream, but only seepage and a small trickle of water was obtained. To
facilitate the flow of water, a charge of dynamite was used which worked in reverse after the explosion even the trickle had ceased. Headquarters Company was then
presented with the problem. By moving to approximately 150 feet from the ocean's
edge and by using a ditching machine to dig a well, an adequate supply of water for
all purposes was obtained. Showers and laundry facilities were constructed, and
when pipe became available, the water was brought to all Company kitchens. Heads
for the showers were obtained at high cost; to obtain them it was necessary to trade
some of the precious whiskey which had been brought from the States, but even so
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steep a price was justified by the enjoyment that the showers gave the Battalion and
the neighboring units.
"Washing Machine Charlie" taught the Battalion another lesson which had not
been taken very seriously in state-side training; he made it very fashionable to be the
owner of a covered foxhole. After "Washing Machine Charlie" had paid a second
visit, it was discovered that no foxhole, however comfortable, was fashionable unless
it was in close proximity to the owner's cot. Enforcement of the order requiring foxholes for all presented no problem.
Early in January the remaining elements of the Shore Battalion arrived from
Milne Bay with engineer equipment, and were pleasantly surprised to find their area
all cleared and, relatively speaking, luxurious. Enough time had been permitted
for establishment of the area, but the air raids and the fact that the Aussies were
battling Japs at Fortification Point not too many miles away, kept the war from
moving far into the background. Since the Battalion and its equipment were now all
assembled, several conferences were held with the Sixth Army Engineer and the officer
in charge of the forward shipping point. An agreement was reached whereby the
Battalion would supply the shipping point with 500 men and supervisory officers,
with a view to taking over the entire operation of the supply beach which was then
being operated by 542d EB&SR. The remainder of the Battalion was to be given
engineer construction work ranging from heavy road construction to carpentry and
electrical wiring. It was a heavy schedule that lay ahead, but the days passed more
rapidly when full, and there was a real satisfaction after training for so many months
to be making at last a direct, albeit non-combat, contribution toward winning the war.
The training and experience in beach work, and particularly the limited training
gained on the docks at San Francisco, enabled personnel to carry out their duties like
veterans, and it was not long before the battalion commander was made beachmaster. In addition to his own command, he had supervision of a port company,
truck company, DUKW company, and a boat company of the 542 d EB&SR. The
shore companies organized hatch crews out of their utility cargo platoons, and it was
not long before these crews were putting more tonnage overside than crews from the
more experienced port company. The shipping point served as an experimental
laboratory, and various combinations of hatch crews, lighterage, trucks, and labor
were tried in order to find which would produce the greatest net result. The experience gained at this time was a sound basis upon which future requirements were estimated. It is interesting to note that it was here discovered that nearly as much tonnage could be handled in three six-hour shifts as could be handled in three eight-hour
shifts because of the time lost in feeding when the longer shifts were worked.
During January and February approximately 35 cargo ships of all kinds were
discharged at Cape Cretin with an average daily tonnage of I ,350, the record day of
which showed a tonnage of 2, I I o. These figures work out to an average of seven tons
per hatch hour, which is exceptionally good over a p eriod of two months and may be
attributed to an excellent beach, quiet water, short haul, and the enthusiasm which
arose from doing the real thing at last. Not even frequent raids nor near misses diminished this enthusiasm.
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The Battalion also had charge of loading the landing vessels which were supplying the Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and Saidor task forces. This work was kept
separate from unloading, and since an extreme shortage of LSTs and LCTs existed,
the work was always performed under pressure of time, and required most efficient
coordination. The LCTs were used on the run to Arawe and the LSTs to Cape
Gloucester and Saidor. Approximately five LCTs were loaded each week and ten
LSTs, the average tonnage per week being about 56oo tons. In loading these craft,
landing jetties built by the 4oth Seabees of coral and coconut logs were used, but a
great deal of maintenance was required prior to each loading operation, and the maintenance was the Battalion's responsibility. Full-time use of two dozers with carry-alls
was necessary to keep the jetties in workable condition. Twelve DUKWs had been
assigned to the Battalion and proved to be very valuable at this time. Despite limited
training in their operation and maintenance, an average of nine were kept operating
at all times, and in emergencies all twelve were put in workable condition. Some of
the drivers learned the hard way, having to take the cargo at ship's side while the ship
was being bombed. Less spectacular but equally essential was the contribution made
by the DUKWs in prompt disposal of the garbage.
The defects in the state-side training program were felt most severely at this
time; in the operation and maintenance of heavy equipment, the Battalion did not
feel at ease. This was directly the result of lack of training with the equipment and
the fact that the Battalion was issued many items from a special list ofheavy engineer
equipment shortly before going overseas and had had no opportunity even to familiarize itself with their use. With some 2 I dozers, five cranes with attachments,
carry-alls of all sizes, dump trucks, well drill, and generators, major jobs were assigned
to the Battalion despite the fact that it had far too few men trained in the use of that
equipment. These assignments included preparation of a staging area with the
necessary road network, sawing of timber, erecting buildings, water systems and
electrical works for the Sixth Army. These tasks were undertaken by the men of the

Pythons, big and little,
killed in the Shore Battalion's bivouac at Cape
Cretin.
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Battalion not already assigned to the beach, with little more than courage and ingenuity. The situation was such that anyone who, through curiosity, stopped and looked
at a piece of equipment found himself immediately designated as its operator.
The Battalion motor officer was noticed during these days to be pulling out large
handfuls of hair and talking in his sleep. It was necessary to train operators, maintenance personnel, and supervisors on the job, and the motor officer devoted at least
18 hours a day to this work. The 40th Seabees, who had helped the Battalion with
the loan of a water trailer, came to their rescue again with the loan of a very competent instructor who held classes for all operators not on shift and also instructed
individuals while they were operating on the job. The Seabees also took student
operators on their equipment and student mechanics in their shops, and it was a
heartbreaking sight to see an inexperienced operator turn over a carry-all or bend a
new dipper stick, but discouraging though it was, it was a necessity and had to be done.
Statistics on the construction jobs which were completed at Cape Cretin are not
now available, but a brief description of them will give a satisfactory picture of their
scope and difficulty. The staging area referred to previously was for the 3 2 d Division, and to reach it, it was necessary to build approximately six miles of road, a part
of which ran through a swamp requiring considerable :fill. The road was :fifty feet
wide from ditch to ditch, with thirty feet of road surface on a four-inch base of crushed
coral. To do the job, six D-8 bulldozers, two D-4 bulldozers, a road grader, four
carry-alls, one Buckeye Shovel, and seven dump trucks were required. To give
variety, a single-span bridge 26 feet wide and 16 feet long with a 25-ton capacity was
included in the road, as was one large culvert.
A survey crew was organized to do all the surveying for the road and for the
staging area, and as part of its duties this crew prepared a topographical map with
two-foot contour intervals for the battalion area, a distance of 7500 feet including a
shore line of 2 miles and extending inland 26oo feet to the foothills of the mountains.
Left: The beachn1aster's headquarters at Cape Cretin.
Right: Mess tent of Shore Battalion Headquarters Company at Cape Cretin.
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A waterworks for the Sixth Army headquarters was another problem which
was successfully solved. A water point was established in one of the nearby streams
and r,ooo feet of 3-inch, 3,ooo feet of 2-inch, r,ooo feet of 1-inch, and 6oo feet of%inch pipe were laid. Pumping stations were installed and three water towers were
erected, one twelve feet high with 6,ooo gallons capacity, another twenty feet high
with two steel tanks of 4,500 gallons capacity each, and the third twenty feet high with
a capacity of 3,ooo gallons. As part of the waterworks, three shower baths and the
necessary plumbing were installed. A Barber-Greene ditching machine was used to
dig the ditch for the pipeline, and it was a source of considerable irritation when upon
completion of the line, the machine was commandeered by Sixth Army headquarters
to dig all the necessary foxholes for its personnel.
The carpenters of the Battalion constructed a number of buildings for Sixth
Army headquarters, including the enlisted men's mess hall, 3 8 by I 2 8 feet with a
corrugated iron roof, complete with concrete floor, screened-in kitchen, shelves,
tables, septic tanks, and plumbing. A dispensary of the portable type was constructed, and three warehouses were built for the quartermaster and medical supply
dump areas. The latter were of native-type construction, and presented the first
opportunity to construct buildings entirely of native materials.
The signal platoon, in addition to the battalion communications and electrical
system, put in wires to Army headquarters and to the 542d EB&SR. They wired
and maintained all of the buildings at Army headquarters, using approximately
30,000 feet of wiring. What with storms, falling coconuts, and alerts fired into the air,
the wires were frequently cut, and the signal platoon was always busy.
Despite overloading from these missions and the beach work, all the jobs had
been done so well that orders were received from the Army Engineer to set up and
operate a sawmill. Of course, there had been no training of this sort, and a call was
sent out from battalion headquarters for any men who had such experience to report.
Ten men and one officer with very limited experience answered the call. With the
aid of an instruction book, two D-4s and a few pieces of broken log chain, this detachment established the mill and began producing lumber in ten days, continuing during
the balance of their stay at Cape Cretin.
A sector of the shipping point had been assigned to the Shore Battalion for defense and the weapons platoon prepared gun emplacements for their .50 calibre
machine guns and for the 3 7 mms and maintained two outposts 24 hours a day. The
G-2 section of the Sixth Army called upon the Battalion for a reconnaissance force to
be sent to Umboi (Rooke) Island, and this mission was assigned to a scouting part
consisting of one lieutenant and three enlisted men who departed for the island on
January 15, 1944, by PT boat and were gone for a month. During this month they
explored and mapped the entire island, obtained valuable information from the
natives, spotted J ap camps, and in general distinguished themselves by their intelligent and thorough reconnaissance. All were awarded Silver Star medals for the highly successful completion of their mission, and the officer in charge later became for
several months a member of Sixth Army's famed "Alamo Scouts."
There was some time for recreation, although not as much as the battalion com-
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mander would have liked. An area was cleared and used for movies, band concerts,
and even a floor show. A substantial stage with a background of young palm trees
was built, and movies were shown three times a week. The 32d Division swing band
and some stage shows plus a concert by the r 12th Cavalry Band were high spots of the
entertainment.
In the middle of February, orders were received to leave Philbertville, as the
battalion area was known, and to proceed to Saidor to relieve the Shore Battalion of
the 542d EB&SR. On the 23d of February, 1944, advance elements of D and E
Companies departed with C Company for Saidor to prepare an area for the Battalion.
F Company, as indicated above, was to move to New Britain.

DUKWs and LCMs work side by side unloading ships over the beach at Cape Cretin.

"Bongs" wrestle rations and fuel drums on Goodenough Island.

Goodenough Island and Milne Bay
Though the Shore Battalion had been hard at work for a fortnight at Cape
Cretin before the plodding Cape Perpetua reached Milne Bay with the rest of the
Regiment, the two boat companies aboard, A and C, were the first 3d Brigade boat
units to arrive in New Guinea for keeps. General Ogden had been directed to assemble his Brigade at Goodenough Island So miles from Milne Bay before committing
it to various actions then in progress or planned. Though Goodenough possessed
many facilities constructed by Sixth Army units in the latter half of r 943, it was by
no means self-sufficient as a staging area, and frequent intercourse with Base A at
Milne Bay was essential. Shortage of heavy shipping required that this traffic be
performed by landing craft. One of the 59 3d shore companies had been pressed into
service to operate boats pending arrival of a boat company and had done a remarkable
job considering its total lack ofboat training. Yet it was not unnatural that General
Ogden was somewhat more than slightly impatient to have a trained boat company
71

72

HISTORY OF 533d EB&SR

inaugurate service between Goodenough and Milne Bay. Thus hardly had the Cape
Perpetua dropped her hook when orders were received to have A company debark
and bivouac near the LCM assembly plant so that it could receive its allotment of
craft and start the vitally needed runs. Since A Company's equipment was intermingled in the holds with that of the other units, all of which were destined to debark
at Goodenough, there was nothing to do but land the men of A Company with
nothing other than the equipment they wore and carried in their barracks bags.
Naturally A Company's camp at Milne was anything but luxurious or efficient.
True they did receive tentage from the 543d Shore Battalion, but for everything else
they had to beg or scrounge. Instead of a field range they acquired an Australian
steam kitchen which they soon discovered was a very ingenious contraption. Life
was pretty grim with no lanterns, tools, or utensils, particularly when so much effort
had been expended in the States to make sure that the outfit would arrive in the
tropics with everything that foresight could provide.
On january Ig, four days after getting ashore, the Company had received enough
boats and put them in seaworthy enough condition to inaugurate convoy service out
around East Cape, past Normanby Island and up through the coral-studded Moresby
straits to Melauna Bay, Goodenough. This 84-mile run once started was maintained
with packet-ship regularity for a month. The boats would load during the afternoon
and evening and depart shortly after midnight, arriving at Goodenough in the early
afternoon. Shortly after sunset the return run would start and terminate early the
next morning allowing the crews but a few hours to service their craft and eat a hot
meal ashore before taking their boats around to the loading beach for another round
trip. Though this grueling schedule was unfortunately to be typical of requirements
thrown at the Boat Battalion wherever it went, the fact that many men were seeing
an LCM for the first time in their lives and were naturally doing many things "the
hard way" made this assignment one which was never exceeded in terms of pressure
and fatigue.
The outbound convoys were considerably larger than those which returned to
Milne Bay; for A Company in addition to moving critical freight to Goodenough was
delivering to C Company and the 593d their share of the LCMs that rolled down
the ways of the 52 I I th Steel Hull Battalion. This convoy work was not the only thing
that kept A Company's free time at a minimum. Normal harbor lighterage and miscellaneous missions to islands off the mouth of the Bay were plentiful enough to insure
that no coxswain and crew ever received a complete lay day.
A detachment of the company moved up to Goodenough to locate the hundreds
of crates of precious equipment which had been left aboard the ship at the time of
debarkation at Milne Bay, sort them and prepare what was believed to be a semipermanent bivouac for the Company. Actually the temporary camp at Milne, which was
finally struck on February I 3 when the 543d Boat Battalion took over the convoy
mission, was a year-round affair when compared to the frantic 6o hours A Company
spent on Goodenough equipping and loading up its boats for the New Britain campmgn.
Meanwhile, on January I 6 the Cape Perpetua had wended her way into Melauna

Left: Scenes from the Camp on Goodenough Island showing C Company kitchen and
showers erected by Regimental Headquarters Company. Right: Laundry in the raw.

Bay, and Regimental and Battalion Headquarters Companies and Company C had
alighted on Goodenough's far from inviting shores. This island, roughly I 5 miles in
diameter and dominated by an 8ooo-foot mountain, was selected during the dry season
as the assembly area for Sixth Army headquarters and the first troops assigned to
that force. Its northern slopes had been ideal during the southeast monsoon that
prevailed during the second half of the year, and Sixth Army had prudently moved
forward to Cape Cretin before the change of season. Even in late December and early
January when the advance detachment of Brigade headquarters was allotting
bivouac areas and laying out roads and reconnoitering fords across the countless
"brooks" that creased the coastal plain, it appeared to be well suited to acclimate
green troops gradually to the tropics. But a week before the Cape Perpetua arrived the
monsoon changed with a vengeance. Day after day the rain poured down- over
40 inches in one week - and of course that which fell on the lofty mountain swelled
the brooks to streams and then to raging torrents in a matter ofhours. The road into
the 533d's camp area crossed a tiny trickle one day, was barely fordable by a 2Yz-ton
truck that night and was impassable to a D-8 tractor the next day. One company of
the 593d had to be evacuated from trees and hummocks by assault boat. Food had to
be air-dropped to a large hospital. Land communications were at a complete standstill, and coral blocked off most areas from approach by landing craft.
Into this nightmare fresh from the States stepped the three companies of the
533d. Luckily their area was on a slight rise from which the Kunai grass had been
scraped with a bulldozer before the deluge started, but to reach it the men had to
wade shoulder deep and had to manhandle all their equipment hundreds of yards
from the tiny coral-free beach which was fortunately discovered at one end of the
area. For four days the only access to the camp was by boat. During that period a
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General Mud was a potent adversary throughout the tropics; he got in his first licks on
Goodenough Island.

group of boatmen and radio operators with no equipment other than sledges and
hand saws built a 25-ton solid mahogany bridge across the mouth of the river that
isolated the camp, on the theory that being over tidewater the whole sea would have
to be raised before it would share the fate of all the other bridges on the island. A
smaller stream was corduroyed, and as the rainy season had apparently shot the
works in its initial onslaught, from then on the three companies could communicate
by land with the unloading beach and supply dumps.
Less than 36 hours after landing C Company received a fleet of thirty battered
LCMs and a few LCVPs from the 593d's E Company. It is no reflection on the shore
engineers who had b een running them diligently for a month to say that these craft
were in pitiful condition; yet not only did they have to be put right to work lightering
around the clock and running missions to Kiriwina and elsewhere, but it was also
learned that they would have to be made to last for many months. It was a sad blow
to C Company, and these ancient hulks nearly crippled that Company's effectiveness
when the pressure was on at Saidor. Lightering at Goodenough was of course pretty
dull, but the boats were new to the men and the practice in handling them in sheltered waters was very valuable. Maintenance facilities were conspicuous by their
absence. With no tractor crane the best that could be done on the LCMs that required underwater repairs, which they all did with alarming frequency as a result of
the maze of coral, was to winch them out ofwater on a skidway ofpalm logs. Fortunately, shortly before C Company's departure, LeTourneau cranes were issu ed, or it
would not only h ave b een unable to repair damaged boats but also unable to install
gunmounts and other accessories which should have been installed at the LCM
assembly plant in Milne Bay.
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Not only did the boatmen have to build their own bridges in the absence of the
brethren of the Shore Battalion, but they also had to take over a busy beach. The
593d's Shore Battalion had been handling the local beach, but its entire efforts were
required to repair the ravages of the downpours and floods. Boat Battalion headquarters took over supervision of the entire unloading of three liberties, the movement
of cargo across the beach and its delivery to the proper dumps. By trial and error and
relying heavily on the determination of all attached units to get the ships, which were
loaded with their own much needed equipment, discharged in a hurry, the somewhat
bewildered boat officers and noncoms hulled the job through. This experience was
most valuable when the same headquarters was made responsible for the beach at
Cape Gloucester, and furthermore gave the boat officers a sympathetic understanding
of the Shore Battalion's constant problems, an understanding which helped weld the
Regiment into an effective team in later major operations.
The primary mission of the companies at Goodenough was securing their equipment and readying themselves for real assignments in the forward areas. This
seemingly simple task was a terrible headache for several reasons. First, the San
Francisco Port of Embarkation seemed to have taken a fiendish delight in commingling the equipment of different units. Second, all vehicles and heavy equipment had
been shipped knocked down and crated and had to be assembled in hip-deep water
with no tools other than the driver's hand tools packed in the crate. Third, the
flooding of the dumps had damaged many items and had disorganized the personnel
responsible for the dumps so that pilferage was very serious. Fourth, many items
were received for the first time here without even a sample available to the unit
for study and demonstration before leaving the States. Finally, the Shore Battalion
had virtually no personnel on Goodenough, so the job of assembling and preparing its
heavy equipment for movement forward fell on the regimental S-3 and a handful of
mechanics.
All told the few weeks on Goodenough were a pain in the neck to all ranks, and
the receipt on February 4 of warning orders for movement up the line came as a
welcome relief, but there was little time for rejoicing in the two weeks that remained
before the departure date. Barely in time the last boats to complete A and C Companies' allotments came off the line at Milne and were rushed to Goodenough to have
gunmounts welded and equipment checked aboard. Vehicles were completed so
close to the deadline that some were actually loaded aboard LCMs with less than one
mile on the speedometer. At last, just as it appeared that the deadline would be met
on all critical items, came a drastic and apparently ill-considered order to give up
twenty-five per cent of the boats, and as will be seen in the next chapter, the final few
days on Goodenough were probably the most annoying for the Boat Battalion of its
entire overseas tour.
Convoy of LCVPs coasts down the shore of New Guinea just south of Finschhafen;
Mt. Sattelberg in the background.
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CHAPTER VIII

New Britain

O

N the 10th of February the advance representative of the 533d landed at the
airstrip at Cape Gloucester. The status of the campaign on New Britain at
that time may be summarized as follows: after lightly opposed initial landings at Sag
Sag and at Yellow Beach in Borgen Bay, the Marines had closed rapidly on the airstrip
and Bloody Point, and had cleared Cape Gloucester proper prior to the end of 1943.
The Marines had then regrouped, facing toward the south, and during January had
fought a bloody series of engagements, particularly the battle for Hill 66o, and had
moved down the west shore of Borgen Bay, crossing the Natamo River after a sharp
battle on January 28. Thereafter the 5th Marine Regiment had pushed rapidly
eastward through crumbling J ap resistance and had reached Cape Gauffre.
The push along the coast was entirely dependent for supply and evacuation on
the landing craft of Company C, 592d EB&SR, which was also charged with unloading
the shipping in the harbor. This company had had only twenty-odd boats initially,
and continuous operation on bad beaches with inadequate replacement parts had
reduced their serviceable boats to a scant dozen. Consequently, Major General
Rupertus, USMC, the task force commander, was more than delighted at the prospect of the reinforcement of another boat company, and he ch eerfully outlined an
accelerated offensive to the eastward that would be made possible by this new flotilla.
The 533d officer made tentative arrangements for bivouacs in the least atrocious of
the various swamps available and then departed for Goodenough to expedite the move
forward as much as possible.
For the next two weeks a confusion in the lines of responsibility in the higher
command echelons made life very difficult. Brigade and regimental h eadquarters
were placed under USASOS, with the primary mission of expediting the unloading

Softening up Cape Gloucester shortly before the initial landings December 26, 1943.
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of supplies at Gloucester and Saidor, yet the battalion commanders were placed under
the task force commanders who were charged by Sixth Army with completing their
tactical missions with the least possible delay. The first and unhappy effect of this
confusion was that General Ogden withheld 25 per cent of the LCMs slated to go
initially to both Saidor and Gloucester, so that the 593d could employ them on the
run from Finschhafen to Arawe where there was no conflict of interest. As a result,
the units assigned to the advance task forces were placed in the embarrassing position
of having to hedge on their promises. While this confusion was reigning in higher
headquarters, personnel performed herculean feats in preparing their craft for combat,
mounting machine guns, drawing and distributing all types of equipment. The
conflict of authority struck a particularly hard blow on the boat crews who had to
turn their boats over to the 593d on the very same day on which they finished several
days of very heavy work in preparing them. A similar irritating result was that ten
out of forty of the boats which had already been loaded for the move had to be emptied, and their loads had to be redistributed. Nevertheless, the job was accomplished and everything that could be crammed aboard the reduced fleet had been
loaded when darkness fell on the qth of February. It should be added that the loading, unloading, and reloading was performed during 48 consecutive hours of heavy
rain, and by the time the flotilla put to sea tempers left much to be desired.
The fleet consisting of 6o LCMs, 2 picket boats, and 37 LCVPs wound out of
Melauna Bay and down Moresby Strait to Collingwood Bay at dawn on the 18th of
February. The I so-mile trip to Oro Bay took less than 24 hours with good weather
but considerable maintenance work en route. After the arrival at Oro Bay, one whole
day was lost because it was necessary to manhandle the fuel drums. In addition, the
battalion commander was kept occupied that day by the base commander who failed
to see eye to eye with him on the question of garbage disposal. On the 20th, the
flotilla proceeded uneventfully to Cape Cretin.
At Cape Cretin two days were lost because the Shore Battalion was not released
from its construction and beach control assignments; the headquarters to which it
had been attached displayed profound indifference toward the necessity of meeting
the target dates which had been established for the Talasea and Yalau attacks. Finally, a few minutes after midnight on the 24th of February, C Company with elements
of the Shore Battalion commenced the 125-mile run along the New Guinea coast to
Saidor. A few hours later, A Company, Boat Battalion Headquarters, elements of
F Company and of Company A of the 563d Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion
departed on the final 85-mile run through Dampier Strait to Borgen Bay. A fresh
northwest wind kicked up a sharp chop in the Strait and all hands suffered a thorough
drenching, but the convoy arrived on schedule off Yellow Beach that evening.
Immediately upon landing at Borgen Bay, it appeared that any thoughts of a
few days in which to establish a camp and to service and repair the craft after their
long run could be discarded. Instead, one of the worst " rat races" of all time was to
occupy every minute of every 24 hours for the next week. The task force commander
was confronted with a tremendous problem. In scarcely a week he had to move a
substantial part of the ISt Marine Regiment fifty miles to relieve the sth Marines in

A "raft" of LCMs at anchor in Borgen
Bay - Hill "660" in the background.

the Rein Bay area; he had to build up thirty days' supplies of all classes, including
three units of fire, at Iboki; and he had to stage and deliver an assault on the Willaumez Peninsula with a full regimental combat team. Since all of this activity
depended on a few dozen landing craft, not an hour could be spared for any boats
that were not actually disabled; if a boat could be run, no matter by what field
expedient, it had to run.
Going ashore upon arrival on New Britain was a rude awakening; the mud, the
stench of dead Japs and foul soil, the rain that would not let up quite long enough to
dry clothing, the area that turned out to be a bomb- and shell-cratered jungle, the
flies, mosquitoes, and rats - into such a Utopia moved the provisional battalion of
the 533d. Perhaps it was well that the pressure was as great as it was, for no time was
permitted to anyone to worry about conditions.
LST beaches at Yellow Beach, Cape Gloucester.

Light artillery section of the llth Marines splashes ashore at Cape Gloucester from LST.

All amphibious and allied elements were placed under control of the 533d ,
including :five LCTs from the Navy, Company C of the 592d EB & SR with its
maintenance platoon, and a port company. As fast as the boats were unloaded they
were checked by the A Company maintenance section, and if they were found capable of half speed on one engine when loaded to the gunwales and when covered with
as many marines as could perch on the cargo and the narrow waterways, they were
so loaded, and convoys of a dozen or so boats were dispatched on the :fifty-mile run to
Iboki. The run along the coast lay through continuous patches of b arely subm erged
coral which stretched many miles from the shore. To avoid these reefs by p assing
to seaward of them would nearly double the distance, so it was necessary to twist in
and out amongst the reefs, and the convoys were limited to daylight runs. The :first
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The n1aintenance beach in Borgen
Bay was always jammed with crippled
craft.

few groups were led by boats of the 592d whose coxswains had been probing those
waters for four weeks, but having made one trip through the maze, all coxswains were
presumed to know the passages, and whether by knowledge or luck they always got
through.
Iboki was actually occupied by the Marines on the 25th ofFebruary after a sharp
air bombardment, and as quickly as they reached the point they were met by the
LCMs with fresh troops and supplies. The day was marred by a tragic accident
when one of the convoys was attacked by three B-25s of our own airforce which were
returning to New Guinea from a strike on the Admiralties. They made three strafing
attacks on four boats of the 592d, killing one engineer officer and several marines,
and wounding many more of both marines and amphibian engineers. It was later
learned that the pilots had been furnished with intelligence maps on which the New
Britain data was 45 days and 50 miles out of date.
Meanwhile back at Borgen Bay the few men who were not involved in boat
operations were struggling to set up a base camp in a dismal swampy forest, crisscrossed with fallen trees six feet in diameter and pocked with thirty-foot craters
caused by the pre-landing bombardment. A daily rainfall of some two to five inches,
clinging bottomless volcanic ash muck, and lack of tools and equipment made this
work a misery which will never be forgotten. The maintenance problem was somewhat eased by the arrival on February 28 of Company A, 563d Maintenance Battalion less one platoon. With no opportunity for substantial repairs to the boats
since their assembly at Milne Bay nearly five weeks before, the backlog of work
presented to the maintenance unit as it debarked was staggering. But it rose to the
occasion in splendid fashion and began hauling and repairing boats as fast as it could
roll its equipment down the ramps of the LCTs.
Relieved from work at Borgen Bay the A Company maintenance section moved
forward that same day to Iboki and there established an advance repair base in
preparation for the next push up the coast. Realizing the amount of work his group

Company street of Headquarters Company, Boat
Battalion at Borgen Bay
nfter many dump-truck
loads of fill had been poured
into the swan1p it once had
been.

Middle of Willaumez Peninsula viewed from the Northwest.

Garua I.
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would be called upon to turn out, the maintenance officer picked the beach best
suited for hauling boats, completely disregarding the fact that it was located at the
upper end of Rein Bay, several hundred yards beyond the barbed wire of the marine
perimeter. Ignoring both Japs and marines and the blackout prescribed by the
latter, this little task force maintained its own "perimeter," and night as well as day
the bright arc of its welders could be seen.
Through the first days of March the hectic shuttle service continued to pour
troops and supplies into Iboki. Continuous downpours not only made a morass of
the staging area, but so limited visibility that the convoys fell well behind schedule,
as they picked their way through the tortuous route.
The assault on the Willaumez Peninsula was directed at the airfield and village
of Talasea on the east coast. No naval combatant craft larger than PTs could be
spared, nor were any LCis or LSTs available, for the campaigns in the Marshalls and
the Admiralties were then at their height, and so it was necessary to make the attack
on the west coast and thence move overland to the east coast in order to minimize the
risk and keep the hours of discomfort for the assault troops riding in small open boats
to the minimum. Volupai plantation, directly across the neck from Talasea and connected thereto by what was thought to be an adequate road, was chosen as the initial
beachhead.
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Plantation

j Center of landing

j Elbow of channel by which

beach

boats had to approach beach.

The 5th Marines were to attack in a column of battalions with normal attachments, including a few pieces of equipment and a small advance detail from F Company of the Shore Battalion, which were all that had as yet arrived from Cape Cretin.
Adequate fighter aircraft cover was expected during daylight, and a saturation bombing of the beach area was scheduled from H minus 40 to H minus ro minutes. Control
was given to the commander ofthe 533d Boat Battalion of all elements afloat, including eight PTs, five LCTs, and a company of amphibian tractors, in addition to the
40 LCMs and r 7 LCVPs of the 53 3d and 592d. It was planned that the "amtracs"
carrying the first two waves of infantry would be lifted in the LCTs and launched a
mile off shore, from which point they would proceed directly across the barrier reef to
the beach. The beach was so placed that the landing barges had to take a dogleg
course in order to follow the only channel to the beach that was shown in the air
photos. The feasibility of this channel was doubted by the amphibian scout who had
made the reconnaissance, so an emergency plan to transfer men and appropriate
equipment of later waves to the amtracs had to be prepared. The risks involved in
ordering landing craft to approach the beach in column at an acute angle caused
considerable concern, but there was no alternative.
The approach track selected was nearly 6o miles; so in order to make the o8oo
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H hour the convoy, held down to the LCTs' speed of 6 knots, had to clear Rein Bay by
2200 D-1. The PTs after providing a screen for the convoy during the night were to
strafe the beach and neighboring headlands with 20 mm fire from outside the reefs.
To replace the "call fire" against emergency targets usually available from destroyers
and APDs, four medium tanks were to be carried in LCMs covering the flanks of
the first wave of amtracs. Tests in Rein Bay showed that the tanks' 75 mm guns
could deliver accurate and rapid fire over the coamings of the boats.
March 5, the day before the attack, found the shuttle service between Borgen
Bay and Iboki still operating in high gear. When the loading out commenced after
noon, one-third of the craft had not yet arrived. The afternoon and early evening saw
a hectic jumble of boats jammed topside to topside on the narrow beach, discharging
supplies and the last of the troops who were to take over the Iboki area, and taking on
the attacking troops and their equipment and stores. No floodlighting equipment
was available, so as darkness deepened and the deadline for departure approached,
pandemonium reached new heights. Yet by dint of superhuman efforts on the part
of all hands, the incoming boats were discharged, serviced, organized into waves and
loaded in time.
The motley convoy that stood out to sea that night carried more than 3000 men
and rooo tons of equipment in what was probably the War's outstanding example of
overloading small boats. Luckily the wind was calm all night and only the gentlest
of ground swells rocked the boats.
Following close in the wake of the A Company picket boat the blacked-out
flotilla kept in reasonably good order, though a series of inky rain squalls caused one
three-boat wave to go astray for a time. The "free" boats carrying the various
regimental and battalion commanders were delayed in departing, and being unable
to find the main convoy in the blackness, proceeded independently to the rendezvous
area. Daybreak came as a welcome relief shortly before 0700 and disclosed the little
fleet somewhat northward of its prescribed track but about on schedule as it approached the mountainous peninsula.
As the minutes passed and the brightening sky remained empty of planes, a chill
sense of foreboding crept up many a spine. The calculated risk of attacking an enemyheld shore without preliminary naval bombardment had been taken, but to go on in
through the tricky channel and land on a beach overhung with thick jungle without
benefit of preliminary bombing, strafing, and smoking was something else again.
Nevertheless Colonel 0. P. Smith, USMC, commanding the force, signalled "carry
on"; so the assault began. The amtracs clattered and splashed off the LCTs' ramps as
the PTs hurled their small HE shells at the beach. The lead boat, an LCVP, followed
by the beach control boat dropping buoys, and the LCMs with tanks, picked its way
through the nigger-heads. As these craft and the churning amtracs approached
within two hundred yards of the shore, they cut loose with all their machine guns.
The small Jap garrison reacted sharply, picking a few marines off the approaching
amtracs with rifle and machine gun fire and lobbing go mm mortar shells into the
water. At this critical moment the "air support" did arrive - one L-4 cub with
General Ogden in it tossing hand grenades at likely Jap positions!
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Giant Bread-fruit tree that
dominated A Company's
camp at Borgen Bay.

With few casualties and in good order the amtracs reached the beach, and simultaneously two medium tanks rolled off the ramps of the LCMs, one being promptly
disabled by a suicide attack ofajap with an armful ofmagnetic mines. The mortar
fire increased in tempo destroying several of the channel buoys and otherwise causing
many of the boats to get fouled up in the coral patches. No boat suffered a direct hit,
and the only casualties were from fragments of shells bursting on the surface. Luckily
the J aps kept their mortar fire on the water in the initial phases of the assault, for if it
had been directed on the tiny (75 yards long) beach which soon was jammed with men
and equipment, the casualties might have become prohibitive.
The twelve waves were finally discharged by r roo, only 45 minutes behind
schedule, and except for five boats left for emergencies or flank patrols, the flotilla
headed back for Iboki, taking with it the casualties. On the return trip to Iboki, the
airforces, which had failed to arrive at all when needed, made their record for the
day complete when a PBY strafed the crippled boats that were tagging along at the
rear of the column. Meanwhile, the troops on the new beachhead were facing heavy
going. Behind the beach the terrain was little more than a quagmire, and the artillery
had to take up a position only a few dozen yards from the water's edge. When the
boats withdrew, the Jap mortar fire was pulled in to the beach and casualties began
to mount, including two officers and a sergeant of the boat control section of A Company. While the F Company detachment and the marines were laboring to lay
cyclone fencing across the bog and thus to permit reasonable dispersion, the 533d
medics were assisting the marine corpsmen in sheltering and administering to the
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wounded. By mid-afternoon, the marines had worked far enough inland to drive the
J aps from their mortar positions and the wounded could be moved from their foxholes. Those who were urgently in need ofhospital facilities were loaded on the only
two good LCMs and on one crippled LCM for an agonizing eleven-hour trip back to
Iboki. Not a few died on the way. Some of these lives could have been saved if the
PTs had been retained in the objective area as was urged by the 533d and agreed to
by the task force commander and the PT squadron commander, but Seventh Fleet
headquarters had flatly directed that PTs be used exclusively as escorts for the LCTs,
and when the LCTs returned to Iboki, the PTs went with them. Some of this loss
that could have so easily been avoided was decreased during the night when the PTs
did run out from Iboki to intercept the incoming LCMs and expedite bringing to
shore the most seriously wounded. But the saving of time was trifling as compared
with what it could have been. It was later learned that the commander of the Jap
garrison and his staff escaped by barge to Garove that night, and if some PTs had
remained on patrol in the objective area, these J aps could have been killed or captured.
The main convoy reached Iboki just after sunset, and the night was spent refueling and servicing the boats and loading the reserve battalion and the remainder
of the units that had made up the assault force. Departing shortly after dawn, this
echelon arrived on the beach at r6oo, by which time the fighting had moved to the
other side of the peninsula so that the resupply unloading was unopposed. On the
second trip back to Iboki pressure had relaxed sufficiently so that all hands were given
3 hours sleep- the first for some in over roo hours. The third load was principally
bulk ammunition and rations, which took all day to take aboard.
During the day the Division's plan to attack Garove in the Vitu Islands on March
I 5 was discussed at length between the Boat Battalion commander and the commanding officer of the rst Marines. The mission would involve an 8o-mile run and a
landing on beaches overlooked by cliffs whose caves concealed three inch guns.
Naturally destroyers were to blast the way, yet even so, such an undertaking would be
risky in view of the run-down condition of the boats and boat crews. So a promise was
extracted from the assistant division commander that after the coming trip to Volupai
all but four boats were to return to Borgen Bay to refit and get set for the Garove show.
At o8oo the gth, the convoy arrived off Volupai beach to learn that despite
prodigious efforts of marine and army engineers the four-mile road from the plantation across the peninsula was a hopeless quagmire and that the two battalions currently driving the J aps from Talasea airstrip would starve if they depended on it as a
main supply route. Though instructed to await a DE as an escort before rounding
Cape Hollman and landing at Talasea, the convoy got under weigh immediately
and, unescorted, made the 6o-mile passage into Talasea, the most important peacetime port between Rabaul and Madang.
The trip was not uneventful, for the last three boats of the convoy, two of which
were carrying light tanks, came upon twojap barges at dusk offBulu-Murli and in a
brief engagement, employing the tanks' 37 millimeter guns as well as the .50 calibre
machine guns of the landing barges, caused one J ap boat to be abandoned and capsized the other.
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Leaving five LCMs to ferry equipment and supplies from Volupai around to
Talasea, the rest of the boats returned 100 miles to Iboki next day to pick up the
1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and take them back to Borgen Bay to stage for Garove.
En route Bulu-Murli, off which the previous night's barge engagement had occurred,
was given a thorough strafing from a range of 50 yards. Arriving shortly before midnight the boat group learned that Sixth Army had canceled the Garove operation
and that the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was to "clean out" Linga Linga plantation
and the surrounding territory as soon as possible.
The Battalion with ten days supplies was loaded in 14 LCMs and 2 LCVPs
shortly after daybreak, and the little convoy picked its way eastward through the
uncharted coral reefs, arriving at a 1300 H hour. Shortly before noon the column
of boats rounded into Eleonora Bay and formed into three waves for the assault.
Brigadier General Sheppard who had just completed a cub reconnaissance flight over
the objective dropped a message warning the boats to lay down heavy fire before
landing. The maneuver was tricky, for the waves had to approach close and parallel
to the beach, execute a "by the left flank", and land. Actually there was no opposition
to the landing, but a few score yards inland the marines killed and captured several
Japs.
The next day the force split up into several small amphibian patrols, approximately a reinforced platoon to each, and set forth to scour the shores of the bay
LCMs at Talasea deliver fresh bread, baked at Cape Gloucester 120 miles away, to the
delight of men of the garrison who .had lived for several weeks on K and C rations.
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together with its dozen inhabited islands. The results were good: over a hundred
Japs killed or captured. A particularly neat little operation occurred at Kandoka
village on Riebeck Bay. Twenty-five well armed Japs occupied the village, which
could not be attacked from the sea because of an impassable barrier reef 400 yards off
shore. Thirty-odd marines were landed a mile or more from the village and approached it from the rear. The three boats feigned a frontal attack on the town,
grounded on the reef and plastered the village with 6o mm mortar and machine gun
fire. At a prearranged time the boats ceased fire and the marines, who had undetected crawled within hand grenade range, rushed the village killing 24 and capturing
I Jap without suffering a single casualty. The first river penetration on the Regiment's
record occurred the same day when an LCVP and 2 LCMs bounced over the bar and
skidded into the mangrove-walled Kulu River. No Japs were encountered, but three
small barges were destroyed with rifle grenades.
Operations were continued in the entire area between Iboki and the Willaumez
Peninsula with small patrols, using landing craft for mobility, making quick raids on
islands and villages wherever Jap stragglers were reported or suspected. Several
hundred Japs were killed here in the next four weeks and substantial numbers of
prisoners captured- the largest haul in the S WP A to date. A few groups, rear
guard elements of the division withdrawing toward the Gazelle Peninsula, put up stout
resistance, and occasionally marine patrols which were pinned down and in serious
danger were evacuated by LCMs utilizing their full .50 calibre fire power to keep the
Japs at bay.
Meanwhile to the east the 5th Marines pushed down the Willaumez Peninsula
and garrisoned San Remo plantation as the main outpost on the north shore of New
Britain. The 533d's job became in the main one of supplying all forces east of Cape
Gloucester - a total of about 5000 men. Day after day convoys of a dozen or more
LCMs loaded supplies at Borgen Bay, departed at 16oo and after 120 miles of openwater running put in to Talasea the following morning, discharging their cargo and
returning with casualties or damaged equipment that night. Section leaders or
coxswains soon took command of these runs, demonstrating seafaring acumen and
piloting ability that amply justified their arduous training off the California coast.
To render the 5th Marines self-mstaining on the water the 3d platoon of Company A and the maintenance section that had been in Rein Bay were ordered to establish a base at Talasea. The platoon set up its camp on a high headland near the
jetty used for unloading, while the maintenance beach was established in a small cove
close by. The other platoons ofthe company later took turns at this ideal assignment
and most of the men of A Company will remember Talasea with its beauty and unusual climate as the only spot approaching a "paradise" in the tropics. The picturesque harbor so well protected from all weather, the geysers steaming and spouting
periodically along the shore, the hot streams that supplied baths and showers, the vast
coconut plantations, the exquisite mission that overlooked the harbor, the steers and
bananas on Garua Island, fishing that usually only liars experience- all these combined to make a tour of duty at Talasea the next best thing to a leave in Australia.
At Cape Gloucester itself there were ships to unload and short supply runs to
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outlying radar stations. The maintenance work was divided between Borgen Bay,
where the 56 3d platoon did all echelons of work on boats that were deadlined there,
and Talasea where the A Company section did Ist, 2nd and 3rd echelon work on the
boats disabled in that vicinity. Despite impressive operating hours of all boats and
the ravages of coral, an average of over 8o% of the boats were kept in operational
condition.
Company F maintained a detachment at Talasea constructing roads and landing
points in conjunction with the I 7th Marines. The balance of the Company operated
initially with the Igth Seabees on general road maintenance and extension in the Cape
Gloucester area. As the pressure of off-loading ships in the harbor steadily increased
until the port company and the marine stevedoring detachments could not cope
with it, the Company's manpower was diverted to unloading. By early April the
entire responsibility for handling 6oo tons of cargo a day was placed on F Company,
and it rose magnificently to the occasion, turning out I 3 hatch crews each day in
addition to handling the control of the beach and operating the necessary heavy
equipment.
On April IO the Ist Marine Division was relieved from assignment to the SWPA
and alerted for movement to the Solomons. The Marines were to be relieved regiment
by regiment by the 40th Infantry Division, as promptly as possible; and so continuous
pressure was put on the boats to pull in the intermediate marine garrisons and to
bring back from Talasea the vehicles and impedimenta of the 5th Marines.
Fortunately the Saidor Campaign was about over, and after much bickering
between the commanding generals of the 40th and 32d Divisions, Sixth Army finally
ordered C Company to proceed to Cape Gloucester, and the additional boats were
most valuable in the exchange of garrisons which commenced on April 23. The
navy transports refused to go to or near Talasea, so the entire I85th Regimental
Scenes from Talasea-Left: Camp of 3d Platoon of Company A. Right: Steam rising from
one of the geysers around the edge of Garua Harbor.
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Combat Team was disembarked in Borgen Bay into LCMs many of which had just a
few hours before arrived after a I 30-mile trip from Saidor. When the unit was all off
the transports, the 6o LCMs took off in three convoys for Talasea and San Remo,
150 miles away. The passengers thus were not set ashore at their destinations until
nearly 24 hours after they climbed down the landing nets. The next day the 5th
Marines piled aboard the same boats for their return to Borgen Bay. Certainly this
was the most extensive "ship-to-shore" troop movement of the War.
By the 5th of May the last of the convoys of transports had sailed with the last
of the Marines, and the balance of C Company and the Maintenance Company had
arrived at Cape Gloucester. For the first time since leaving California, the Boat
Battalion was two-thirds intact, B Company still being in Australia.
The next development in the campaign was the extension of American control
of New Britain to include Cape Hoskins, which point the Marines had planned to
assault, but were prevented by their sudden move. A plan for an amphibious attack
by two battalions of the 185th RCT was worked out, including a preliminary attack
on an island off the Cape to secure artillery positions dominating the airstrip, but
reconnaissance patrols developed the fact that thejaps had withdrawn all but a small
screening force, so the plan was dropped and a quick landing was made on May IO
by landing craft from Talasea in conjunction with troops moving overland from San
Remo. Casualties were confined to those caused by land mines and a handful of
snipers. In an effort to learn what was behind the sudden evacuation ofthejaps, the
53 3d proposed to 40th Division headquarters that a road block be established 2 o

LSTs at Yellow Beach during the relief of the lst Marine Division by the 40th Infantry
Division.
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miles beyond Cape Hoskins at a point where the coastal trail crossed the Kapiura
River and became a vehicular road to Rabaul. This point was I 2 miles upstream
from the sea, and impassable swamps to the north and mountainous jungles to the
south turned it into a perfect bottleneck. The division commander agreed merely to
a daylight reconnaissance using a handful of 533d men. By that time an LCM had
been converted to a gunboat, not nearly as heavily armed as were the later such
craft, but with a 37 millimeter and five machine guns, it carried substantial armament.*
With an additional LCVP and LCM the gunboat pushed up the river, and although
nerves were tense as the boats moved noisily up through the heavy jungle that would
provide perfect cover for an ambush, no opposition developed. Upon reaching the
crossing the party went ashore and reconnoitered a few miles in each direction.
Only one Jap was killed, but enemy telephone lines were cut and several substantial
rafts were destroyed, and this mission was the nearest approach to Rabaul made by
ground forces for several months to come. It also pointed out the possibility of employing landing craft on rivers for rapid stabs into doubtful territory.
Partly for purposes of training, the 40th Division had reoccupied Sag Sag and
Aisega on the western end of the island, so that the 533d was now responsible for
water-borne supply of an area that extended 210 miles from east to west. Fortunately,
lighterage at Borgen Bay was not at that time heavy and an unusually efficient SCR
284 radio net helped solve the problem of dispatching and control.
At this time the 533d again requested permission to reconnoiter Garove which
would be a valuable refuge for boats making the run to Talasea and San Remo now
that the southeast monsoon season was approaching. IfGarove were not available, a
crippled boat in a bad southeaster would have no refuge nearer than the Carolines.
This request was passed by Division to Sixth Army which approved it, but limited
the force to a platoon, and Division then turned it over to the 16oth Infantry. After
several days of planning, the I 6oth determined that the project was too risky and
*For a detailed d escrip tion of these " LCMGs" see p ages 282-288.

LCMs tied up at the dock
built in Borgen Bay during
Aprill944.
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that in any event 35 miles off shore was too far for small landing craft! Thoroughly
fed up a small party of 533d boatmen on May 27 embarked on an LCM gunboat,
made the 8o-mile trip, landed, and, after determining from the natives that the J aps
had departed "two moons" ago, collected a fine haul of souvenirs and prepared several
trucks for later removal. Upon their return they learned that the mission had been
assigned to the I85th Infantry and that strict orders had been received that 533d
craft were not to approach the island until it had been cleared by the infantry.
The story's sequel was that the RAAF studying photographs discovered that
certain trucks had "moved" and plastered the island with bombs. The I 85th studied
and planned and finally after four weeks dispatched a Kanaka in a sailing canoe to
obtain a report. To the considerable embarrassment of the 533d who had kept the
secret within the outfit, he reported that "Jap palla go three moon (ago) white master
come one moon (ago)." Late in June a landing of infantry was finally carried out
and Garove was then "officially" recaptured.
Orders received on June I alerted all but one boat company of the 533d for
movement to Aitape 440 miles to the westward. Before departure the I08th RCT
had to be moved in LCMs with all their vehicles and equipment I 20 miles to Arawe
to relieve the I I 2th Cavalry. Several convoys including boats of the 543d were
required for this move, and the boats encountering the full force of the southeast
monsoon in Dampier Strait and along the southwest coast of the island took a terrific
beating. Ramps worn thin by lack of paint and abrasion on sand were smashed in by
the steep breaking seas. Men and equipment were drenched for hours as the boats
struggled to make good 3 knots against the wind and sea. One boat was lost - the
only sinking during all operations of the 53 3d - because her bilge pumps gave out and
her battered ramp let the seas in at will. All personnel were removed before she
went down, but the general's foot-lockers, jeep, and ice chest full of beer necessarily
became part of the contents of Davy Jones' locker. Part of the I08th was carried

Garove Island's
north shore - spot
where l85th Infantry eventually made
its "assault" landing.
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beyond Gasmata to Montagu Harbor on the south coast thus extending the operational routes of the Battalion in New Britain waters to well over 400 miles.
Finally, after a hectic struggle to repair the battered C Company boats, Boat
Battalion Headquarters Company, C Company, and the 3d platoon of the newly
named 1461st Engineer Maintenance Company loaded aboard their landing craft on
June 22 and at dawn the next day took off on the 220-mile run to Kronprinzhafen on
the New Guinea coast between Madang and Hansa Bay. There they refueled and
followed by a 2d ESB convoy proceeded out around the islands offWewak and arrived
at their new base - Aitape. F Company sweated out several weeks waiting for heavy
shipping that never showed up and eventually at the end of August was moved to
Aitape on two convoys ofB Company LCMs.
A Company remained based at Borgen Bay all summer, with a platoon at
Talasea, and easily handled the required water traffic, which task was made simpler
by the laissez-faire policy of the 40th Division. By this time its area was well set up;
eggs, butter, meat, and bread were no longer mere words; and moving pictures
operated on schedule. So it was not an uncomfortable nor an unprofitable stay which
A Company put in during the summer and early fall on New Britain. In September
a boat company of the 594th EB&SR relieved A Company of nearly all work, and it
concentrated on readying itself for its next assignment. A so% replacement of boats
was accomplished by exchanging worn-out craft at Milne Bay, and after the usual
numerous false alarms, Company A finally left New Britain on November 14 to rejoin
the Regiment at Aitape.

CHAPTER IX

Saidor

T

URNING the 1944 calendar back to February, we find that advance elements
of D and E Companies departed with C Company on the 24th for Saidor. The
run from Cape Cretin to Saidor was a little over 100 miles and was accomplished
uneventfully. The balance of Companies D and E and Headquarters Company,
Shore Battalion arrived on LSTs on the morning ofFebruary 28. It was raining hard
when the troops went ashore and continued to do so for most of the stay at Saidor.
Nevertheless a camp site was selected for the Shore Battalion along the beach between
the airstrip and the fuel dump, and the area was cleared and tents erected in rapid
time.
C Company, requiring a harbor for its small boats, found an area a few miles
to the east where a long coral reef furnished nearly sufficient shelter for its anchorage.
Although the anchorage was usable, the area ashore was not. It was swampy, and
perfumed by decomposed Jap bodies. Nevertheless, tents were erected and steps
were taken to create the comforts that were even at this early time known to contribute
so much to efficient operation of an organization. In a conference with the Chief of
Staff of the 32d Division, it was learned that the Shore Battalion would relieve the
Shore Battalion of the 542d EB&SR and operate the harbor under the general direction of the division G-4 section. To it were attached Company B of the 542d EB&SR
and the Amphibious Truck Platoon from the 2d ESB, and in addition assistance was
to be given in harbor operations by the 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion, and miscellaneous labor from the Division and the Air Corps. C Company's LCMs were to be
assigned primarily to combat and resupply missions, but such as could be spared from
those duties, together with two LCTs, three barges, and some DUKWs, were to furnish
lighterage for the harbor. All base communications and beach defense were the
responsibility of the Shore Battalion, as were the construction and maintenance of the
beach and dumps and the road between them, and the supply of water to troops in
the adjacent areas. In case these tasks did not keep the two-company Battalion fully
occupied, it was directed to furnish the division engineer with engineering equipment
and operators whenever called upon.
This mission was anything but glamorous, yet, in the estimation of many, it was
the most difficult assignment the Shore Battalion had during its overseas duty. The
entire operation was bogged down in mud; the initial supply dumps were inaccessible, and the road from the beach to the airstrip and to task force headquarters
was little more than a canal of mud. There was no room to work, except for a much
too narrow strip of beach; the beach was difficult, and coral patches made it very
hard on LCMs. Spare parts for engineer equipment and for boats were not available,
although the operating conditions were such that repeated breakdowns were inevitable. To this should be added the fact that the 32d Division was an extremely stern
taskmaster, and that the Japs were bombing the area every night.
Upon arrival the Shore Battalion discovered that all classes of supplies were
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Mud was the curse of the early days at Saidor. Big dozers struggle to strip the jungle and
make a river of goo into a road.

dangerously low, and so beach operations could not be suspended to give an opportunity to construct a road or to enlarge the working area at the beach. Traffic had
to be kept moving even though tractors at work on the road had to stop frequently
to tow vehicles that were mired. At one time the supply of POL was so low and roads
were so bad that a D-8 towing a sled was assigned to remove fuel from the initial dump,
although it could pull only three drums at a time. It was obvious that supplies could
not cross the beach in any substantial quantity until the beach itself and the roadways
had been greatly improved. This was the first and primary mission of the Shore
Battalion and by working all hours of the day and night with all possible equipment,
a gravel pit was opened, from which the gravel was hauled in trucks and dumped on
the roadbed as D-8s with carry-alls removed the mud. Hand labor opened up drainage-ways, and slowly but surely the difficult problem began to give way before
95
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determined efforts to solve it. Finally, when the weather broke for a few days, an
excellent all-weather road was completed.
With an exit from the beach to the dumps assured, the next necessity was working-room at the beach, and a swamp area was filled in for a parking place for trucks,
and an office for the beachmaster and port director was built. Two other beaches
were in use at this time from which supplies were sent to elements of the Division
which could not be supplied by road, and time was even found to improve these
beaches.
Meanwhile C Company had also been put to work at once. No sooner were the
kitchen and maintenance sections unloaded, than orders were received that boat
operations would begin the following day. This was the first of 368 missions which
were run from this base and, ironically, the first mission was a fishing expedition for
two general officers- at a time when every effort was necessary to get the boats in
condition after their long run and to establish adequate living and working conditions!
Immediately upon arrival, rumors were heard of an assault landing, and on the
28th of February the rumors were confirmed. At this time the 32d Division was
driving the Japs west along the coast, while Aussies were driving them inland along
the Markham Valley. An escape from the valley was located a few miles behind the
Jap line of resistance on the coast. It was necessary, therefore, to cut off the escape

The battalion landing
force assigned to
strike Yalau Plantation holds "dry run"
off Yamai,
New
Guinea.

of the J aps from the Markham Valley and to cut off those who were retreating westward along the coast, and the spot chosen to plug this leak was the plantation of
Y alau. Several night reconnaissances of the beach were made by PT boats, and the
plans were carefully laid. Command afloat was assigned to the 542d's boat battalion
executive as he was the senior amphibian officer, and the first three waves were comprised of boats of Company B, 542d EB&SR. The mission of Company C, 53 3d was
to land the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and gth waves and to handle the resupply of the
reinforced battalion making the attack. The embarkation area was Y amai, located
approximately a third of the way from Saidor to Y alau and not far behind the point
where the 32d Division was engaging the retreating Japs.
On the day prior to the landing, a dry run was made to assure that the landing
would go off with no hitches. Boats were loaded with troops, equipment and supplies,
and after a short run to sea the troops unloaded again, leaving the equipment and
supplies aboard. At dusk the troops reloaded, and the convoy started for Yalau in
97
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good order. Instead of using an army navigation boat, as the 533d did in the Talasea
operation, the flotilla commander placed a PT boat in the guide position and this
resulted in considerable confusion, for the PT could not run slowly enough for the
heavily laden landing craft. The PT would run at 8 knots for a half a mile or so and
then wait for the 6 knot landing craft to close up; as a result in the dark the waves
were constantly running through each other. To add to the problems the sea was
rough, so much so that at times the hubs of the jeeps in the wells of the LCVPs were
under water. Nevertheless, none of the boats were lost, a fact which reflected great
credit on the coxswains, one of whom received an official commendation for his work
that night. At dawn a heavy aerial bombardment took place, and the PTs and landing craft showered the beach with fire.
The Japs, however, had anticipated the attack and had disappeared, and so
the landing can be credited chiefly as valuable experience. The boat crews learned
A combat patrol lands at daybreak behind the enemy lines from LCVPs in
Astrolabe Bay.
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much from it, and one particular occurrence is worth reporting; as two boats moved
in to the beach in their first combat landing, considerable amusement was caused
when it was noted that coffee was boiling on their poop decks.
After the resupply was completed, the temporary base at Yamai was abandoned,
and all the boats returned to the original base. The demand for boats had now
increased, for in addition to the lightering, the coastal runs had been tremendously
increased, both in number and in extent. Initially there was considerable confusion
in boat dispatching caused by too many different agencies ordering boats, by communications difficulties, total lack of maps and charts, and general inexperience, and
C Company was subjected to a good deal of criticism because the boats frequently
arrived at the wrong place at the wrong time and in the wrong number. A change in
personnel, laying a telephone line to the C Company base, and simplifying the
channels of orders affecting boat operations soon rectified this situation.
Back at Saidor the improved working area and roads had produced a greatly
increased rate of discharge. To meet the shortage of hatch crews Companies D
and E were required to train additional winch operators, and though every available
man in the Battalion was put to work, still more men were needed. Through the
G- r section of Division it was discovered that there were a few men who could operate
ships' winches among the divisional units, and they were placed on special duty, which
enabled the beachmaster to . organize and train four hatch crews from a tank destroyer battalion and thus to keep the cargo moving an extra shift. Some 36,rgo
tons of supplies were unloaded at Saidor during March and April, with a daily tonnage ranging from practically zero in the early days to a record in April of r,540 tons.
No records of supplies sent up the coast are available, but from the number ofboats
dispatched on such missions to forward stations it is estimated that such shipments
averaged 50 tons a day during March.
With increased demand and increased tonnage C Company began to run into
maintenance difficulties, and on the 23d ofMarch an all-time low was reached when
only nine boats were operating out of seventy-four assigned. This frightful state of
affairs was the inevitable result of circumstances beyond the Company's control. Its
fleet included not only boats that had been abused back at Goodenough and run
hard daily for over three months, but also contained a score of wrecks that Company
B of the 542d had turned over to C Company for cannibalization rather than risk
moving back to Finschhafen when it was relieved. Replacement parts were short
throughout the Theatre and what few there were were being hoarded by the 2d
Brigade for pending critical operations. Finally, the conditions under which the
boats were forced to operate were unspeakably bad. The beaches were continually
pounded by surf and consisted in large measure of boulders. The impossibility of
keeping bulk-loaded boats from broaching on the beach dictated the use of mobile
loading - driving trucks empty aboard the LCM, loading the truck at shipside with
a bare 3 tons, and landing the loaded truck from the LCM. This meant many more
beachings per day to obtain the same tonnage and put particular strain on the ramp
winch mechanisms which at this period contained many inherent defects.
Part of the trouble lay in the inadequacy of the maintenance beach for hauling
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Handling slingloads of cargo~into an LCM and into DUKWs .
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out boats regardless of the tide; so Shore Battalion equipment and operators began the
construction of the first of many semi-artificial beaches the Regiment was to build.
At the same time the worst of the wrecks were condemned and stripped to obtain a
meager supply of parts for the others. But division headquarters could understand
only the superficial figures and waged a futile campaign of recrimination directing
the Shore Battalion commander to relieve the two senior boat officers for wilful
destruction of government property and preferring charges against seven coxswains
who obeyed their Company commander's orders to bring damaged boats back to the
base rather than aggravate easily repairable trouble by making additional landings.
Prompt and vigorous representations by the commanders of the Boat Battalion,
Regiment and Brigade caused reconsideration of this hasty action. The real cure
came shortly thereafter as a few critically needed parts were released, and superhuman
labors of mechanics and specialists of the C Company maintenance section and the
platoon of the 563d conquered the deadline. By April g the Company was able to
turn out 3 I of its 40 LCMs and 7 of its I o LCVPs which is not an impressive record by
later standards but was a vast improvement over the past. As an example of the strain
Loading miscellaneous gear aboard LCMs from a % -ton truck.
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on the maintenance personnel, in a thirty-day period 274 propellers and 196 shafts
were changed, and 310 ramp belts were repaired; .this was, of course, in addition to
other work on a similar scale, and illustrates the difficulties which were met at this
station.
For both Battalions the period at Saidor was a very hard school, but the lessons
learned were learned well and never forgotten. From a dismal start progress was
made to very substantial accomplishments which in turn led to a record in the future
of which the Regiment can always be proud. The pressure on lighterage, which
caused such difficulty, seemed puzzling at the time to many, but it was later learned
Test firing the after "fifty" on an LCM.
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that the task force was under similar pressure to build up a supply base for the airborne supply of the Aitape-Hollandia task force with which the Regiment was later
to work.
In the middle of April the 40th Division and the 32d Division engaged in a tugof-war for the services of C Company; the former persuaded Sixth Army to issue
orders under which C Company departed for New Britain, but the 32d Division
secured orders first countermanding the move and then directing the Company to
move less one platoon. C Company, however, had already moved but had been forced
to leave behind nine LCMs and an LCV, which were in such bad condition that they
could not undertake the trip, and the necessary maintenance men to put these boats
into satisfactory operating condition. As a result of the conflicting orders this rear
echelon became hostages for the platoon and at the same time was called upon to run
some missions. When the 32d Division finally came to realize that nothing was being
accomplished by keeping the hostages, and also as the result of some radio messages

Part of the Shore Battalion's camp at Saidor.

from Boat Battalion h eadquarters, which made rather free use of the persuasive n ame
of Krueger, the rear echelon at last obtained leave to proceed to New Britain, arriving
there during the first week in May.
The Shore Battalion carried on at Saidor for a little longer, profiting in efficiency
of operation from the h eadaches suffered in the early days. As of the 2gth of April it
was relieved from attachment to the Saidor Task Force and assisted the Navy in
loading out the 32d Division, and was relieved in turn from its beach work by an
Australian docks operating company. On the 8th of May the Battalion, less F
Company, consisting of 560 men and 32 officers, boarded the Liberty ship William N .
Byers and joined a convoy of approximately sixty vessels supposedly bound for Aitape,
where the task force assigned to seize Wakde I sland was assembling. The Byers
stumbled out ofher convoy and into another one during the night of the roth, arriving
to everyone's surprise at Hollandia. As soon as the error was acknowledged, the ship
put to sea again and arrived at Aitape on the 13th ofMay.

CHAPTER X

Aitape

G

ENERAL MAcARTHUR'S operations to shatter thejap main line of resistance
in Northeast New Guinea and the Bismarcks were successfully concluded with
the seizure of the Admiralties early in March. The J aps were isolated in eastern
New Britain and New Ireland, and their main New Guinea force, the XVIII Army,
was feverishly bracing itself in the Wewak-Hansa Bay area to receive the next American onslaught. But once in the enemy backfield General MacArthur had no interest
in assaulting J ap defensive strongholds. His eye was fixed on the end zone - the
Philippines. H~s interest in New Guinea was confined solely to securing necessary
staging areas and air bases, and the less J aps protecting these the better he liked it.
Hollandia, at almost the center of New Guinea's north coast, and Biak Island, threefourths of the way from Milne Bay to the western tip were prize base areas and yet the
Japs, lulled into security because they were so far behind the front lines, left them
feebly garrisoned. Every effort was made to convince the J aps that the next American
objective was Hansa Bay and Wewak, including the planting of faked diaries on life
rafts dropped from planes attacking this locality, and the Jap commander bithook, line and sinker. H e stripped Aitape and Hollandia to concentrate three firstclass divisions near Wewak, collected and rallied the units retreating from Saidor and
the Markham Valley, and confidently expected to repulse the American assault and
avenge himself for a long series of defeats in eastern New Guinea.
In the darkness of April 22 the largest amphibious force yet assembled in the
SWPA suddenly appeared over the northern horizon one hundred to two hundred
and fifty miles behind Wewak and landed virtually without opposition at Aitape,

The beach at Aitape was a narrow
strip between the surf and the
jungle. Scene from the D day landing
April 22, 1944.

•

At Humboldt Bay, Hollandia, doughboys of the initial landing force pass wreckage of
Jap equipment as they seek a trail leading inland.

Hollandia, and Tanahmerah Bay. This great end run at one stroke moved the
Sixth Army nearly four hundred miles nearer the Philippines. Since previous
amphibious attacks had never bitten off more than one hundred miles at a time, it is
small wonder that the Jap forces were utterly bewildered and unprepared. Taking
advantage of his initial success, MacArthur pressed the offensive using one of the two
combat teams that had landed at Aitape to attack Toem and Wakde Island, a hundred
miles beyond Tanahmerah Bay, and the balance of the 41st Division to seize Biak
Island. It was as these attacks were being teed up that the 533d Shore Battalion
came into the picture. Its move from Saidor had been timed to bring it to Aitape in
time to load out with the r63d Infantry for Toem and Wakde, and so the men were
informed when the Byers dropped her hook in Aitape Roads on May r 3· Immediately
the staff began making hasty plans while the troops, except those needed to unload
the ship, marched to a temporary bivouac near the beach. Late that afternoon,
105
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however, it became apparent that the Battalion's heavy equipment could not possibly
be unloaded in time to meet the loading schedule set up by the Wakde attack force.
Accordingly the 593d EB&SR's Shore Battalion, which had taken part in the initial
attack on Aitape, was assigned to the Wakde task force and the 533d Battalion's
mission was changed to relieving the 593d and operating the Aitape beach installations. This was naturally a bitter disappointment for all ranks as they felt long overdue for a combat assignment, but as events turned out the erratic navigation of the
Byers which had kept them out of the Wakde show actually was responsible for their
later participation in two of the three biggest operations in the Philippines. The
593d Shore Battalion seemingly getting the good break was in fact heading up a blind
alley that was to lead to many boring months on Noemfoor Island and no chance to
get into action after July 1944·
The mission of the force at Aitape was purely defensive: locally it was to protect
the intermediate airstrip and, when and if the Jap XVIII Army reacted to its
predicament, it was to repulse any effort by the Japs to move against Hollandia.
In other words the huge base installations at Hollandia were to be kept free to prepare
for the invasion of the Philippines while the troops at Aitape were to h<?ld the mainjap
forces at a safe distance. Early in May the Aitape garrison consisted of the 32d Division with normal attachments, and the Shore Battalion despite its difficulties at Saidor
had sufficiently impressed division headquarters so that it received a warm welcome.
As the Jap Army slowly recovered from its shock and faced about to attack to the
westward, the Aitape garrison was steadily reinforced to meet the threat. But this
involved many weeks, for the Japs, harassed by day by the RAAF and by night by the
PTs, had an extremely difficult job moving 5o,ooo men and equipment a hundred
miles over the miserable trails. The major battle which will be known to history as
the Battle of the Driniumor River did not begin in earnest until mid-July.
To return to the r 3th of May, the disconsolate Shore Battalion was allotted an old
· J ap ration dump for its camp site. This spot had not been touched since the J aps
abruptly abandoned their breakfast three weeks before and required several days of
clearing and burying garbage; so the battalion commander decided to keep the men
in their temporary bivouac using }1ngle hammocks and emergency rations while the
new permanent camp was being established. Between the two areas lay an ammunition dump with both J ap and American shells piled in not too well dispersed bays.
The second night after the Battalion debarked, this dump caught fire, whether by
accident or by the hand of a J ap infiltrator will never be known, and soon was a raging
inferno. Exploding shells and whining bullets made the temporary bivouac and the
main unloading beach untenable for twenty-four hours and isolated the men who were
working at the permanent camp site. Liberty ships in the roadstead hastily weighed
anchor and moved out of range of the shells. The men working on the beach removed
supplies to safety and carried on unloading activities on a new beach. When the
ammunition fire burned out, the Battalion lost no time in establishing itself in the
permanent camp site. Tents were erected, kitchens and latrines installed and screened
against the flies. Water works were installed including showers and water piped to
all company kitchens.
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The principal mission of the Shore Battalion was the same old one of getting
cargo out of the holds of the ships and into the appropriate task force dumps. Attached to the Battalion were a port company, a DUKW platoon, Company A ofthe
593d EB&SR with forty LCMs, and a few LCTs. Extra labor and trucks were furnished by division troops on the basis of daily requisitions by the Shore Battalion commander. During the first few months relatively calm waters and dry weather made
for smooth harbor operations and good tonnages, with the average daily off-loading
amounting to 1200 tons in June and 1428 tons in July. The work was handled by
three six-hour shifts except when round-the-clock operations were necessitated by critical shortages ashore. Experience proved that as much if not more tonnage could be

The Shore Battalion's Can"Ip at Aitape.

disch arged by a given unit in this way in 18 hours th an in a full 24 hours because eight
h our shifts lost so much time in on-the-job feeding. In addition the shortage of
supervising officers with only a small battalion staff to draw from made this shorter
work day more efficient over a sustained period of m any months.
The engineer platoons and their equipment were steadily employed, but as was
gen er ally the case, their work consisted of a great variety of small jobs. One of th e
most difficult j obs, and one that required all dozers, was building LST ramps. New
ramps h ad to be constructed for each echelon, for the surf made it impossible to build
permanent j etties. They cleared and drained all dump areas, maintained all roads
leading to and within dump areas, prepared beach roads and parking areas for out-
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loading task forces, assisted with the construction of the airstrip and operated a gravel
pit for the I 18th Engineers.
The Boat Battalion less A and B Companies, which had left New Britain for
Aitape on the 23d of June, on the morning of the 26th caught its first glimpse of its
new station, Seleo Island, a small island located three miles from the mainland and
furnishing part of the meager shelter for Aitape Roads. As the convoy neared its

Left: "Mobile loading" of a B Company LCM and a DUKW alongside a Liberty ship.
Right: The beach at Lemieng, Aitape, was cleared and widened to handle heavy traffic.

future home it passed hard by Angel Island, which was built up solidly with native
huts, and the souvenir hunters acquired a new interest in life. The convoy lay to off
the western shore of Seleo while a reconnaissance group went ashore. The island was
small, and there was nothing to be found except the remnants of a J ap fuel dump,
which had been efficiently bombed and strafed, and several wrecked Jap landing
barges. A fringing reef from 40 to 100 yards wide surrounded the island, except for a
small break at the northwest corner, which was occupied by the maintenance platoon
attached to Company A of the 593d. It was at once apparent that the most serious
problem would be a maintenance beach, and the only feasible solution was to build
one out over the coral reef some ninety yards or more. With the experience from
Saidor and New Britain, the work of building the maintenance beach and setting up
camp proceeded smoothly.

Left and upper right: Dipper stick filling dump trucks in borrow pit at Aitape.
Louer right: A section of the arterial highway that eventually ran through the base atAitape.

As usual the Battalion was informed that lightering would begin within the first
twenty-four hours and the first six boats to be unloaded were dispatched to the mainland to start a monotonous grind that was to last for six months. The beach where
the lighterage was taking place looked ominous; the flat and shallow underwater
contour promised considerable trouble for propellers, strut bearings, rudders, and
water pumps, and so work on the maintenance beach was pushed forward with all
possible speed. The lightering commitment was raised rapidly, and throughout its
stay on Seleo the Battalion furnished the beachmaster all boats that were not either
disabled or engaged in tactical missions. The boatmen were glad to find the eighteenhour day in effect, but of course this meant no six-hour shift for them. As long as
there were enough serviceable boats they split the day into nine-hour tours, but the
trip to and from the beach and delays at the end of each period extended this duty to a
good twelve hours a day. As the pressure increased and the old boats began to collapse under the strain, the boats that were fit to run lightered the full eighteen hours,
which barely permitted a brief return to the island base once each night.
During May and June the tactical situation shaped up about as expected. The
32d Division established outposts of about company strength at Babieng and Y akamul and an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. Preparing for the worst,
it laid out a final defense line including only a strip a few hundred yards deep running
from the Nigia to the Raihu Rivers. This line barely took in the vital Tadji airstrip
109
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Scenes from Seleo Island: Left to right, top to bottom: The anchorage; carryall building beach over coral
shelf; hauling an LCM on the artificial beach; vistas of C Company's bivouac; the island's only highway.

and left so little room to maneuver that the main hospital was moved out to Tumleo
Island. The first inkling of the approaching onslaught came shortly after the Shore
Battalion arrived, when the outpost company at Babieng radioed during the middle
of the night that it had been by-passed and cut off by a large body of Japs. The
Division decided to withdraw the company by sea rather than start a fight I 5 miles
from its main lines. Four LCMs of Company A, 593d, and two LCTs escorted by two
593d LCMGs effected the rescue without loss.
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Knowledge that the Japs had substantial forces so far along the trail from Wewak
to Aitape caused prompt acceleration of work on the main defences. The Shore
Battalion not only cleared fields of fire and constructed coconut-log pill boxes and gun
emplacements throughout the beachhead but was also assigned a sector of its own on
the line. Under the direction of Brigadier General Stark of the 43d Division, which
was en route to Aitape, the western half of the perimeter was assigned for the time being to available engineer troops on the possibility that the J aps might skirt the eastern
defenses and strike at the "rear" of the beachhead. The Battalion's defense platoon,
well reinforced, selected and organized its position in jungle so heavy that its 3 7 mm
guns had to be dismantled and carried into position by hand.
By the end of June the Jap 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions had arrived within
striking distance of the American positions. Had they attacked at once using their
entire strength it is not at all unlikely that they would have broken through and put
the Americans in a desperate position. But as usual they dallied, thrusting here and
there and driving our outposts back to Niumen Creekjust east of the Driniumor. At
the same time the Aitape task force was growing rapidly. Control passed to XI
Corps under Major General Hall, and the I I 2th Cavalry Regiment and the I 24th
RCT ofthe 31st Division arrived to build up the Corps, while the 43d Division began
to come in from New Zealand. Though still outnumbered, General Hall on July g
decided to throw theJaps off balance and at least gain some time by having the 124th
RCT make an amphibious attack at Naparake behind the flank of the Jap 20th
Division.
D day was set for July 13, and lightering operations were to be suspended while
~
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all available craft of Company C and the 59 3d's Company A and the LCT group moved
the combat team 20 miles down the coast for a surprise dawn attack, heralded only by
a quick air strike and PT and LCMG strafing. Most of the Shore Battalion was
attached to the landing force, and all 53 3d men eagerly prepared themselves and their
equipment for the first amphibian assault in which both battalions would perform
their standard functions as a team. Unfortunately--or perhaps fortunately-the Japs
struck first, throwing several battalions across the Driniumor during the night of
July I o- I r. Several I 27th Infantry outposts were cut off east of the Driniumor, and
the I I 2th Cavalry at Afua near the inland extremity of the line was also for a time
encircled. During the I I th plans for the attack on N aparake were pushed in the
belief that it might be possible to force the Japs to withdraw in order to meet this
attack, but when the seriousness of the Jap penetration was fully realized, the operation was called off, and the I 24th RCT hastily moved up the beach in trucks, DUKWs
and on foot to Tiver to hold the point oftheJaps while the I 27th Infantry was directed
to abandon most of its Driniumor defense line and retreat to Chalogi Creek, about
halfway back to the final defense line. The fierceness of the fighting meant an unexpectedly heavy volume of artillery fire, and it was soon realized that unless unloading
was stepped up the ammunition dumps would soon be dangerously low. So, for the
bulk of the 53 3d, the direct result of this break-through was to put their noses back on
the lightering and cargo handling grindstone, and to turn the crank harder than ever
before.
A minority ofthe 533d, principally men assigned to LCMGs, DUKWs and some
LCMs saw considerable excitement in the next few weeks. The very afternoon that
the attack on Naparake was canceled a cub plane spotted one of the lost platoons
of the I 27th Infantry trying to cut its way out to the beach beyond the Driniumor.
At that time four LCMs guarded by two LCMGs had just finished delivering supplies
to the new front lines. The boats quickly set off down the coast taking their course
from the cub plane. The pilot got slightly mixed up and led the boats toward the
near side of the wooded point at the river mouth, and only by luck did one of the
LCMGs, swinging wide on the turn, spot a colored smoke grenade several hundred
yards to the east of the point. This boat immediately altered course and with some
difficulty signaled the rest of the craft to follow. As the first gunboat drew near,
doughboys could be seen running out of the woods and plunging over the low sand
dunes while puffs of sand indicated plenty of J ap small arms fire. The boat did not
wait for the others but beached immediately, and as the first doughboy scrambled
aboard, the infantry platoon leader backed out of the woods spraying his tommy gun
to indicate there were no more Americans to come. The gunboat's machine guns
then began to rake the woods, and as the men closed in around the gunboat helping
the wounded aboard, the 37mm piece belched cannister and HE into the trees less
than 25 yards from the water's edge. The Japs were content to remain in the jungle,
and though the gunboat was somewhat peppered with holes, no casualties were sustained. The other boats arrived as it was retracting with its cargo of grateful and
exhausted soldiers, and the little fleet gave the scene an intense strafing before retiring.
The gunboats took station that night offTiver as an extension of the perimeter, a

AITAPE

113

function they were to perform for the rest of the summer. Not only did this afford
the troops ashore security from attack from the sea or along the beach itself, but it
also put a half dozen machine guns in excellent position to enfilade any banzai
attack against the perimeter's first 100-150 yards. Early on the 13th the entire
American force counterattacked to re-establish the line on the west bank of the
Driniumor River. Along the beach the attack was spearheaded by a platoon of tank
destroyers with the gunboats slightly ahead and as near the beach as the surf would
permit (30-50 yards). Radio contact over the SCR 300 linked the boats with the
TDs and the rifle company that was following immediately behind. Every thicket
and group of thatched huts was raked with machine guns and HE before the doughboys moved ahead. When snipers in tree tops made a nuisance of themselves the
boats' 37s blew the treetop to pieces. All went well until about noon. Anamo had
been recaptured and an obstinate group of Japs in Chakila was being plastered with
small arms. Suddenly enemy artillery began to rake the beach. No one could see
just where it was coming from, and seized by mild panic both tankers and doughboys
hastily withdrew more than half a mile. · The boats quickly received full attention
from the concealed Jap battery, and unable to discover its whereabouts they too
adopted "evasive tactics" and scrambled to the westward at their full seven knots.
A cub plane soon spotted the Jap battery 300 yards from where the boats had been,
and our artillery silenced it. That afternoon the ground was regained by the same
methodical methods with the additional support of 4.5-inch rockets from one of
the LCMGs, and by nightfall the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, had dug in along the
lower reaches of the Driniumor with the gunboats, unable to cross the shallow bar,
standing guard at the river mouth ready to spray the surface of the river should the
Japs attempt to counterattack across it. The units farther inland had not made
such easy progress, and through gaps between companies the J aps launched a counterattack breaking through to the sea again three miles to the westward in the vicinity of
our artillery positions. A savage battle raged throughout the evening with two 533d
LCMGs dueling with Jap machine guns at point blank range. Here again the concentrated fire power of these improvised craft was decisive, and the rain ofHE 20 mm
and 37 mm shells was more than the Jap party could stand, so it withdrew into the
jungle, and the tenuous line of communications along the beach was re-established.
For the rest of July things were relatively quiet on the seaward extremity of the
line as units farther inland, dependent primarily on supplies dropped by air, struggled
up to their assigned positions on the river and thejap units behind them were mopped
up. Each night the LCMGs maintained their defensive station and during daylight
made short runs forward to strafe or dump rockets on reported Jap concentrations.
Though the J aps in battalion strength attacked the river line nightly for more than
two weeks, they made no attempt to cross it near its mouth. Supplies and replacements for the forward troops were brought up daily by LCMs, and express service
was maintained by DUKWs which could make excellent time along the beach and
swim around the unfordable creek mouths.
During this period one small action involving the boats occurred, and though it
was the only costly such encounter, it was completely unplanned and unnecessary.

Top: A Shore Battalion DUK\V rushes reinforcements from Aitape towards the Driniumor.
Bottom: Treadway bridge across a slew near Anan1o.

Early one morning an ambulance and a jeep carrying a full colonel got their landmarks mixed up and at low tide drove across the Driniumor, not only unaware that
they were proceeding into enemy territory but also ignoring the orders to halt given by
the local platoon leader. The infantry commander requested that the 593d LCMG
which was standing by overtake the vehicles and order them to return, which seemed
rather a hopeless task since the gunboat could only make 8 knots and the vehicles were
by then far ahead. The gunboat picked up a cargo LCM that had just discharged a
load of supplies and proceeded down the beach· until both vehicles were in view.
Suddenly, near Parakovio, the ambulance stopped, and the driver started running
back along the beach. Through the glasses it could be seen that the ambulance had
been hit by small arms fire. This apparently finally convinced the colonel, and the
jeep began to turn around. Halfway around, however, it bogged down, and the
driver and the colonel evacuated promptly. While the gunboat moved in on the
exposed flank, ready to open fire when a target appeared, the cargo LCM grounded,
and the three men climbed aboard and headed back for safe territory with no worse
114
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effects than the loss of the vehicles. The colonel, however, soon recovered his nerve
and after transferring to a DUKW to continue homeward himself, he ordered the
boats to return up the beach in order to salvage the jeep and the ambulance. A party
of troops came aboard, and the boats headed back to the beach at the same spot where
the men had been picked up. The second trip into the beach, however, was fatal,
for as the cargo LCM reached the outer breakers a 75 mm gun, well-concealed but
close to the beach, opened fire on it, getting <;1 direct hit that burst in the cargo well
among the troops. The gunboat opened fire and strafed the beach, searching for
the hidden gun, and although no damage was apparently done to the enemy gun, its
fire was drawn away from the cargo boat which was thus enabled to withdraw from
the beach. The enemy gun crew scored one hit on the gunboat, the shell exploding
in a rocket launcher just forward of the engine room, but the continued heavy volume
of fire from both craft prevented further hits, and the two boats were soon out of range
where stock could be taken. The price paid for the colonel's stupidity was five men
dead or dying and eleven wounded. The colonel was promptly relieved of his regiment by the corps commander and later severely punished.
A worse tragedy was nearly enacted when a jumpy corps staff officer became excited over a report that thejaps had collected barges for a sea-borne attack behind our
Driniumor positions. In the middle of the night he abruptly altered the patrol zones
carefully worked out between the 533d, the local PT squadron commanders and the
destroyer division commander, informing only the PTs. As a result a PT skipper,
believing that the LCMGs had been withdrawn opened up on one of them with a
40 mm gun at 75 yards range, fortunately missing. Identities were established in the
nick of time and a frightful battle, that would not only have pitted army gunboats
against PTs but would also have involved our destroyers and artillery, was averted
by an eyelash.
On July 3 I the corps commander, sensing that the Japs had bled themselves
white in futile piece-meal attacks, ordered a general offensive. The I 24th Infantry
quietly assembled during the night behind the Driniumor and passing through the
I 28th advanced eastward along the coast. The tank destroyers and gunboats, with
PTs standing by a little farther off shore, once more paced the attack which in two days
gained three miles. Then, as the boats deceivingly raked Yakamul and Parakovio

A rocket barrage in the vicinity of Naparake fires a Jap dump.
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Tank destroyers spearhead the counterattack of August l, 1944 eastwards from the Driniumor River. Slightly
a head on their seaward flank were the LCM gunboats.
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with rockets and automatic weapons, the r 24th turned and drove straight inland
with the other line units wheeling to the right in a finely coordinated maneuver
that rolled up the Jap Army and penned it between the r 12th Cavalry and the impenetrable Torricelli Mountains. For ten days fierce fighting raged in the heavy
jungle around Afua as six American regimental combat teams relentlessly chewed
the Japs from three sides and the forbidding mountains blocked any escape. So
ended the battle of the Driniumor River, one of the decisive battles of the War and
the largest ground engagement in the Southwest Pacific prior to the fighting on Leyte.
Its outlines have been included in this story, despite the fact that 533d played a very
minor role in the actual fighting, for several reasons. Both boatmen and shore
engineers were straining to the utmost to meet the logistical demands of this campaign
and yet had pitifully little information about its progress and importance. The
glamorous break-through of the Third Army in France and the well publicized campaign in the Marianas captured all the headlines and news broadcasts at the time.
Yet, had the battle of the Driniumor gone the other way or even been a prolonged
stalemate, the invasion of the Philippines would have been postponed many months.
Finally, the campaign itselfwas a military masterpiece in which the XI Corps, without benefit of superior numbers and despite incredible difficulties of terrain, utterly
destroyed an army of so,ooo as a fighting force.
Back in Aitape Roads, where the bark of our artillery could be heard above the
datter of bulldozers and cranes, the stress of the battle was brought home to the men
working the ships by the frantic appeals of the corps staff for more tonnage. Ammunition was being expended day after day at a sustained rate never before witnessed
in the Theatre. Engineer materials to bridge the countless streams and strengthen
the perimeter defenses were invariably in short supply, and the bombers and fighters
based on the Tadji strips, setting new records in missions per plane per day, had an
inexhaustible appetite for fuel and bombs. The 43d Division with 2o,ooo tons of
equipment had to be unloaded in a hurry and, over the protest of the 533d, corps
headquarters insisted that this be done over the beach nearest the Division's bivouac,
.a nightmare of shallow sandbars pommeled by severe sur£
Though the shore engineers and their equipment felt the strain, it was the boats
that produced the real crisis. The fleet of Company A of the 593d had been badly
battered in the early days of the landing and was down to about 20% operable boats
when the 533d's C Company arrived with its fleet of relics that had barely survived
the ordeal of Saidor. These craft stood up pretty well at first, but the maintenance
·crews soon fell behind as their small stock of spare parts and materials dwindled under
the pressure of repeated breakdowns. Propeller blades were built up and hammered
into shape so many times that they actually became limp, and coxswains could not
gun their motors, for the propeller blades would bend under the sudden load. As the
boats ground their way on and off the flat beaches, the propellers went completely out
of shape, and the shafts bent like reeds. The shafts were worn so much at the strut
bearing that it was necessary to turn them down on a lathe and fit them with sleeves
made from iron pipe. When the supply of strut bearings was exhausted, wooden ones
were turned out on lathes, but the combination of a high-speed shaft, a steel bearing
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surface, a wooden bearing, and an inexhaustible supply of sand rendered this expedient vain, for such bearings wore out faster than they could be turned out.
The maintenance men did what they could, patching and improvising and
praying for a reasonable shipment of new shafts, propellers and bearings, and when
the hulls of the boats gave way, they patched ramps and hulls with flattened oil drums
until oxygen gave out. Then they were helpless. On the 25th ofJuly after repeated
reports as to the desperate condition of the boats went unheeded at Corps, the Boat
Battalion commander condemned and laid up twenty hopelessly leaking boats so
that the limited repair resources could be concentrated on keeping the least unseaworthy craft operating. This brought immediate constructive action from the Sixth
Army Engineer, and a few days later twenty boat crews in three C-4 7 transports
were winging their way 8oo miles to Milne Bay to draw new boats and bring them to
Aitape under their own power. Sheet steel, oxygen, water-pump gears, shafts and
other critical items were flown to Aitape from elsewhere in the Theatre. And the
533d's B Company which had been sitting at Finschhafen since early in July while
various base commanders wrangled for its assignment, was ordered to join the Battalion at Seleo Island relieving the virtually inoperative 593d Company. Finally
additional LCTs, far more suitable than LCMs for lightering under the prevailing
conditions, were sent down from Hollandia. By mid-August, as the fury of the battle
subsided, the critical lighterage situation improved, and for the next several weeks
unloading operations went forward with relative smoothness.
During August the Regiment for the first time since arrival overseas made real
progress toward concentration. Regimental Headquarters after six months on the
Nugudu Peninsula at Finschhafen loaded up in boats of B Company and the new C
Company craft en route from Milne Bay, and moved via Bogia to Aitape, where it
established its command post and assumed operational control of the theretofore
virtually independent battalions. The B Company boats then made two round trips
to New Britain to bring F Company back into the Shore Battalion fold. Thus by the
first week in September the entire Regiment, except A Company, was located in the
same task force area, though separation of the bivouacs by several miles of water did
much to preserve the separatist sentiment in the battalions. As will be seen in the
next chapter, no sooner was the Regiment reunited than it was alerted for a major
attack on the Talaud Islands between Morotai and the Philippines. But after two
feverish weeks of planning and preparation this operation was canceled, and the
outfit with a bad feeling ofletdown went on with its routine work of discharging ships
and constructing and maintaining roads and other facilities.
At the end of September the surf suddenly and without apparent cause built up
until the beach which had been used ever since April became unusable. Lightering
operations were transferred to Aitape Cove where the sheltering headland took the
brunt of the northwesterly swells. This involved great inconvenience, for the trucks
had to run five miles to some of the dumps over a winding road and the boatmen had
to make a seven-mile run from Seleo Island to the cove which added nearly two
hours to their lengthy working shift. The new sea conditions soon washed away the
artificial beaches built on what had been Seleo's sheltered side, so all maintenance
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activities were concentrated in the tiny cove recently evacuated by Company A of
the sggd.
Gunboat operations which had subsided when the climax of the Battle of the
Driniumor moved inland, were revived late in August when the 43d Division relieved
the XI Corps which departed for Morotai. The remnants of the Jap XVIII Army
straggled back toward But and Wewak, and Major General Wing decided to give
them no chance to reorganize within harassing distance of Aitape. First his 103d
Infantry and later the I 72d Infantry were given the mission of aggressive patrolling
to the east. These patrols were also intended to season the many replacements that
had joined the Division in New Zealand after its costly campaign the previous year
in the Solomons, and they made constant use of the 533d's flotilla now numbering
six gunboats with armament up to 57 mm guns. During early September elements of
the Iogd pushed through the Drimbol plantation and established an outpost at
Babieng, and in the latter part of the month the I 72d fought its way against increasingly vigorous resistance another twelve miles to Suain. An attempt to push on
across the Danmap River to Cape Djeruan would have been a disaster had it not been
for the support of the two 533d gunboats. The Japs let a platoon of Company F,
I 72d Infantry ford the river and advance 1000 yards, and then they closed in. While
the LCMGs helped this platoon battle its way to a point on the shore where it was possible for the boats to beach in the heavy surf and pick it up, a J ap battalion crossed the
river further inland and attacked the rest of F Company near Luain. A rescue
similar to that in the first days of the Battle of the Driniumor was performed by two
gunboats of B and C Company with the additional obstacle of such heavy surf that
the wounded had to be floated out on rubber boats. After this narrow escape Division
prescribed a more conservative policy, and thejaps too seemed willing to leave a wide
no-man's-land-provided their positions at But were not threatened; so the gunboats
had no more excitement.
One final exploit of the LCMGs came about because the PTs which had shared
the Seleo anchorage had moved on. An old Walrus biplane of the RAAF took an
intelligence officer on a risky mission to question natives on Karasua Island well
within the Wewak stronghold. The natives turned out to have been pro-Japanese,
and machine gun bullets promptly set the plane afire as it landed. An accompanying
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plane thought the Aussies on the Walrus had escaped into the jungle and that if a
boat could enter those waters they might be able to swim out to it. With no PTs
available, four 533d LCMGs and a picket boat with newly installed radar immediately
set forth with the understanding that they would lie to off the island until an hour
after sunrise while RAAF planes scared the 5-inch and 6-inch batteries on nearby
Kairiru and Cape Karawop into silence. Despite a series of rain squalls that drowned
out the radar and reduced visibility to zero, the rendezvous was made before dawn and
flares set off. The promised air cover failed to materialize, but the Jap batteries,
probably uninterested in wasting ammunition on such small targets, remained quiet,
and the boats after leisurely skirting the island with no sign of refugees, impudently
splattered some knownjap installations with 40 mm HE and returned unmolested to
Seleo. It is believed that no other Allied craft, army or navy, ever penetrated those
well-fortified waters by daylight until well into 1945.
As various problems began to find solutions, opportunity for recreation could
also be found. The gentlemen from Kentucky and Tennessee, cut off from their
native supplies, were forced to improvise from materials at hand, and alcoholic
beverages whose parentage was subject to a great deal of question began to appear in
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the tents of the Regiment. The amateurs were forced to resort to forcing raisins and
sugar through the eyes of coconuts or to stirring canned heat, hair tonic, and aftershave lotion with dried prunes and raisins. The more professional, however, proceeded with the aid of several Coleman stoves, some pilfered copper tubing, and a
couple of five-gallon cans to set up a distilling operation which speeded production
and increased potency to such an extent that after considerable consumption the
consumer became a superman, as witness the following story. An ex-fisherman from
C Company stocked himself up fully and, while in that condition, fell unnoticed off
the stern of an LCM about four miles away from Seleo; unconcerned as the boat failed
to slow down he began to swim to the island and found the water so refreshing that he
swam right on past it and had to retrace his course some two miles after he discovered
the error. This feat gave rise to many theories, the most plausible one of which is

The native population was cordial,
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was devoutly religious.

AITAPE

123

that so much of the water in his body had been displaced by alcohol that he floated
three-fourths out ofwater, and his failure to correct his speed curve for this change in
displacement caused him to over-shoot the island.
The construction of stills, however, was not the only recreation. The Shore
Battalion constructed a fine open-air theatre, large enough to accommodate neighboring units, and film was thus secured for a picture almost every night. Once the
schedules had been coordinated with the shifts at the beach so that the maximum
number of troops could attend, a great deal of pleasure was had from this pastime.
When Bob Hope's show arrived an even larger stage complete with dressing rooms
was built. The show was held in the afternoon and work- except of the most essential variety- was suspended so that almost all of the Regiment was able to enjoy it.
Softball came into its own for the first time at Aitape and provided a source of
entertainment for a great many of the troops. Each company of the Regiment on the
mainland had a team, and from these teams was selected an aggregation which represented the Battalion in inter-unit competition. On Seleo, too, companies, platoons,
and even the officers had their own teams, and games were in progress whenever the
work schedule permitted. Not only the players but the spectators were greatly benefitted from the games. In June the Regiment began to receive monthly quotas of
leaves and furloughs to Australia; the quotas were so small as to be almost invisible,
but the thought that they might be increased, the fact that even so few were actually
going on furlough, and the stories told by those who returned gave everyone a great
boost in morale.
In November the regimental commander, after several conferences with the
battalion commanders, decided upon a reorganization within the Regiment which
would give it a really workable T/0 and would more nearly equalize ratings with
responsibilities. The boat companies with tables calling for 65 boats were actually
operating 45, and the shore companies with tables calling for 3 dozers were actually
manning 6 and many other pieces of equipment. Therefore, ratings were taken from
boat companies and distributed to the shore companies. To give the Shore Battalion
commander, who was ex-officio beachmaster, an adequate staff for round-the-clock
operations, the regimental staff was pared down and officer and enlisted ratings given
to Headquarters, Shore Battalion. Finally, the weapons sections and platoon of the
Shore Battalion were abolished, subject to being reconstituted on a provisional basis
during assault operations, and the shore companies were divided into an engineering
platoon and a cargo platoon, thus recognizing a functional division which had in fact
existed since their arrival overseas. Though this shake-up in ratings and organization
inevitably worked against the interests of many individuals, the overall results proved
excellent in suceeding operations.
The final weeks at Aitape were absorbed in intensive preparation for participation in the invasion of the Philippines and are covered in the next chapter. As the
monsoon season changed, even the relatively sheltered beach at Aitape Cove was
buffeted by an increasingly bad surf. This caused frequent suspension of unloading,
and brought the average daily tonnage for October and November down to less than
I ooo as compared with nearly 1500 during the hectic days of August.
But the
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Bob Hope and Frances Langford wow 15,000 Gls from the Shore Battalion's stage at
Aitape.

unloading quota did not perceptibly relax as the 43d Division built up its supplies for
the Philippine campaign and the 6th Australian Division with numerous service units
moved in to take its place. An unfortunate result of this continued pressure despite
bad conditions was that the new boats were soon nearly as dilapidated as those that
had been condemned in July, and yet they had to be made to last through the Lingayen Gulf operations.
The tour of duty at Aitape can be summed up as nothing but a hard grind for
nearly everyone in the Regiment. The instances of exciting combat participation
were few, and the hours of drudgery were many, but the men of the 53 3d who sweated
in the holds of liberties and in the conning towers of LCMs performed feats of endurance' that, while not heroic, were none the less vitally essential to the success of the
largest American force that fought in the jungles of New Guinea.

CHAPTER XI

Luzon

T

HE first embryonic plans for the reconquest of the Philippines were undoubtedly
formulated by General MacArthur and his staff as soon as the gallant defense of
Bataan became hopeless. The creation of the Southwest Pacific Theatre in March
1942 was in large measure directed to that object. Once theJap offensive was blunted
and turned back in Papua during the latter part of I 942, the New Guinea campaign
had just one real objective- the liberation of the Philippines.
There were some in Washington and Pearl Harbor who favored a strictly defensive campaign in the SWPA, arguing that Japan could be defeated by a drive
across the Central Pacific, by-passing the Philippines. But the MacArthur school,
necessarily anticipating that Japan would not quit until her home islands were actually
invaded, successfully maintained that such a tremendous invasion would have to be
based on more than a few small islands and that, therefore, disregarding entirely our
moral obligation to rescue the Filipinos, the reconquest of their Archipelago was an
absolute necessity to our ultimate victory over Japan.
The initial plan adopted by MacArthur called for successive leaps up the New
Guinea coast to its western end, then to Morotai, the Talaud Islands, and Mindanao.
This plan, which was carried out except for the last two phases, was dictated by the
simple fact that in the SWPA as distinct from the Central Pacific, each new beachhead
had to receive its air support from a previously secured land base. Three hundred
miles thus represented about the maximum stride that our forces could make at one
time. This was in sharp contrast with the Navy's Central Pacific Theatre where control of all aircraft carriers enabled Admiral Nimitz to move virtually as far as he
liked in a single hop.
Morotai was seized on September 15, 1944. The Talaud Islands, northeasternmost group in the Dutch East Indies, were scheduled for attack on October 15 (Operation "Gossip Monger") and the initial assault on the Philippines proper was to be
delivered November 15 at Sarangani Bay, Mindanao (Operation "K-1"). As far as
amphibians were concerned these actions were to be strictly 3d Brigade affairs, the
533d being attached to the 32d Infantry Division for the first one, and the other two
regiments going into Mindanao with the 33d and 43d Divisions.
Detailed planning for the Talaud show moved into high gear the first week in
September. The plans made the maximum use of the Regiment's mobility and
flexibility. The initial beachhead was to be made on Salababoe Island by the 127th
and I 28th RCTs landing with the Shore Battalion from APDs, LSTs, APAs, and
an LSD. 533d LCMs were to be carried to the limit of the shipping capacity. The
balance of the Boat Battalion was to leave Aitape on October I and proceed under
its own power to Morotai via Wakde, Woendi Lagoon, and Sansopar, a total distance
of 1000 miles. The run from Morotai to the objective - 140 miles - was to be made
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by the gunboats and part of the LCMs the night ofD-I in convoy with a PT squadron
and at H
2 hours these craft together with some LVTs were to pick up an infantry
battalion on Salababoe and make a shore-to-shore hop to Karakelong. The seizure
of the remaining islands in the group was to be accomplished in similar fashion as
rapidly as possible.
The logistics were all worked out and field orders drafted, when on the evening
of September I5 came a radio message "operation canceled." Though the reason
was not disclosed for many weeks, this sudden change resulted from a deal made
between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz on the basis of Admiral Halsey's
reports of the pitifully weak J ap air opposition to his early September carrier raid on
the Philippines. Deciding that it was prudent to strike at the heart of the Archipelago
relying initially only on carrier-based air cover, General MacArthur agreed to change
his initial plan in favor of a major lunge at Leyte, provided the Third Fleet supported
him and his Sixth Army was reinforced by the XXIV Corps. Admiral Nimitz likewise agreed to call off his projected attack on Yap in the Carolines, and the Joint
Chiefs at Quebec promptly concurred.
The revised strategy in the Philippine Campaign made possible by the reinforcement of MacArthur's command was to split the J ap forces in two by seizing a vital
island, whence planes could dominate most of the narrow seas. This would force the
Japs to commit their reserves to a meat grinder, from the effects of which they would
never recover. How well this worked is well-known history and is not part of this
story. The Jap navy threw itself away in a brilliantly conceived but poorly executed
endeavor to destroy the shipping of the Leyte task force. Their air forces, engaging
in repeated suicide attacks for the first time, suffered a depletion they could never
make up. And their army reserves including their crack I st Division were largely
annihilated in a series of grueling slugging matches in the Ormoc Valley where our
32d and 24th Divisions distinguished themselves.
When the fate of Leyte was sealed early in December by the 77th Division's
capture of Ormoc, MacArthur took a well-calculated long chance and threw part of
the 24th Division past Cebu, Negros, and Panay to seize and hold Mindoro. As usual
the chance worked beautifully, and the Japs on Luzon seeing Manila threatened
immediately from the south began to move heavy forces toward Batangas and
Tayabas. The stage was now set for the touchdown play - the taking of Manila
from the rear by landing at Lingayen Gulf and sweeping down the now virtually
unguarded central plains.
This avenue ofapproach had not only been employed by the japanese in I94I,
but had been decided upon in the original plans for the reoccupation of the Philippines. The initial assault called for four divisions, the two on the left to land between
Dagupan and Damortis, wheel slightly and push into the mountains to secure the left
flank, while the two on the right were to land between Dagupan and Lingayen and
drive rapidly down the broad plains to Manila Bay. Four other divisions were to
follow as rapidly as shipping would permit to man the line that soon would extend
I 50 miles from Damortis to Laguna de Baie.
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Planning
The 533d was first notified ofits assignment to this "M-1" task force and attachment to the 43d Infantry Division in early October, but no detailed information
reached the orphan task force at Aitape until mid-November. Even then, with
loading-out less than three weeks off, it was impossible to make any real plans. The
fact that Sixth Army which would control the show was still up to its neck in the
Leyte fight while the 43d Division was at Aitape and I Corps, to which the 43d was
attached, was at Hollandia, accounted in part for this, but the refusal of the Navy
even to talk with any echelon lower than an army headquarters added materially to
the confusion.
One thing was painfully clear at the outset: most of the boats would be left out
of the initial assault because of the insufficient LCM capacity ofthe transports assigned
to the Division, plus the fact that the LSD would carry only LCTs. This latter was
very annoying, as it was hard to see why the LCTs could not proceed on their own
bottoms to Mindoro and join the convoy there. But the Boat Battalion received a substitute mission, and its novelty and possibilities of real excitement mitigated the disappointment. The assignment called for the creation, along with the defense platoon of
the Shore Battalion, of two provisional heavy weapons companies to form the backbone of the defense of the 5-mile beach perimeter. In previous operations in New
Guinea the infantry had normally performed this function, but the 43d Division's plan
called for a rapid drive inland to seize high ground up to eight miles from the beach
the first night. Any by-passed Jap groups would thus be able to counterattack the
beach installations at will unless shore party troops interposed. Hence the decision to
use the surplus Boat Battalion personnel to man the key points of the perimeter.
The problems facing the Shore Battalion were quite the opposite. As soon as
the magnitude of the operation in terms of equipment and men to be brought ashore
was disclosed, it was apparent that the Battalion would be swamped unless heavily
reinforced. In addition the Division planned to land three regiments abreast on a
front of nearly 3 miles and to keep supplies coming in over the two extreme ends of
the beach indefinitely. This would spread the shore party's personnel and equipment
to the limit and dictated decentralization of control. Moreover, several reserve divisions were scheduled to land on the most suitable beach, and map studies indicated
that this would be the 533d's.
The logistical planning of a major amphibian operation is as complex as anything in modern warfare. A shore party commander and his staff find themselves
at the very nerve center of this planning. Since "M-1" was the first full scale effort
of the Regiment as a unit, it will not be amiss at this point to outline in general terms
how the problems confronting a boat and shore regiment are analyzed and dealt with
before the task force even embarks.
Naturally the underlying decisions as to what size unit will attack what point
and when are made in higher headquarters. The shipping in which the force and its
supplies will be "lifted" is determined in joint Army-Navy conferences. Based on the
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anticipated difficulties of the campaign, senior supply officers issue orders as to how
many " days of supply" of each class are to be brought in with the assault forces, and
subsequently. These decisions, as a matter of experience, are never final, and
changes are announced daily until the task force actually departs and not infrequently
even after that. So when the division G-4 and the engineer shore party commander
and staffs do their work, they start with the most fragmentary information and find it
shifting with discouraging frequency.
Despite these uncertainties they try to analyze their mission to see just how many
tons of supplies must be brought across the beach each hour. In the initial assault the
theoretical standard is the maximum that can be moved out of the transports' hatches
and over the ramps of the LSTs. The reason for this is twofold: ships are always
scarce and rapid turnaround is essential if the overall theatre requirements are to be
met; secondly, ships are vulnerable to air and submarine attack, hence every effort
of both services is bent toward discharging them in the shortest possible time.
Having calculated, then, how many tons can be spewed out by the convoy
hour by hour, the next step is to provide enough small craft, LCTs, LCMs, LCVPs,
DUKWs, and sometimes ponton barges, to keep that tonnage moving to the beach
and provide an empty craft at shipside as soon as one pulls away. The distance from
transport anchorage to unloading point, surf and beach conditions, and many other
factors affect this calculation. In actual experience almost all operations were more
than adequately supplied with small landing craft, but they were none the less a
potential bottleneck and had to be figured accurately.
But cargo piled in landing craft, whether they be en route to shore or beached
with ramp down, is no use to the advancing doughboys; so adequate labor and cranes
must be provided at the water's edge to accomplish the unloading at the same speed
as the loading at shipside. Figures based on experience show that a man can reasonably manhandle 6 tons a day and that a light crane and its crew can move I o- I 2 tons
an hour from landing craft to truck. The efficiency of cranes as compared with manhandling is such that all shore parties employ as many as possible. In the SWPA
which had the lowest priorities of any theatre on all equipment, there were never
nearly enough. Thus many hundreds of men had to be detailed from service and
frequently from combat units to make up an adequate labor pool for the beach.
The next item to be studied is transportation from the water's edge to the dumps.
Piling supplies on the beach itself is justifiable only as a last resort, as confusion,
congestion, and possible destruction inevitably result. A smooth flow of supplies from
ships straight through to well dispersed dumps, each organized to receive and issue to
using units separate classes of stores, is the ultimate objective of every shore party.
Though the trip from the water's edge to the dump sites may b e only a few hundred
yards, the small capacity of the standard 6 x 6 truck, the time required to load and
unload, and the unavoidable loss of time caused by operating in a new area, on
"roads" that barely deserve the name, and among hundreds of vehicles, require a
surprisingly large truck pool for the shore party alone. Experience in many operations has shown that the shore party should have at least 2 trucks per LCM and 4
per LCT if it is to discharge them without delay. Not once did the 533d ever have
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such a truck pool. Not only did shortage of shipping space severely curtail the entire
task force's wheeled transport, but even after the shore party's requirements had been
ruthlessly scaled down, it normally discovered once ashore that many of its trucks
were taken for "priority" missions elsewhere.
Finally, the unloading of trucks in the dumps by both cranes and manual labor
must be geared to the overall flow of tonnage so trucks will not be wasted while idling
in a dump. These dumps are normally run by the appropriate task force supply
officer, but the shore party commander cannot neglect them at any stage of the planning or operation.
The above outline touches only the high spots and omits such vital problems as
radio and wire communications, engineering work such as erection of ponton causeways, or sandbag jetties, making of roads, and clearing dump sites. When all these
and myriad other items are considered and tentatively decided, beach layout plans
are made and sandbox models constructed so all concerned can familiarize themselves
as well as possible with the anticipated operation in advance of embarkation.
For the Lingayen operation planning proceeded as above. To augment the
shore party's manpower, various port, ammunition, ordnance, quartermaster, etc.
companies were attached, bringing the regimental strength to 3500 officers and men.
Most of these units staged from points hundreds of miles from Aitape which added
materially to the difficulties of organizing a coordinated team. An M.P. company,
two medical companies and a DUKW company rounded out the shore party.
The question of adequate trucks was incapable of solution. After much careful
calculation, the shore party stated that the minimum required to handle the peak load
was 240 2 ;Y2-ton trucks. All that was actually received was a promise of 123, which
would have been adequate if resort was had to some temporary stock-piling on the
beaches.

Loading Out
The latter part of November saw all ranks involved in preparations for the big
attack. While personnel clerks typed passenger list after passenger list only to tear
them up as the embarkation plan shifted, motor pool mechanics checked vehicles and
welded wire-cutters to front bumpers. Officers and men assigned to perimeter defense
conducted intensive weapons training, including full scale night exercises on Seleo
Island. New boats just in from the Boo-mile trip from the boat plant at Milne Bay
were armed and readied. Old boats actually ripe for the graveyard were patched
and strengthened. Spare parts for tractors and LCMs were brought in by air and by
landing craft. In no class of supply other than rations was the Regiment adequately
equipped, but that was such an old story that no one was particularly concerned.
Meanwhile not for one second did the pressure of routine work slacken. In fact,
in some respects it increased the closer the day of embarkation came. The incoming
Australian 6th Division had to be unloaded completely by 533d boats and Shore
Battalion, and each successive week surf conditions grew worse with heavier and more
frequent damage to the boats.
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Thanksgiving evening brought a good break for the Boat Battalion. The boat
companies ofthe 544th EB&SR which had been attached to the 37th Infantry Division announced they were unable to proceed to Finschhafen in time to meet their
convoy for Bougainville whence the Division would stage for the Philippines. Consequently I Corps directed the 533d to have a boat company ready to load out of
Finschhafen (400 miles away) in 6o hours time. Since A Company had only just
arrived from New Britain and was not yet unpacked, and since a large detachment of
it had just left Milne Bay with new boats, its selection was natural. Not only did the
company have to do a quick job of striking camp and embarking during the remaining
hours of the night, but one-third of its 56' boats had to be exchanged for 50' craft of
B Company.
The trip to Finschhafen was made in the teeth of the southeast monsoon and was
the finishing touch for some of the old boats which had to be replaced on arrival.
Using SCR 284 radios with a normal range of 30-60 miles, company and battalion
headquarters maintained contact with the detachment leaving Milne Bay 8oo miles
away, with the result that it and the rest of the company entered Finschhafen simultaneously. The naval transport squadron which arrived to pick up A Company
thought it was only to receive LCMs and their crews, and refused to be bound by I
Corps orders to lift the entire company and its equipment. Only by fast talking and
pleading with individual skippers did the company commander succeed in moving his
unit virtually intact to Bougainville. There it was forced by the 544th EB&SR to leave
almost all its organizational equipment behind in an indefinitely delayed rear echelon.
The transport squadron to lift the 43d Division and attached troops arrived off
Aitape at the end of November. Only by talking with each skipper was a definite
statement finally obtained as to the number and size of craft they would carry. Thus
another revision of plans was made less than a week before scheduled departure.
Actually the Boat Battalion wound up with gg of its I I 7 LCMs in the operation which
gave it nearly 6o% of the LCMs in the entire attack force, but it was too late to relieve
it of responsibility for the perimeter defense.
Loading out commenced December I with all boats scheduled for the attack
attached to their respective ships. Though this gave the Navy operating control of
the boats, it was essential, as all our shore maintenance facilities had to be packed and
loaded. The first days of loading disclosed that only a miracle would permit the
Division to embark and sail on schedule. High surf and a heavy ground swell in the
anchorage were the principal causes, but the necessity of continuing to unload Liberties
in order to get supplies ashore to complete the task force's stocks used up all the spare
boats. Fortunately, the Jap position in Leyte could not be cracked without an
amphibious assault near Ormoc which used shipping earmarked for Lingayen and
thus "S" day for the "M-I" show was postponed from December 20 until january g.
The three weeks respite permitted an orderly out-loading despite the increasingly
vicious surf, and also made possible securing certain vital equipment which the
Regiment would otherwise have sailed without. The last four LCMs needed to
replace old boats that finally collapsed in the outloading were forcibly removed from
Hollandia in a night raid on the Base G boat pool-illegal but unavoidable under the

LSTs were loaded to capacity and then some, and as 1nany men as could find a perch were
crammed aboard for the two-week trip.

circumstances. Christmas eve found everything other than troops safely aboard the
ships, and the day was devoted to consuming beer and turkey. Early on the 26th
troops clambered up the landing nets. The next day a rather half-hearted rehearsal
was held with no boats going within 200 yards of the beach. At I400 December 28
the convoy got under weigh, and New Guinea dropped over the horizon forever for
most of the Regiment. Left behind was a rear echelon of nearly 200 officers and men
manning equipment and boats to be forwarded later from either Aitape or Hollandia.
Some of these poor devils were not to rejoin the Regiment for five months.

The Trip
The 43d Division convoy in standard formation included I 8 large transports,
3 LSDs, I 5 LSTs, g LCis, plus miscellaneous escort and auxiliary craft. The LSTs
kept the speed down to seven knots - barely perceptible motion on a big ship. After
crossing the equator a junction was made near Pelilieu with a similar convoy carrying
the 6th Division from Sansopar. Still further along the Third Fleet ships carrying the
4oth and 37th Divisions fell in astern. 533d personnel and equipment were scattered
on more than forty vessels in these convoys.
The first hazy view of the Philippines came on January 4 as the ships entered
Surigao straits. From there on through the Mindanao Sea and up along the western
coast ofNegros, Panay, and Mindoro the convoy was brazenly exposed to Jap air and
submarine attack. Though all hands stood "GQ:' at sunup and sundown and at
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Lingayen Gulf packed with all sizes and types of combat and cargo ships.

special alerts during the day, the troop-carrying convoys were hardly more than
annoyed. Up ahead the bombardment force of seven battleships and many cruisers
and destroyers had already entered Lingayen Gulf and was receiving plenty of
attention from the kamikaze planes. Serious damage was suffered by I 7 warships
in their first day in the Gulf. The main convoy received enough sample attacks to
keep the troop passengers on their toes. A transport and a tanker took direct hits
from suicide planes. A couple of midget submarines made a daring attack first on
the cruiser division and then on the White Beach attack group, being sunk by ramming within a few lengths of several LSTs after narrowly missing a brace of ships.
Probably the most spectacular, if least menacing, entertainment of the trip occurred
when ajap light cruiser emerged from Manila Bay and headed right for the convoy.
Three American destroyers engaged her, using star shells, and in a matter of seconds
sent her to the bottom.
Men of the Regiment manned guns throughout the fleet; some served the .5os
on their own LCMs, others manned 20 mm pieces of their ship's battery. Gunboat
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Down the cargo nets into landing
craft scramble the assault troops on
the morning of January 9, 1945.

MB1 aboard a Liberty received
credit from her skipper for a
major share in bringing down a
suicide bomber.

The Landing
Shortly after midnight January g the mighty armada deployed in Lingayen
Gulf; 40o,ooo soldiers and sailors - considerably more than were involved on American beaches the first day in Normandy - gulped early breakfasts and donned combat
equipment. Before daybreak the transports were anchored in their appointed areas
and were shedding their landing craft and debarking troops. From Damortis to
Lingayen the twenty mile shoreline was pricked by orange bursts as 16-inch shells and
lighter thudded into suspected pill boxes and earthworks.
At White Beach No. 3, San Fabian, troops wade ashore over the gently sloping beachscenes of wave ll at H
48 minutes.
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Daybreak was hard to detect for the normal haze and shadow cast by the mountains was intensified by the pall of smoke that covered the fleet and the shore. More
than a thousand small landing craft circled off the quarters of their mother transports,
moved on signal to the net-draped sides of the ships, and received their quota of
troops and equipment. As soon as a wave was loaded it moved off in single file toward
the control craft at the line of departure 4000 yards off shore. Though the smoke and
haze caused some of the boats to miss their assigned positions by a few hundred yards,
the landing went off remarkably smoothly.
The first amtracs (LVTs) crawled out of the moderate surf at 0930 to be followed
by four or five waves of LCVPs at five minute intervals. Then came the LCMs
followed by LCTs, LSMs, and finally the LSTs. A Company landed at Crimson
Beach just west of the Dagupan River and encountered no opposition. The rest of
the Regiment went in on the White Beaches running northward from the Bued
River past San Fabian to Mabilao. On the northernmost of these there was considerable enemy reaction with mortars and light artillery. Many of our boats were hit
and some of our men wounded, but no boat was more than temporarily disabled.
Clearing the Bued River was the mission of a Boat Battalion detachment of
three LCS(S)s which had been carried in LST davits. The river formed the boundary
between the 43d and 6th Divisions, but no one knew in advance whether the bar at
its mouth could be crossed by landing craft, and if so, how far up stream it would be
navigable. The three little support boats moved shoreward on the right flank of the
first assault waves and bumped their way over the bar at H +I 5 minutes. As they
rounded the first bend, a J ap machine gun on the south bank of the river opened up
and scored direct hits on the turret of one boat, but caused no casualties. Immediate
.50 calibre return fire from the boats silenced the gun, thus permitting not only the
boats but also a halted Ist Infantry patrol to resume their advance. The craft continued upstream as far as they could, keeping abreast of the infantry points but encountered no further opposition. After making a quick hydrographic survey and
reporting to the naval beachmaster the desirability of landing much of the bulk
supplies in the calm of the river, the detachment came out of the river and moved
northward where it operated in flank support of the I 72d Infantry. Here the boats
were exposed to mortar and light artillery fire, and were fairly well peppered with
fragments until they withdrew beyond effective range of their own machine guns.
On the beaches themselves the enemy did little to interfere except at White I
and 2 where frequent concentrations of accurate mortar and light artillery fire interrupted work and for several hours kept LSTs and LSMs off the beach. Unfortunately
this was by far the most suitable beach from a hydrographic standpoint, so there was
nothing to do but keep on pouring supplies across it and accept the inevitable toll of
casualties .
All the other beaches beginning with White 3 and extending on around the
gulf to Lingayen were so fiat that even LCMs grounded way off shore. LSTs stuck
hard and fast almost a quarter mile out. In addition to the deeps inside the sand bars,
craters made during the bombardment constituted fatal traps for vehicles and men
attempting to wade ashore from the boats. Not even waterproofed tractors could get
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103d Infantry men ford the slews
behind White 3 as the 533d sets up its
first beach CP in the Philippines.
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in from the larger landing vessels, and the result by mid-morning was a messy picture
of drowned vehicles- their cabs barely awash- and LSTs and LSMs stuck well off
shore, while small boats were already bringing in bulk stores to a beach that was
unprepared to receive them.
Gradually order developed from confusion as Seabees struggled to put enough
sections of ponton cube causeways together to reach the beach from the LSTs. Small
boats and DUKWs brought ashore the most critical personnel from the big landing
ships, and all artillery and engineer dozers that could be collected went about salvaging the drowned vehicles in the surf. Dumps were reconnoitred and marked according to plan, but so few trucks got ashore on schedule that most of the bulk was handled
by human chain from the boats' ramps to a temporary heap above the high tide mark.
With less than three hours of daylight remaining the LSTs finally started to
discharge across both White 2 and White 3 beaches. A heavy smoke screen and some
good fire support from destroyers had quieted the enemy fire on White 2, and the Seabees on White 3 at last pooled all their resources and bridged the gap from the number
one priority LST to White 3 beach. From then on through the night things went
reasonably well on both beaches.
The boatmen began a grueling g6 hours of incessant runs from shipside to beach
and back again. The inability of LCTs and LSMs to land within workable distance
On White Beach 3 even the little LCVPs ground well off shore as the LSTs fail to reach
within ponton causeway range of the beach. Lower right: LVT being loaded from LCM.

-

·-

~

~ ,.,.·~-.~~-

•·4.:-

-··

-·-·•·y·

-

"""

.._,.

-

-~

~

-····-

--

Beach White 3: Top: Human chains unload LCVPs grounded far out on the flat beach.
Bottom: Two ponton causeways enable vehicles on LST to reach fordable depth.

of the water's edge placed an unusually heavy strain on the small craft. Our go-odd
LCMs shuttled vehicles and then bulk cargo from the ships that had borne them from
New Guinea. As soon as these parent ships were empty, the boats were directed to
other ships of the same transport division and continued the same grind. When the
"Trans Div" was discharged, the LCMs turned to on any other naval attack transport, and finally when these were done, there was a gulf-full of liberties with high
priority cargo to be sped ashore. As all cabins had been destroyed on Seleo prior to
embarkation, the boat men snatched what h ad to pass for a rest on the throbbing
studded steel of the LCMs' decks, and for shelter from the blistering daytime sun or
night rain squalls they had nothing.
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Beach White 2: Smoke pots conceal unloading operations from enem.y observers in the
hills and work continues despite intermittent shelling.

Besides its LCMs the Boat Battalion took over 25 of the transports' LCVPs.
This transaction had been arranged without warning after the convoy had been at
sea a week. With the Battalion having 99 LCMs, a fair sized rear echelon and 5000
yards of perimeter already charged to its responsibjlity, it had a problem setting up
25 boat crews. But cooks, motor pool mechanics, clerks, typists, as well as machinists
from the 1461st eagerly volunteered for the job, and demonstrated that the essentials
of landing-craft seamanship could be learned by mere association and exposure.
These men and their LCVPs brought many thousands of troops ashore and handled
the vital little flank missions, ferries, and other jobs that would otherwise have wasted
the priceless capacity of an LCM or bigger craft.
The prime terrain characteristic of the initial beachhead was the maze of waterways that crisscrossed and meandered throughout its breadth and depth. During the
first days, b efore adequate bridges were built, LCM and LCVP ferries provided the
only egress from their initial footholds for many units. Physical contact b etween
I Corps and Sixth Army, and between 43d and 6th Divisions, for example, depended
on the 533d ferry in the Bued River.
140
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The organization of the perimeter defense was badly delayed by the failure of the
LSTs to land. The reconnaisance parties landed with the early waves and pushed
inland with the infantry to lay out the straightest possible line. Several forward displacements of this protective line had to be made because high ranking hospital COs
etc., who did not like the area assigned for their installations within the beach perimeter, moved forward to a nicer grove. The weapons were finally all unloaded
about sunset, and the line organized after a fashion. Luckily thejaps made no attempt
that first night to penetrate it.
During the hours of darkness work continued as usual, with lights being doused
only under actual fire from artillery. Shortly after midnight a character who was
later to become known all too well introduced himself with appropriate gusto. He
was "Pistol Pete" later identified as a 320 mm ( r 3 inch) Krupp howitzer cleverly

"Pistol Pete" Krupp 320 mm howitzer which shelled the San Fabian area from the
mountains near Rosario for n1.any nights.

hidden in a ravine between Damortis and Rosario. His line of fire was such that he
could enfilade the beach while none of our ships could either see or reach him. A
couple of dozen of his r6oo pound shells fell each night in and around San Fabian,
and though doing surprisingly little total damage, served to acquaint all hands with
the full meaning of the textbook phrase "harassing fire." The society for the improvement of foxholes sprang full-blown into life within a few seconds after the first
awe-inspiring burst in the area.
The second day saw drastic revision in all shore party plans occasioned not by
anything the J ap did, for he put up no resistance at all save in the hills at the north end
of the beachhead, but by a heavy northerly surf. These breakers building up unhindered from the China coast crashed onto the virtually flat beaches extending from
San Fabian to Lingayen. All types of landing craft were virtually impotent as they
were alternately victims of a towering breaker and stuck hard and fast in only a foot
or two of water in the; troughs. At Blue Beach even an LSM broached and the ponton
causeways leading to the LSTs were smashed and tossed in the sands. LCMs continued to work the beaches but more often than not had to be helped off with dozers
or salvage boats. The superlative demonstration of seamanship put on by the coxswains of A Company on G_rimson Beach was the subject of many laudatory statements
Pages 142-3 Scenes from Crimson
and Orange Beaches between Dagupan and Lingayen.
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by captains of navy transports; nonetheless the volume of tonnage moving over these
exposed beaches dropped to a trickle. On the initiative of A Company officers the
Dagupan River was reconnoitred and buoyed, so that supplies could be unloaded
in the protected waters of the Dagupan town waterfront, and the Navy at last consented to our running our own boats into the Bued rather than onto the churning face
of White 3· Only on White 2 were conditions suitable for landing LSTs and for
using any kind of boat on the open beach. So a great transfer of ships from all the
other beaches to White 2 commenced.
There was no semblance of order or system to this shift. In some cases the skipper
of the landing ship, completely fed up with fighting to keep his vessel from broaching,
and seeing little or no progress in discharging his cargo, just retracted on his own
initiative and proceeded to White 2. Again, the local shore party commander on
his own responsibility closed down all or a portion of his beach and told the craft to
move to White 2. Or the naval commander on his command ship receiving reports
of the hopelessness of all beaches other than White 2, directed all shipping under
his command to discharge over White 2. However it started, the stampede to take
advantage of the relatively good gradient and modest surf of White 2 soon assumed
such proportions that to all intents and purposes it could be said that, except for three
of the initial assault divisions, Sixth Army and the bulk of supplies for 200,000 men
landed over the 533d's rooo yards of beach.
Bearing in mind that this beach had been originally expected to land two regimental combat teams, and that therefore its shore engineers consisted of two shore
companies plus part of Shore Battalion headquarters, it is a wonder the shore party
was not completely obliterated. None of the headquarters or individuals who caused
this transfer bothered to inform the regimental CP or the navy beachmaster of the
change. The 533d shore party merely consulted its landing tables a few times, threw

At the busy BeachInaster's CP on
White Beach 2 Capt.
Smith, Shore Battalion S-3, receives
a report from~ Lt.
Walton of E Company.
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them away in disgust, and began to handle in turn each new craft that slapped its
ramp on the beach. Only because each man from the battalion commander to the
weary men of the beach squads rose magnificently to the challenge did the beach
succeed in handling this new load. Intermittent fire from the hills continued to land
in the crowded beach area, and the medics worked incessantly. 573 casualties were
treated in the beach aid station in the first five days.
The confusion necessarily incident to such a huge flow was further heightened
by the bewilderment of the troops coming ashore. For example, a tank unit attached
to XIV Corps expected to land near Lingayen and had its plans and maps all set for
such an event. Instead it found itself 20 miles away in the zone of I Corps with no
means of communication and no route yet open by which it could proceed to its
assigned area. Similarly the entire signal section of GHQ which was meant to land
near Dagupan found itself, complete with multi-tonned trailers, on the extreme left
flank of the beachhead some 1500 yards from the Jap gun positions. All such units
that could not proceed over the light bridges to their proper areas had to be corralled,
organized, and then shipped by landing craft to where they belonged. Thus after a
few hours there was an out-loading problem of considerable proportions to complicate
further the tangled beach. Sixth Army headquarters was still afloat; the two corps
headquarters were busy trying to collect themselves and get established; 43d Division
headquarters had its hands more than full in pushing the J aps from the hills dominating the beach. But each element of the invasion rolled in over this narrow strip of
beach, fanned out, found its proper place, and did its job virtually without assistance
or interference from any headquarters higher than a regiment. A tribute indeed to
the initiative and intelligence of the junior officers and men.
On S+2 a whole new convoy arrived bearing the 25th Division and other reinforcements. This division unloaded its vehicles and equipment entirely over the Bued
River part of White 3 - a strip of beach not over 50 yards wide - in the course of
three days. Company F plus organic division troops formed a remarkably efficient
shore party. It is doubtful if any division ever came ashore through a narrower
bottleneck.
In the few days after S day the 533d's Shore Battalion's tonnage handled exceeded

Beach White 3: Cranes expediting unloading and tractor towing disabled % -ton truck.

"

·---

--·

Above: White Beach 3 showing control point, temporary bivouacs and a roller conveyor in
action.

Below: Supplies are stacked in temporary dumps on Beach White 3 as shortage of trucks
prevents transfer to designated dumps.
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Ponton causeway
broached between
White 2 and White 3
is turned in to bridge
across mouth of slew.

that handled across Omaha Beach in Normandy during the comparable days.
Omaha Beach had a shore party of two full Engineer Special Brigades, reinforced,
aggregating over 20,000 men!
The perimeter defense line was relocated early on S+ I and thoroughly prepared
with good fields of fire and excellent communications to meet an attack by anything
up to a battalion. A patrol was sent out to comb the gap left between the 6th and 43d
Divisions to be sure no undetected counterattack was launched from there. This
patrol led a merry chase for several days, engaging in several sharp fire fights with
small J ap parties in which the score in killed was I 3 to o for our side.
Shortly after OIOO the second night a Jap infiltration party ran smack into the
portion of our line just southeast of the San Fabian railroad station. A sheet of flame
and lead from everything from .30 calibre machine guns to 37 mm mountain guns

Machine gun nest manned
by men of B Company on
perimeter south of San
Fabian Railroad Station.
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Railroad Station
San Fabian.

at

,,
firing cannister killed or wounded more than half the Japs, and the balance withdrew.
Several days later when a suicide battalion was liquidated well inland, its captured
orders disclosed its mission to be "destroying enemy strong points east of the railroad
and north of the Bued River," a good indication that the Jap field commander realized that ifhe wanted to raise havoc in the dump areas he would first have to breach
a pretty substantial inner defense line. A few days after the first attempt, another
was made at the opposite end of the line near Mabilao. TheJaps sneaked undetected
to within arms length of one of our machine gun nests, but were repulsed after a brisk
grenade-tossing melee.
As the infantry units continued to make progress, the threat to the beach area
diminished rapidly, and on S+ 5 and again on S+ ro the defense line was drastically
thinned out, being converted in effect into a line of listening and warning posts.
The LCS (S)s were joined by three ofthe LCM gunboats on S+2 and continued
to support the r 72d Infantry's left flank near Rabon. While their light armament and
high angle rockets did little damage to the well dug in Japs, the boats drew fire and
spotted several gun positions which were eventually taken under fire by the larger
naval vessels. 43d Division Artillery sent a special observation party on an LCMG
well behind the J ap lines to try to spot "Pistol Pete" but without success. Later
several Alamo scout patrols were landed in the bay above Damortis for the same purpose. In these night missions no enemy opposition was encountered, but many hair
raising moments occurred for those aboard, as the Navy, though notified hours in
advance, never seemed to be able to notify the screening destroyers of our intended
mission. It is hard to blame the larger ships for being wary, considering the menace
of "Q:' boats with their deadly charges of TNT. Yet everyone aboard an LCM as a
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Fletcher class "can" swoops out of the night at 30 knots with five 5 " ;38's trained on it,
wishes he were elsewhere.
The pressing need of the infantry units pushing into the mountains around
Rosario and Pozzorubio for qualified guides caused Sixth Army to order the guerrilla
forces operating in the vicinity of San Fernando to detach a battalion for service with
the 43d Division. Scouts landed by boats of the 533d and from PTs contacted guerrilla headquarters and a rendezvous was made for S+ 10 at Aringay, I5 miles beyond
the American lines. Two trips were made to bring out the 2 d Battalion, I 2 I st
Filipino Infantry, all without interference on the part of the Japs.
Although the commanders of the major service units who were to assume responsibility for supply of Sixth Army after S+ 10, could not make up their minds until the
last minute as to where they would locate the principal "ports," the Regiment concluded that the White 2 area was the only feasible one and so set about getting
organized.
At Aringay, 15 miles behind the Jap lines, a battalion of the l2lst Philippine Infantry
boards LCMs to join the American forces to the south.

Bued River - first CP of the Boat
Battalion on Luzon.

The Boat Battalion began intensive development of the southwest bank of the
Bued River which provided a nearly perfect site. Starting at the head of navigation
the companies extended down the river bank leaving enough room for each boat
to have its berth in 8 feet of water while its ramp rested flush against the bank- the
most convenient landing-craft base imaginable. The r46rst set up on a slightly muddy
bank but one which could be used to haul boats at all tides. The progress was slow
for several reasons. Much vital equipment was on rear echelon shipping, and much
that had been advisedly loaded on S+2 and S+4 ships was not unloaded until two
weeks after S day, because of higher headquarters' habit of slapping on revised unloading priorities several times a day. Also the usual amount of tentage, etc. had been
pilfered and some destroyed. Finally, all hands had so much to do with their primary
tasks that establishing the bivouac received belated attention. Native craftsmen
erected thatched huts for tentless units such as Company A and Boat Battalion Headquarters Company, and when at last housed, these units had the best quarters of all.
Only one company kitchen was available for the whole Battalion, and that had to be
subdivided so that a unit could be sent to A Company, 6 miles away on the Dagupan.
Regimental Headquarters and the Shore Battalion also took over a fine area
between White 2 and White 3 and despite pressure of beach work were soon well
established and comfortably isolated by slews of salt water. Native workers, while
not very industrious and invariably inconveniently in the way, made themselves
more and more useful with the result that ere long all hands were living better than at
any time since Fort Ord.

A Company officers' mess on the
Dagupan River.
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Top four scenes: Initial bivouac of Regimental Headquarters Company back of White
Beach 3. Bottom: Views of Headquarters Shore Battalion (left) and Regimental Headquarters toward the end of the stay on Luzon.
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Operations Under Base M Control
The two months from January 20 to March 20 saw the Regiment enmeshed in
the operations of a gigantic base which furnished the entire supply and administration
for an army of 2oo,ooo in constant aggressive contact with the enemy. Though
much of the fighting was scores of miles to the south, the presence of fighting within
sight and hearing immediately to the north was a great stimulant to those engaged in
service activities in the beach area.
I

i

I
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Left: Colonel Johnson, Executive Officer Base M, argues with Col. Moore, Lt. Cols. McLallen and Amory, and Capt. Kelchak over best location for the future base.

Right: Major General Hugh Casey, Chief Engineer SWPA, visits Col. Moore a few days
after the landing.

In theory, Base M took over all responsibility for discharge of shipping and handling of supplies and assigned "sub-port" commanders to control these functions at
the three unloading points - White 2, Dagupan, and the Calmay River. Inasmuch as more than three- fourths of the total tonnage was to come in over White 2,
the 533d - though nominally relieved of all functions other than furnishing lighterage and beach labor - soon found out that its burdens were drastically increased
rather than diminished by the advent of Base M. The Base was woefully undermanned at first, being unable even to take care of its own communications. Its top
personnel were experienced in handling ports with adequate piers and other facilities,
but were totally unfamiliar with the problems of moving supplies via landing craft
across an open beach. Consequently they organized the job on a horizontal basis
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with one person in charge of port companies aboard the ships, another in charge of
lighterage, another in charge of the beach labor, another with control over all trucks,
and so on. As a result no one below the base commander himself was responsible for
the movement of a box of rations from hold to dump, and the bickerings and backbiting between the various facility commanders were incessant.
The Regiment was in an unenviable position - it was the largest unit attached
to the Base and the most conspicuous one, but it had no authority and could only
work to improve the situation through persuasion and behind the scenes maneuvers.
To almost every man in the Regiment and in the 543d EB&SR, which came under
operational control of the 533d, the results of the organization, or lack thereof, were
painfully apparent. LCM coxswains carried an average of I .6 pay-loads per 24-hour
day, pounding on the beach for 8-Io hours while IO tons of supplies were unloaded.
Shore Battalion crane operators twiddled their thumbs while a sling-load dangled
20 or 30 minutes waiting for a truck. Dump truck drivers with full loads waited
for hours in dumps in which there was no labor.
After I o days of thorough snafu, various reorganizations were adopted and
efficiency gradually improved. All LCMs were unloaded at one part of the beach,
larger landing craft at another, and DUKWs at a third. Truck control was decentralized more to the beachmasters, and the flow of tonnage kept reasonably steady.
During the second week in February the 543d, less its reinforced boat company,
was relieved and shipped out to participate in the Zamboanga landing. The 534th
EB&SR, less its boat battalion, replaced them in the White Beach set-up. Company
A of the 533d was at last relieved from attachment to the 544th EB&SR and moved
to the Bued River, thereby concentrating the entire Boat Battalion for the first time
in I5 months.
Including the 543d boats, the Boat Battalion now had a fleet of I 50 cargo LCMs
plus nearly 40 LCVPs and overhead boats. Of these 85% were kept operating at all
times despite severe wear from the fine silt of the beach and the excessive age of many
of the boats. IOO LCMs each day lightered cargo onto White Beach, while coastwise
trips kept the balance busy. Boat control was developed to a high degree with a
ponton barge surmounted by a tower anchored 200 yards off the landing b each.
~

I
The LCM part of
Beach White 2 in full
operation with Filipino labor, February,
1945.

----

-
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From this tower all loaded boats were directed to beach slots, and empty boats to
ships, thereby cutting to a minimum the wear and tear of idle boats on the beach.
In addition to the dispatchers, clerks filled out forms feverishly, covering every boat
trip as the first stage in a process of report fabrication that had to be set up to satisfy
the statistics-crazed gentlemen of Base M and higher headquarters.
The Shore Battalion took full charge of the LCM beach while the 534th handled
the LCTs. As the fighting moved inland, native labor became more plentiful, and
actual labor by men of the Battalion was reduced to such skilled work as rigging.
Privates bossed gangs of 25 Pangasinans through their capitazes and did their best to
get a half-dozen honest man-hours out of each hour the 25 worked. Though Base
originally undertook to handle the administration and financial matters connected
with the Filipino labor, it shortly turned this problem over to the Regiment. A full
time labor section complete with interpreters and fistfuls of pesos kept tabs on the
more than 6oo laborers who worked each day.
Every piece of mechanical lifting equipment that could be obtained with a
semblance of legality was employed on the beach as the proportion of heavy lifts far
exceeded anything in the Regiment's previous experience with one- and two-division
size task forces. But, as always, the beachmaster could have used three times as many
cranes. To keep those few operating most steadily and most effectively, short piers
were constructed at intervals along the beach. Not only did this eliminate the wear
and tear on cranes incident to crawling about on the beach, but it kept the crane
level, out of the surf, and off the tender ramp hinges of the LCMs. The piers were
built without pile drivers, using jetting equipment improvised from fire pumps, and
the effort expended on them was repaid many times over in the performance of the
cranes and general efficiency of the beach.
By the end of the period cargo handling was highly effective with the exception
of movement in trucks from the beach to the dumps. The local base authorities controlled the available trucks well, but there just were not enough for the job. The
shortage was in large part caused by destruction of the railroad and the far greater
than anticipated damage to port facilities in Manila. Consequently, truck companies
which had been expected to operate exclusively in the San Fabian-Lingayen area
found themselves running hundred-mile convoys in a desperate attempt to get supplies
to troops east of Manila which should have been supplied over the Manila waterfront.
Despite all shortcomings and difficulties the performance of the White Beach
group set new records for the Pacific. The quota of 6ooo tons a day set by Sixth
Army was regularly exceeded by nearly one third. The gooo tons handled on peak
days were divided almost evenly among roo LCMs, 28 LCTs, and 300 or more DUKWs.
No enemy shellfire could reach the beach during this period, but nights were
requently enlivened by nuisance air raids. The two best remembered include the
night of February 20 when a bomb landed flush in a pile ofland mines which detonated, showering the Shore Battalion area with 240 mm (fortunately unfused) projectiles and demolishing E Company's kitchen. Few will ever forget the night a stick
of 6 bombs crashed into the Rabon ammunition dump. The area for miles around
was illuminated as 2500 tons of ammunition, including multi-colored flares, tracers,
and HE, went up in an awe-inspiring display which lasted for many hours.

LUZON

Token regimental
formation at which
decorations for heroism and meritorious
service during the
Lingayen Gulf landing were presented by
Colonel Moore, February, 1945.
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Though virtually the entire effort
of the Regiment during these two
months was devoted to the glamorless grind of getting supplies ashore,
the Boat Battalion added new
friends and laurels in a series of
supply runs to points up the coast
of Luzon far behind the enemy
lines. It all developed quite by
accident in the course of working
out arrangements with the local
PT squadrons so there would be
no unfortunate clashes during night
patrol actions. The PTs were finding barge hunting along the northwest coast of Luzon absolutely
profitless and could not strafe Jap
positions because of the danger
of killing Filipinos. They figured
good hunting could be had off
the north coast around Aparri,
but their cruising radius did not
p ermit them to reach there from
any base within American controlled territory. So the 533d
agreed to move an LCM fuel boat
to Dirique inlet, I I 3 miles northward of the most advanced American positions and on the extreme
northwest corn er of Luzon, and to
keep it replenished by running
cargo LCMs with drums of IOOoctane gas up there in periodic
convoys. This was done for several
weeks and, though no particular
excitement developed other than
with our own airforces, it did result in the distinction of maintaining the northernmost outpost in the
Theatre.

Toe-to-toe fighting along the Villa Verde Trail- 32d Division doughboys battle for one of
the countless ridges in central Luzon.

In the course of coordinating this mission with the guerrilla forces that would
screen it from the neighboring Jap garrisons, the Regiment became acquainted with
Colonel Volkmann, leader of all guerrilla forces in northern Luzon. The brilliant
record of his Division did much to pave the way for the reconquest of Luzon, but his
men had been operating with virtually no outside assistance in the way of supplies
and by February were in desperate need of many items, ranging from guns to radio
tubes. Air drops in the steep jungle-clad mountains were not too successful. The
Navy could not spare escorts for LSMs and LCTs and would not permit them to
operate beyond Lingayen Gulf without escort. The problem was a natural for the
Boat Battalion, and after securing permission of Sixth Army it undertook responsibility for all water-borne supply of the northern Luzon forces and to provide the necessary escort with its own gunboats. A liaison radio station manned by 533d men was
established at Volkmann's CP to eliminate the delays incident to using army, corps,
or similar channels, and a regular convoy run was established to the beaches at Durigayos, Santiago, and Currimao controlled by guerrilla units. In five weeks 1000 tons
of essential equipment and supplies were placed in the hands of this hard pressed
unit, and its subsequent spectacular successes in seizing San Fernando and cutting
Route 5 in the Cagayan valley were materially assisted by that support.
157
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Heavy northerly winds and seas were the principal obstacle to these missions, and
the risk of a disabled boat's falling into Jap hands was not inconsiderable, but the
hospitality of the populace at the ports of call made assignment to one of these convoys
coveted by all men of the boat companies.
Because of the dominance by the Navy of the waters west of Luzon, the Japs
generally avoided digging in on the coast, so the type of support the LCM gunboats
gave east of Aitape could not be utilized. Yet several night patrols of the 33d Division
and the I58th RCT were landed in the Caba-Aringay area to obtain prisoners and
information. The predilection of the J ap forces for caves in the mountains made
these tame affairs, but one never failed to get a thrill making a midnight landing
miles behind the enemy's front lines.
A small detachment of Boat Battalion men put the techniques they had developed
on gunboats to good use far from salt water. When the 40th Division ran into extremely stubborn resistance in the Zambales mountains west of Fort Stotsenburg,
they sent a hurried call to the 533d for rocket batteries. Launchers were quickly
transferred to light trucks and a provisional battery organized and dispatched southward to the scene of the mountain fighting. The 4.5-inch rockets were employed
with fair results, but the officer in charge concluded that the weapon really needed
was the T-32 portable 37 mm cannon which he had mounted on gunboats back at
Aitape. When these were brought up they proved just the thing for blasting at
otherwise masked cave mouths, and the amphibian engineers had qualified as experts
in mountain artillery!

Where Next?
No sooner had the Regiment caught its collective breath after the initial landing
than rumors of its next assignment popped up at every turn. Most of these had some
basis of fact, because GHQ backed and filled for several weeks before final allocation
of amphibian units to succeeding operations, and Sixth Army and even division
headquarters for a long time were not sure that an "end run" to take Baguio from the
northwest would not be necessary. During February I Corps plans to pull the 25th
Division out of the lines near San jose and throw them into a shore-to-shore operation
from White Beach to San Fernando reached the stage where boat allotment tables
and wave diagrams were being prepared. On March 4 the 33d Division decided to
make a regimental combat team landing at Aringay on March 7 but canceled it
when a drive up the coastal highway met surprisingly light resistance. Sixth Army
had the 53 3d scheduled for a XIV Corps task force with I st Cavalry and I I th Airborne Divisions, but called off the show.
Meanwhile, at the exalted levels of inter-army and GHQnegotiations there was
much wire pulling. All brigades wanted to get the best assignments, but without
prejudice to their being available when the lineups were announced for the assault on
Japan later in the year. The decision ultimately made was that all three brigades
would be concentrated as well as possible for employment against Japan, but that the
assignment to intervening operations would be dictated by considerations of present
location and available shipping. Thus the 2d Brigade, which was spread in the cen-

LUZON

159

tral Philippines from Leyte through Mindoro to Subic Bay, would be employed in the
Visayan landings under Eighth Army, the 3d Brigade, nearly half of which was still
in New Guinea, would furnish the amphibians required by Eighth Army for the
recapture of Mindanao, and the boat elements needed by the Aussies in their attacks
on Borneo. The 4th Brigade already concentrated on or en route to Luzon fell heir
to the Manila assignment by the process of elimination. To some in the Regiment
this was a blow, but Manila turned out to be pretty grim and involved pure service
troop functions, while the Mindanao tour was to contain plenty of surprises and
enough action to make the last few months of hostilities pass quickly.
As a consequence of the knowledge that the next assignment would be in an active
campaign, advantage was taken of the proximity of a huge base to procure many
items always wanted but never before had. Conversely both Battalions sloughed off
T IE and S.L.O.E. equipment which was obviously not worth its weight and space.
New cranes, tractors, and dump trucks increased the effectiveness of the Shore Battalion, and at the same time it unburdened itself of such little used items as the saw
mill, track press, and well-drilling rig. The Boat Battalion foraged far and wide to
capitalize on lessons learned in recent campaigns. 40 mm guns were obtained for the
LCMGs, and each company built a new one incorporating all manner of new improvements. 120-tube rocket launchers permitted construction of single purpose
rocket LCMs, and some fast talking to a 4th ESB supply officer wangled 100 new
twin .50 calibre Heintz mounts for the cargo LCMs. Spare parts were procured
from floating supply ships in quantities undreamed of in New Guinea. A few replacement boats, deck-loaded from the States, replaced utterly worn-out craft, but a sub-

4·3d Division's memorial service at San Fabian, February 24, 1945; Top left: contingents
from all elements of the reinforced Division form around the cemetery; top right: Guard
of Honor from 12lst Filipino Regiment; bottom left: General Krueger, Major Generals
Swift and Wing, commanding Sixth Army, I Corps, and 43d Division respectively, arrive;
bottom right: ruins of 17th century abbey at San Fabian.
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stantial majority of the vehicles and boats that were to participate in the last campaign
of the war had seen extensive service in New Guinea.
On the 20th of March the 533d was officially relieved from duty with Base M,
but in order not to cause any more disruption than necessary, normal functions were
continued until March 26, just two days before the final farewell to Luzon.

Manila- next to Warsaw the most devastated city in the world- was visited by many of the 533d.

CHAPTER XII

Mindanao

F

ROM the point of view of grand strategy the Mindanao campaign was strictly a
clean-up affair. The island ofMindanao was not required as a jumping off place
for the attack on Japan, but the Southwest Pacific forces had been assigned by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff the positive mission of destroying the Japanese forces in all the
Philippine Islands and re-establishing the lawful government throughout the Archipelago. This mission was identical for the western Visayan Islands, and the order
in which the assaults were made on the various islands of the Southern Philippines
was dictated primarily by MacArthur's genius at keeping theJap garrisons bewitched
and befuddled. The campaigns in the spring of I 945 in this area were known collectively as the Victor Operations: V-I was to free Panay and Negros; V-2, Cebu; V-3,
Palawan; V-4, Zamboanga and the Sulu Archipelago; and V-5, Mindanao less the
Zamboanga peninsula.
In order that our air arm might range over the South China Sea to North
Borneo and Indo China, Palawan, westernmost of the Phillipines, and Zamboanga,
nearest to Borneo, were attacked first. Then came the V-2 and V-I campaigns in the
central Visayas, leaving by early April the main part of Mindanao as the only substantial land mass in the Philippines where the J ap garrison was not under relentless
attack.

Planning
Mindanao, about the size ofPennsylvania, is the largest of the Philippine Islands.
It is also the most rugged, least populated, and generally least civilized and developed.
With the exception of Davao it has no city worthy of the name. Its "road net" is
limited essentially to an east-west road from Lake Lanao thru Malabang, Parang,
Pikit, and Santa Cruz to Davao, and a north-south track (the Sayre Highway )
which wanders northward from Kabacan to Bugo on the north coast.
The defending garrison, composed of the Japanese 30th and I ooth Divisions plus
a miscellany of naval troops and service personnel aggregating about so,ooo effectives, was deployed in the principal towns and controlled the roads. Especially at
Davao were they emplaced in strength with elaborate defenses and large quantities
of automatic weapons and artillery. A frontal assault on Davao Gulfnot only would
expose the attacking troops to murderous fire but would, in addition, require the forcing of what the Navy considered the most vicious mine fields in the Theatre. So
Eighth Army was ordered to "hit 'em where they ain't" by landing in the Moro Gulf
and then moving overland more than IOO miles to take Davao in the rear.
The force designated for this campaign was X Corps consisting of the 24th and
3 Ist Infantry Divisions and 2o,ooo assorted attached troops, including the 533d
EB&SR. Planning the attack, set for April I 7, commenced at Leyte on March I 5,
and as will be seen, continued at Luzon, Mindoro and at sea right up until a few hours
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before the first craft hit the beach. The Task Force's princiP.al components staged
at points ranging from Luzon, Leyte, and Mindoro to Morotai, and were not to meet
until the last moment. Since the 24th Division was to make the assault and the 31st
not to come ashore until five days thereafter, the Regiment was attached to the 24th
and operated exclusively under its control during the planning stages and through
the assault and initial exploitation.
The primary objectives in the assault on the shores of the Mora Gulf were the
airstrip at Malabang and the town of Parang at the head of Polloc Harbor, which
appeared to be the most satisfactory spot for the corps base of operations. Since air
photos showed Polloc Harbor had nothing vaguely resembling a decent landing
beach and, in addition, was believed to be fairly well fortified, X Corps and 24th
Division commanders decided to land initially along the Malabang beaches and to
take Parang from the rear by moving 35 miles along the road. The possibility of a
sea-borne attack on Parang in conjunction with the overland attack was discussed, as
was the problem of clearing the Mindanao River delta. But no detailed decisions
were reached at the corps conferences at Leyte, and so the Regiment left Luzon
hardly knowing more than above set forth.
The movement to Mindoro from San Fabian was accomplished by the Boat
Battalion on its own craft and by the rest of the Regiment on four LSTs. The Boat
Battalion planned to move in three company serials, commencing on March 28 and
successive days. As no fuel could be guaranteed at Subic Bay by units stationed there,
arrangement~ were made to have a tug move the two organic fuel barges to Subic Bay
with the first serial, and from Subic Bay to Mindoro with the last. Typhoon warnings
caused the naval port director to refuse clearance for the convoys until March 31;
consequently the plan of moving by serials a day apart was abandoned, and the entire
Boat Battalion, consisting of one 63' command boat, five LCMGs, 27 LCVPs, and
106 LCMs, departed from Lingayen at 0700, arriving at Subic Bay 1200 April 1.
A naval escort, consisting of an LCI, was furnished for this part of the voyage in
deference to the presence of a large tug, but the port director at Subic Bay, because of
a shortage of escort vessels, designated one of the 533d's LCMGs as the escort for the
tow for the run to Mindoro. Band C Company departed Subic Bay at 0700 April 2,
and arrived in good order at Mangarin Bay, Mindoro, at ogoo the following day.
Company A left Subic Bay a day later, and made the same schedule. A temporary
camp and maintenance beach was set up on the eastern shore of Mangarin Bay,
adjacent to the Boat Battalion of the 532d EB&SR.
Four LSTs arrived at Lingayen on April 1 and were loaded on the following
day, providing ample room for all authorized and informally acquired equipment.
This convoy departed Lingayen on April 4 and arrived at Mindoro forty-eight hours
later. Regimental Headquarters Company and the Shore Battalion debarked and
set up a temporary bivouac approximately one-half mile inland from the LST beach.
Representatives of the Regiment, meanwhile, had proceeded to Mindoro via
command boat and were busily working out plans and orders with the 24th Division
staff and the staff of Naval Task Group 78.2. In many respects this operation looked
much simpler than Lingayen; in others it would be far more complex. The most
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obvious difference was that no large navy transports, APAs, AKAs, or the like would
be involved. This would ease the shore party load but would make the Boat Battalion's job more difficult in requiring a long run on its own bottoms and probably
considerable ramp-to-ramp unloading.
The scheme of maneuver was essentially dictated by conditions of beach and
inland terrain. Opposite the airstrip and town ofMalabang the beach was apparently
suitable only at high tide for craft no larger than LSMs. The beach at Parang was
doubtful at low tide for any craft and probably useful at high tide only for LCTs and
small boats. Moreover, if the enemy had gun positions on the capes protecting Polloc
Harbor, a landing at Parang would be too hazardous for the ships involved. Only at
the extreme left flank of the objective area, at Baras Plantation, was there a beach
positively capable ofreceiving LSTs satisfactorily. Given these conditions, there was
no alternative to the Division's plan of attack, which was as follows:
Red Beach (Baras Plantation): Land one battalion to secure the beachhead and
follow it with all LSTs.
White Beach (Airstrip): Land two battalions in column with small craft, with
the mission of seizing the airstrip and assisting in capture of the town.
Blue Beach (Malabang Town): Land one RCT in column ofbattalions, with the
dual mission of destroying the garrison of 700 in the town and of pushing rapidly
down Route No. I to take Parang in the rear.
Green Beach (Parang): To be secured if possible by overland envelopment and if
not, after reconnaissance by PTs, L VTs, and gunboats, to be assaulted with units
previously landed on Malabang Beach or, if the latter were unexpectedly engaged,
by elements of the combat team in floating reserve.
Under such a scheme, beach control rather than beach labor was the difficult
problem. With three beaches stretching over more than five miles of coast to be
handled on R Day, and a fourth beach twenty-two miles distant to be operated on
R + I, the control sections of the Shore Battalion had to be spread extremely thin.
The general plan for employment ofthe Shore Battalion was to divide one company between White and Blue Beaches, to assign one company to operate Red Beach,
and to have one company land at Red Beach to reinforce the company assigned to
that beach if necessary, the last company to be prepared to move by LCM to Green
Beach at the earliest opportunity.
For tactical purposes the Boat Battalion was required to furnish only two waves
of LCVPs, IO boats each, and one wave of 8 LCMs, but it was recognized by the
division commander that additional LCMs were essential if the light vehicles, small
dozers, and boat maintenance equipment of the Regiment were to be available when
needed. Moreover, the possibility of subsequent shore-to-shore movements made the
presence of all available army landing craft desirable. The 533d was, therefore,
encouraged to take all craft possible, provided the Admiral approved. He insisted
that the Navy's LCTs be towed by the larger landing ships but agreed to allow all but
I8 of the LCMs to proceed as the 533d saw fit. The acquiescence of the naval commander in the unescorted movement of 99 small craft nearly 350 miles, and in the
rendezvous and junction of these craft with the naval convoy for the final one hundred
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and thirty miles of the approach, reversed Seventh Fleet's long established policy of
not tolerating long distance moves of army craft in connection with assault operations.
As will be seen hereafter, the presence of these extra craft was the principal factor in
the initial rapid progress of the campaign.
The final questions determined at Mindoro dealt with the subsidiary landings
and reconnaissances. The Division adopted the recommendations of the Regiment
as to scouting Ibus and Bongo Islands early in the game and assigned appropriate
missions in the reconnaissance along the coast to Parang. Initially under the impression that the opening of the Mindanao River would be a navy task, the General
refused to specify this as a mission of the 533d EB&SR. After the naval commander
stated that the shoal water in the river might preclude his LCIGs and PGMs from
accomplishing this task, the division commander tentatively assigned this mission
to the Regiment, reinforced by one rifle company, but stated that final orders would
be issued only after the securing of Parang.

The Trip
A rehearsal was held on April I I. It included the prescribed maneuvers for all
ships and boats engaged in organized waves, except those army boats that were
already enroute to Zamboanga. Assault troops went ashore, but neither vehicles
nor bulk cargo were discharged, and heavy amphibious shipping merely crossed the
line of departure and then returned to the anchorage. The small boats performed
well, but it was found that the time allotted between deployment of the convoy and
H Hour allowed for absolutely no mishaps. In fact, the LCMs, after casting off their
tows, had to run I I miles at top speed in order to cross the line of departure at the
prescribed time. A critique aboard the flagship later that day resulted in the Navy's
consenting to increase the time cushion by moving the deployment area nearer the
beach. There is no doubt but that the holding ofthis rehearsal was of great value to
the boat crews and wave leaders, who had had only one previous ship-to-shore operation in two years. Moreover, this particular operation was far more complicated than
the normal ship-to-shore attack from naval transports, because 95% of the boats
picked up their troops not only from ships other than those towing or carrying them,
but also from ships which, in the transport area, lay many miles from the point at
which the boat coxswains were put on their own.
The embarkation presented no noteworthy difficulties, though cancellation of
some of the promised LSTs meant that a fair sized rear echelon had to remain at
Mindoro awaiting the turnaround shipping. Lack of time required all sorts of short
cuts. The Shore Battalion actually had less than 48 hours between the time it d ebarked at Mindoro and the beginning ofloading out. Thus the standard program of
carefully worked out field orders issued in lengthy briefing confer ences by each h eadquarters was necessarily telescoped into the preparation and rapid distribution of a
single field order, followed by short skull practice sessions for such key personnel as
could be spared from the work of out-loading. The experience at Lingayen, where the
shore party successfully handled an emergency of unforseen magnitude, tended to
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give all hands a feeling of confidence and of indifference to formal orders. "Just tell
us where we're to land -we know the rest" was the general attitude. How little
they knew the extent to which events were to put this glib assurance to the test!
Except for a command and communications group loaded in 6 LCMs, Regimental Headquarters Company was left for the R +I I turnaround. The Boat
Battalion was allotted LST space for its tractors and shop trucks, and carried the bulk
of its personnel and equipment, including that of the I46Ist EM Company, in 46
LCMs. The Shore Battalion had all its DUKWs loaded in I3 LCMs of the assault
waves, as well as its weapons section and light dozers. In addition, its light vehicles
and 2;Y2-ton trucks not loaded in LSTs were carried in 26 LCMs.
The LCMs were loaded on April 8 and g, each one carrying, in addition to its
cargo, IO individuals, including the crew, on the general theory that IO men on an
LCM would be less acutely uncomfortable than 500 men on an LST. The truth of
this assumption was proved by the experience of personnel on the LSTs. The LSTs
were loaded on April g, IO, and I2. At their davits swung 3 LCS (S)s and 2I LCVPs
of the 533d.
The LCM trip from Mindoro to Zamboanga was blessed with ideal weather and
glassy seas, as three separate convoys left at daybreak on April 10, I I and I2. Not
only did this division make the run easier on coxswains and control officers, but it also
would be less apt to tip the hand of the whole Task Force should a casual Jap plane
spot the boats. The run of 338 miles was actually non-stop with each boat carrying
enough fuel in drums to keep it going. En route the Cagayan Islands were visited
and the expected evacuation of the Japs confirmed.
After an average passage of 52 hours the boats tied up along the T wharf at
Zamboanga. There 2 to 4 days were spent on refueling and minor repairs, exercise
and recreation ashore, and getting acquainted with and sizing up the first of many
Moros we were to meet. The 543d EB&SR, which had landed there a month previously, were fine hosts during this stay, and the relaxation was only slightly upset by
receipt of a secret radio message froni the flagship saying "Be prepared for alternate
plan eliminating landings at Blue and White Beaches and substituting a I300 assault
landing on Polloc Harbor itself." Since there was no possible way to " be prepared"
any better than had been done, there was nothing to do except await the junction
with the naval convoy two days later.
The naval convoy left Mindoro at I300 April I4. Aboard the flagship, information was received that the Japanese garrison at Malabang had been evacuated by
boat to the Cotabato area, and that guerrilla forces controlled most of the MalabangLeft: C Company convoy moves out of Mindoro bound for Zamboanga 338 miles away.
Right: The entire flotilla of the 533d tied up at Zamboanga two days before the attack.
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Parang area. Confronted with this situation, the task force commander made a
radical change in his attack plan. Only the Red Beach assault was left unchanged;
the elements originally assigned to assault Blue Beach were ordered to attack Parang
(Green Beach) at H+6o, to be followed by the elements originally assigned to White
Beach. All of the LSTs, except for 7 carrying aviation engineers, and 8 carrying air
force units, were to land at Green Beach, and all but two of the I 5 LSMs originally
designated for White and Blue Beaches were diverted to Parang.
The wave structure remained unchanged, with the White Beach waves following
on call those originally assigned to Blue Beach. The occupation of Ibus Island was
left to the 533d, which was charged with a new mission of conducting a reconnaissance in force of Bongo Island at the earliest possible time.
This was no minor adjustment but rather a drastic revision in the whole assault
operation. In military doctrine it had always been axiomatic that an amphibious
operation once launched could no more be redirected than an arrow once the bow
string is released. It is doubtful if such a change was ever hazarded in any other major
sea-borne operation. The decision not only indicated great flexibility and daring in
the minds of the admirals and generals, but more important, sublime confidence in
their subordinates' ability to grasp new orders quickly and to execute them without
too great confusion. Naturally the change affected the 53 3d more drastically than
any other unit in the task force, and General Woodruff opened his shipboard conference in which he issued the new orders with the sober words "We will now have one
minute of silent prayer for the 533d."
The naval convoy was due off Zamboanga at 0940 on R- I, where it was to drop
off the R + 2 shipping and be joined by task force elements from Leyte. Because of
the strong currents in Basilan Strait, the 533d directed its small boats to join the convoy well east of the Strait off Malanipa Island at noon. The naval convoy, unfortunately, was approximately two hours behind schedule, so its predicted speed of advance
of 6. 7 knots would not enable it to meet H Hour. So the Boat Battalion, which was
already at its rendezvous, at noon was ordered to proceed ahead keeping to one side
of the track of the convoy, and to join it four hours later than scheduled, thereby
shortening the time during which it would have to strain its engines to maintain
station.
Part of the 533d fleet of LCMs in Basilan Straits off Zamboanga awaiting the passage of the
naval convoy it was to trail across Moro Gulf.
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At noon on R- I aboard a PC screening the convoy the details of the new plan
of attack were learned for the first time by Colonel Moore and his staff. The next
two hours were devoted to a careful study and final revision of the amended regimental order which had been drafted singlehanded by the 533d liaison officer.
All this was accomplished in the time it took the regimental command boat to reach
the Boat Battalion convoy, which was still preceding the naval convoy east of Basilan
Straits. The commander of the Boat Battalion had meanwhile been directed to
assemble his mission leaders aboard his command boat, and in the period I 400I 500 necessary instructions were issued to the boat commanders. The most serious
problem arose from the fact that, whereas the original towing bill insured that all
towed LCMs reach their proper rendezvous area, the revised destinations of the major
amphibious shipping diverted five towed LCMs with Red Beach shore party personnel and equipment from the Red Beach group to the new Green Beach group. In
addition, the assault force on Bongo Island had to be organized from mechanics,
cooks, and miscellaneous passengers aboard the LCM convoy, and this personnel
transferred to selected boats. Finally, the proposed division of the naval convoy after
dark required a new disposition of the boat companies within the convoy.
The regimental command boat next pulled alongside the subchaser on which the
Shore Battalion commander was embarked and advised him of the new plan. As to
getting information to other Shore Battalion elements aboard LSTs, the regimental
command group could do nothing but rely on the general briefing that the task
force commander directed be held on each ship. Inasmuch as the distribution of the
new orders was not completed to all ships in the convoy until after dark, this briefing
was extremely sketchy and left many key personnel completely in the air.
About I6oo the stately convoy covering 25 square miles drew up to the waiting
flotilla ofLCMs at 8 knots- more than a knot faster than scheduled because of its two
hours' tardiness. The wide screen of destroyers slipped by on both sides ofthe LCMs,
followed by the light cruisers Cleveland, Denver and Montpelier and the five APDs.
Then, led by the command ship Wasatch, came the phalanx of thirty-odd landing
ships each towing an LCT or an LCM. Along the flanks were strung the minesweepers, LCis, rocket and gunboats and at the tail came the tugs and minor auxiliaries. Small it was indeed compared to the armada which entered Lingayen Gulf
three months before, but frightfully potent looking when viewed from the deck of a
36' J boat or even one of the line-of-battle 56' gunboats!
The coxswains and wave leaders maneuvered as close as they could to the passing
naval vessels, but even so they had to move 2000 yards laterally to reach their proper
station in the convoy which was moving at the maximum sp eed their LCMs could
attain. To make matters worse, the main convoy doubled up, with the Red Beach
group increasing speed to move out to port and abreast of the main body. At the
same time a series of sharp easterly squalls slapped the stub-nosed craft head on, and
as a finishing touch the Navy increased speed another halfknot. It was soon apparent
that the LCMs could not physically keep up and that if they tried to, extensive engine
damage would r esult. So orders wer e issued to reduce speed to standard cruising
(7 knots) and to proceed to the objective area independently of the naval convoy.
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The rest of the night was a tough grind for all in the Boat Battalion. Black
squalls cut visibility to inches. Head winds made it difficult to maintain even 7 knots.
And the run was further complicated by the naval convoy's failure to adhere to its
revised courses and its turns and speed changes made without signal of any sort.
Nevertheless (with the exception of a single boat which took a 150-mile detour) the
boat company convoys - B Company heading for Red Beach and A and C Companies heading for Parang- remained in good order and within dubious visual
contact until daybreak. At that time all boats opened everything wide, including the
tool box, and reached their rendezvous areas on schedule.

The Landing
The Ibus Island force, consisting of four LCMs and one DUKW, supported by
one LCMG, reached the island's coral shelf at 0730, precisely on schedule. It found a
suitable landing point seven minutes later and was able to report fifteen minutes
before the eight o'clock H Hour that the island was free of enemy.
Wave I at Red Beach, consisting of ten LCVPs, picked up its troops from two
LSTs and landed them on time. Wave 2 contained four LCMs towed by LSMs,
each carrying a DUKW for Wave 4· Unfortunately, the wave leader's boat was

f

As from large transports, troops scramble down cargo nets
from LSTs before
going ashore in
LCVPs.

astern of an LSM diverted to Parang, but a staff sergeant completed the wave by
commandeering another boat, which had been towed contrary to plan to the Red
Beach area, and launched the DUKWs and picked up his troops. The ramp cable
of one LCM broke under the weight of the DUKW, allowing the ramp to fall vertical
in the water, but the same staff sergeant re-rigged it in time to land his wave on schedule
though to do so he had to skip crossing the line of departure, to the chagrin of the
naval control officer. Wave 3, consisting of seven LCMs which had traveled under
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their own power from Mindoro, crossed the line of departure in good order and arrived on time. Four of the eight DUKWs in Wave 4 were in LCMs towed to Parang,
but the other four landed as they should. Thus the Red Beach phase of the landing
and the boat operations were completed successfully despite the confusing change in
plans.
Meanwhile, the Bongo Island mission embarked in two LCMs, supported by
two LCMGs, made its landing at H- 15, and after contacting guerrillas, was able to
report to the flagship by H 30 that the island was free of J aps.
At Green Beach the waves all landed on schedule on the right beach, despite the
fact that no coxswain had any idea of his destination until R Day. Three LCMs had
their tow cables part during the night of R Day, but proceeded independently under
their own power and succeeded in joining their waves during the deployment.
Coastal reconnaissance missions mounted in L VTs, supported by LCMGs,
LCIGs, and LCS(S)s, proceeded both north and south of Green Beach, covering the
coast prior to dark from Tugabangan Point to the Simuay River. One LCMG proceeded twenty miles down the coast to a point below the Mindanao River to pick up
guerrilla liaison officers.
Neither on any of the beaches nor on these coastwise missions was contact made
with the enemy; in fact, the only opposition encountered by the entire Task Force
during R Day was a small sniper party near the town of Parang.
Company D, which comprised the bulk of the shore party at Red Beach, had
loaded its reconnaissance elements, beach marking equipment, and communications
equipment in DUKWs, and its engineering equipment and part ofits reconnaissance
team in LCMs of Wave 3· The latter arrived on schedule, but the diversion of half
of the DUKWs to Parang deprived it of all its beach marking equipment and important communication items. The beach was excellent from a hydrographic point
of view, but the sand was extremely heavy and loose. Heavy vegetation limited the
beach to a depth of I 5-20 yards, and lateral traffic was practically impossible. Slots
were cleared directly inland from each LST landing point to the good ground. The
shore party had two D-4s, one D-6 , and a D-8 , and the LSTs contained a number of
bulldozers belonging to engineer units; so the work of towing vehicles through the
loose sand and of clearing slots proceeded rapidly. Landing mat in quantity would
have assisted materially, but efforts to obtain it had as usual been unsuccessful. One
roll of cyclone fence was carried on each alternate LST and was useful as far as it
went. Some LSTs beached absolutely dry, others required a short ramp no longer
than twenty-five feet. The eight LSTs, which were designated to beach on R Day,
were all discharged and retracted by 2200. In addition, the seven LSTs scheduled
for R 1 were beached late on R Day and were completely unloaded by early the
following afternoon. Because of the soft beach egress roads, nearly 70% of the bulk
was discharged on the beach by hand, and thereafter was moved as quickly as possible
to the dump areas. The total tonnage discharged during the first 30 hours at this
beach was 4940 tons of mobile cargo, 3750 tons of bulk, and 150 tons of bulk backloading, a total of 8840 tons.
F Company and elements of R egimental and Shore Battalion H eadquarters

+

+

The shore at Parang is scanned from
LCMG MAl as it leads an early wave
to the well bombarded beach on

April 17, 1945.

Companies, which arrived at Red Beach, were immediately moved 25 miles to
Green Beach, using the B Company LCMs which had been assigned to Red Beach
for ramp-to-ramp lightering in the event that LSTs could not beach.
The shore line of Polloc Harbor, except for Green Beach, is generally useless
for all types of landing craft because of steep cliffs or flat, soft mud beaches, mangrove
swamps, or a combination of these. Green Beach itself is a soft, sand-covered coral
shelf approximately three hundred yards in length, with one foot of water over the
shelf at low tide and five to seven feet at high tide. The only egress was a steep road
off the north end, and a solid row of houses immediately at the high tide mark blocked
LSMs and an LCI on Green Beach, Parang.

Green Beach, Parang, as seen from the Beachmaster's CP on the second day of
the campaign.

two-thirds of the area available for lateral traffic. The jetty, approximately two
hundred yards north of the beach, had been rendered totally unserviceable by unnecessary last minute air bombardment.
By a fortunate coincidence, high tide occurred at H +go, with the result that all
small craft were able to beach and retract without difficulty. The LSMs and LCis
got over the shelf on their way in, but many were unable to retract until the succeeding tide. The only shore party elements to arrive early on R Day were those on the fifth
wave, carried in LCMs. This group reconnoitered dump areas and with one D-6 and
two D-4s as the sole engineer equipment at their disposal prior to the arrival of F
Company from Red Beach, proceeded to clear the huge quantity of debris resulting
from the demolition of the houses on the beach by naval gunfire, and to repair large
craters in the existing road at the north end of the beach until it was capable ofhandling the flow of mobile traffic.

Troops assembling on Green Beach
after debarking from LSMs and
LCis.
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Makeshift unloading of LSTs - Left: Heavy equipment is brought ashore on sections of
ponton causeway; right: Ramp-to-ramp discharge using LCM.

Test landings of LSTs disclosed that they could approach no nearer than five
hundred feet from the beach, and as there were only four strings of ponton cubes
with the Task Force, LSTs had initially to be discharged solely by lightering. Even
this could not be commenced until the evening flood tide because of the congestion
on the limited beach where many of the LCis, LCTs, and LSMs of the assault waves
were unable to retract, and, as will be seen later, a substantial portion of the LCMs
were at that time diverted to a tactical operation. Early on the morning ofR + r,
three of the ponton strings were installed as extensions of the undamaged portion
of the jetty, enabling three LSTs to discharge there simultaneously. Immediate advantage was taken of the arrival of additional ponton cubes on R+z, and a jetty was

A section of ponton
causeway is floated
into position by an
LCM.

Jetty at Parang, as
seen from the old
Spanish Fort, after
ponton cube extension enabled it to
receive LSTs.
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Jetty of ponton-cube sections accommodates seven LSTs at once.

constructed at the north end of the beach, which extended 4 70 feet from shore and
by R 3 possessed a frontage of 400 feet with a capacity of eight LSTs. 992 ponton
cubes were employed in this jetty. After the construction of the jetty, LSTs were
handled rapidly, with the result that the Navy's return convoy schedules were met.

+

Looking across Polloc Harbor from behind Green Beach.

Top left: Green Beach as seen from the partially ruined steamer wharf. Bottom left: A
battalion of the 21st Infantry moves inland from Parang to support the 19th Infantry.
Right: Two views of the initial beachmaster's CP on Green Beach.
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The Mindanao River
Though the 533d's field order included provisions for the assault on the lower
reaches of the double-mouthed Mindanao River, the division commander would not
commit himself to the operation until Parang was secured. At I 700 R Day the General decided to seize the Cotabato-Tamontaka area by an amphibious assault, because a succession of blown bridges was slowing the I gth Infantry's southward progress along the highway. For the operation he created an informal task unit consisting
ofthe 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, and the gunboat elements and such other 533d craft
as were needed. Since the infantry commander was confronted with the problem
without any forewarning, the general scheme previously studied and recommended
by the 53 3d was readily accepted, and tactical control of the operation was given to
533d officers. The initial objective was set as a line not more than a mile east ofthe
two towns.
The plan of attack was a simultaneous forcing of both river mouths, using independent gunboat teams, aggregating five LCMGs, one LCM rocket, and three
LCS (S)s, to be followed by the landing of one reinforced rifle company at Tamontaka
and of the remainder of the infantry battalion at Cotabato. No assistance from the
Igth Infantry, advancing along the highway from Parang, could be expected until
R+2. One cruiser, one destroyer and two flights ofB-25s were to support the operation, controlled through JASCO units on the leading gunboats.
In previous planning, it had been expected that the ground forces would arrive
at the north bank of the river and be ferried across, using a minimum of boats, so this
new, completely amphibious assault which required twenty-four cargo LCMs and
fourteen LCVPs, presented unforeseen problems in collecting and organizing assault
waves. This was further complicated by the fact that the planning conference did
not break up until after dark, by the heavy rain which set in at sunset and continued

Looking forward on
LCMG MCI; note
theJap25mmautomatic cannon in the
after cockpit.
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all night, and by the crowded condition of the beach, arising from the pressure of
ramp-to-ramp lightering of the LSTs. By virtue of frantic efforts and considerable
luck the boats were rounded up and beached, the infantry with its jeeps, trucks and
self-propelled howitzers were sorted out and loaded over, among, and around the
troops and materiel still pouring ashore across the beach. The waves were organized
on the backs of envelopes, and officers and sergeants were assigned as leaders as they
could be found. Finally at 0030 the last boat pulled off the beach and the little
flotilla of 46 boats anchored while the troops got some damp, cramped sleep until
daybreak.
A final check was made at dawn to see that key personnel was embarked according to plan, and the mission divided into two convoys which proceeded independently
to the river mouths. Each convoy was headed by a gunboat team: the north branch
group including 2 LCMGs, r Rocket LCM and an LCS(S), all C Company boats;
the south branch force was led by 3 LCMGs and 2 LCS(S)s from the other three
companies of the Battalion. The troops followed in LCMs and LCVPs: a rifle company up the south branch and the rest of the infantry battalion up the north.
Meanwhile, the general area bombardment by the USS Cleveland and Sigourney
had been underway since daybreak. Promptly at ogoo the two assault groups started
upstream and reached their initial objective without encountering opposition. A
final intensive bombardment was laid on the two towns, including naval shell fire,
The landing at Cotabato, 5 miles up the Mindanao River, on April 18, 1945.
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five hundred-pound bombs, aerial and boat rockets, and automatic cannon fire from
the gunboats. Troops landed at both Cotabato and Tamontaka without making
contact with the enemy, and fanned out to secure the area between the two river
branches. Sensing that the enemy was totally disorganized and unprepared for a
move up the river, the task unit commander decided to exploit the opportunity before
the enemy could react and establish defenses further upstream. Gunboats were
ordered to proceed up stream to the river junction and the division CP notified of this
action. Orders were immediately received to transport one reinforced rifle company
upstream with the gunboats. This movement was opposed only by a handful of J aps
on the south branch, all but one of whom were killed in a brief fire fight. Guerrillas
reported fifty Japs intrenched at Tumbau, just south of the river junction, and plans
were made for an assault landing at this point, but the J aps fled into the swamps upon
approach of the gunboats.
The two gunboat teams arrived simultaneously at the river junction at I 350,
followed almost immediately by the infantry battalion commander and the reinforced
rifle company in LCMs. A quick reconnaissance of the area indicated no suitable
defensive position for such a small unit at this point, and so a further reconnaissance
upstream was ordered. About a mile above the junction, local residents reported two
hundred Japs dug in at Lomopog with automatic weapons. Orders were issued to
assault this town, inasmuch as it controlled the first road-river junction above Cotabato and would enable our troops to attack from the rear the Japs opposing the
advance of the Igth Infantry eastward along Route No. I, which connects Parang
with Davao via Fort Pikit. By this time the air support had been withdrawn, and the
naval guns were out of rahge, so the gunboats were massed in line abreast to bring the
maximum number of 40 mm and 37 mm guns into action simultaneously. The
LCS(S)s and one LCMG protected the troop-carrying craft. A total of one hundred
rockets were dropped on the town, and automatic cannon fire poured into it at maximum rate, but the only opposition was some machine gun and knee-mortar fire from
the opposite bank, which was quickly silenced. Two launches and a landing barge,
camouflaged under the bank, were sunk for good measure. While in the town itself
no enemy were found, the presence of still-warm fires and numerous papers and arms
in excellent condition indicated that the enemy had withdrawn very shortly before
the landing.
A perimeter was organized, the gunboats deployed in its support, and a reconnaissance patrol, accompanied by engineer officers, pushed out to determine the
condition of the road and the presence or absence of enemy forces. Radio orders
were issued by the infantry battalion commander, on recommendation of the task
unit commander, to move the balance of his battalion from Cotabato at crack of
dawn in order to exploit further the enemy lack of preparedness in the river valley.
At the same time, a radio message was sent to Division advising them of the situation
and urging that reinforcements be dispatched immediately so that the drive could
continue without slackening, until Fort Pikit could be secured and the enemy along
Highway No. I completely trapped.
During the night the J aps crossed the river in canoes retreating northward both
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Just before the landing at
Lomopog- Jap fire from
right hank is silenced and
leading gunboats pour
rockets and 40 mm shells
into the town around the
bend to the left.

upstream and downstream of the task unit, but displayed no desire to test its fire
power. Enthusiastic Moros brought in much valuable intelligence of enemy movements and dispositions further upstream, as well as enough duck eggs for a really first
class breakfast.
No answer was received to the above radio message until o83o, when orders were
received for the infantry to hold Lomopog "at all costs" and reconnoiter the road
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north to Serenaya, and for the gunboats to reconnoiter the river to Ulandang, a mere
five miles upstream. No mention was made of reinforcements, nor was any indication
given that those in authority were aware of the possibility of exploiting the penetration. The reconnaissance to Serenaya had been completed the previous evening, but
in accordance with the message was ordered repeated, and one platoon of infantry
embarked to accompany the gunboats upstream. This party arrived at Ulandang
at I 030 to find that the J aps had left ninety minutes previously, abandoning a large
store of arms and supplies. A quick reconnaissance was made three kilometers north
along the road and a somewhat more limited probe made in the Dulauan area on
the opposite bank. As this road was found to be in poor condition, thus reducing the
value of Ulandang as a jumping-off point for further operations, and in view of the
obvious continued demoralization of the Japs, the decision was made to push on to
Paidu Pulangi to secure it as a beachhead for a drive on Fort Pikit.
As the force was being re-assembled and re-embarked, a message was received
from the Commanding General, 24th Division, directing that Ulandang be held and
that the force proceed no further upstream. It was obvious that the division commander was not aware of the extent to which the J aps were disorganized in the valley,
so the radio message was ignored, and the little force proceeded to Paidu Pulangi
where, after a briefbombardment, a landing was effected at 1300. Here again, evidence was found of a precipitate withdrawal on the part of the enemy, who left file
baskets full of operational papers and arms with shells still in the chamber. A perimeter was organized and a strong radio message dispatched to the division commandScenes at Dulauan and Ulandang 36 miles up the Mindanao River.
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er, explaining the desirability of holding this beachhead and attacking Fort Pikit
with a minimum delay. This message was never answered, and so it was decided to
guide the balance of the 2d Battalion, 2 Ist Infantry, which had been ordered upstream
as far as Lomopog, directly to Paidu Pulangi. Upon arriving at Lomopog at I8I5,
it was learned that the assistant division commander had that morning countermanded the order for the battalion to move upstream and had directed that the infantry be withdrawn to Lomopog.
This was indeed a bitter blow. The infantry battalion commander felt he would
be court-martialed if he did not obey, and so he took his doughboys downstream to
Lomopog. The boats h ad not been mentioned specifically in the order, and it was
senseless to evacuate Paidu Pulangi so that thejaps could reoccupy its well constructed
defenses and exact a heavy toll for its recovery. The decision was therefore made to
hold Paidu Pulangi with the crews of3 LCMGs and 2 LCS (S)s until a personal appeal
could be made to the division commander to exploit the breakthrough. Thus on
the night of R + 2 36 officers and men were deployed in foxholes and on gunboats
holding an essential road-river junction I 3 miles ahead of the rifle company holding
the crossing at Lomopog, which in turn was 25 miles beyond the nearest support.
Scattered throughout the valley were 2000 Japs streaming east and north, their
prepared hill positions by-passed and outflanked.
The night passed quietly and the next day the commanders of the two river
garrisons ordered aggressive patrols partly to disguise their own weakness. A foot
patrol ranged eastward from Paidu Pulangi spotting J ap bivouacs on the road to
Pikit and even repairing a bridge between
-l
the Jap rear guard and main body, only
to have it destroyed again by a B-25. On
the strength of native reports that a guerrilla headquarters was located only a few
hundred yards upstream, two gunboats
were sent out to make contact and get
reinforcements if possible. The few hundred yards grew to I 8 miles before the tense
gunboat crews (on the verge of shooting
their Moro guides) located the CP of the
2d Battalion, I I 8th Infantry (Filipino)
Regiment, at Inogog, and made a deal for
a joint operation against Fort Pikit if the
American infantry did not show up next
day.
Down at Lomopog a patrol on the
south bank flushed about 8o J aps and
soon two platoons were heavily engaged
with mortars, machine guns on both sides,
and barrage rockets from the supporting
Guerrilla leaders in canoe approach
gunboat. The fight ended as a draw, with
gunboat near lnogog.
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our infantry retreating in boats across the river and the Japs using darkness to
move upstream and across the river in canoes.
Back at Parang, it was learned that the Division was rushing reinforcements
upstream as fast as they were disembarked from the R + 2 shipping, and plans were
made to concentrate these troops at Paidu Pulangi during R+4 for an attack on Fort
Pikit the following day. The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, got as far upstream as
Dulauan and continued to Paidu Pulangi early on R + 4·
A brief conference with the amphibian garrison which had remained at Paidu
Pulangi established that the river was clear ofJaps as far as Inogog and that the road
at least halfway to Fort Pikit was not defended, so it was decided to make a simultaneous overland and amphibious move on Fort Pikit, using one company afloat and
the balance of the Battalion overland. Both elements moved out at I IOO. The river
force was now reinforced by three Navy PGMs* which had been working their way
upstream for the past thirty-six hours. They had been sent into the river by the
Admiral only on R + 2 and had stopped for the night at the fork in the river. From
Paidu Pulangi on army officers piloted them, and they operated under the tactical
control of the 533d throughout their stay on the river.
The river force arrived at Inogog for a conference with the regimental commander of the I I 8th Infantry at I400. An officer patrol sent out by this organization two
hours before reported that six hundred Japs were dug in on the east bank below the
ferry, and that two hundred enemy were emplaced above the ferry with two 2.95"
mountain guns. As this was not the first pessimistic report that had been received
from guerrillas in this campaign, orders were given to carry on, except that the
*Pa trol Gunboat , M edium; converted
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subchasers.

LCMs embark 34th Infantry Regiment troops and equipment to exploit the opening of the
Mindanao River.
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Guerrillas swarm
over the LCMGs at
lnogog while plans
are made for the
assault on Ft. Pikit.

infantry company was to be landed a mile and a half down stream from the ferry to
avoid their being taken under fire while debarking, by the reported enemy concentrated on the opposite bank further upstream. The gunboats formed in two columns,
each headed by a PGM, and proceeded upstream to the first reported enemy position.
A maximum barrage was laid down, including 3"/50 from PGMs and the convoy
received no return fire. The PGMs were unable to proceed above the ferry, because
of the wrecked bridge, so the LCMGs drew ahead and covered the second reported

Bursts from the 3"
guns of the PGMs
open the bombardment of reported
enemy positions
just below Pikit
Ferry.

MINDANAO
THE ASSAULT ON
FORT PIKIT

Approaching
the
fort, gunboat crews
scan shore intently.

LCMG 12 sets a
small patrol ashore
right under the fort.

Patrol in the old
Spanish fort raises
flag on boathook to
advise infantry approaching from the
west that the Japs
have departed.
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concentration area with maximum fire of all weapons. Light small arms fire was
received and quickly silenced, and the four gunboats proceeded directly to the town
ofPikit. The dominating position of Fort Pikit atop a hundred-foot hill was obvious,
so a patrol of gunboat crew members quickly occupied it at r6oo, once more finding
valuable stores of arms and equipment, including go mm mortars. Meanwhile, the
infantry company which had landed below the ferry, reached the ferry landing and
was ordered to dig in for the night. The main ground force advancing overland
from Paidu Pulangi began to register artillery on the Fort Pikit area, but by bringing
an SCR 300 to the top of the hill, contact was made with them while they were still
three and a half miles away and identities established before any damage was done.
That night another battalion of the 34th Infantry, and its regimental headquarters, arrived at Fort Pikit in LCMs, and plans were made for reconnaissance in
the direction of Kabacan for R+5, to be followed on R+6 by a joint land and
amphibious attack on the town. The tactical command ofthe river campaign passed
from the 533d to the Commanding Officer, 34th Infantry at that time. *
At daylight of R + 5, three gunboats proceeded up stream with considerable
difficulty as the boats dragged bottom almost continuously. By noon, the infantry
had advanced rapidly along the road and were directed to proceed to the town of
Kabacan prior to dark. Radio orders directed the boats to make all possible speed
in order to join the infantry at the town. Late in the afternoon, the infantry battalion
ran into approximately one hundred twenty J aps in the vicinity of the road junction
Route 1 - Route 3 and, after a brief skirmish, dug in for the night. The gunboats
encountered a party of J aps below the ferry, killed three and scattered the balance,
and arrived at the ferry expecting to find the infantry either there or shortly to arrive.
Contact with them over SCR 300 disclosed the fact that the infantry would not resume its advance until the following day, and that the gunboats would have to hold
the ferry during the night, so once more a perimeter, consisting of a handful of cooks,
radio operators, enginemen, and official observers from higher headquarters, was
established across the line of retreat of the estimated Jap company which had halted
the infantry battalion. Though no concerted attack was made on this position,
several infiltration attempts were successfully repulsed, and three Japs killed. The
commendable coolness of this detachment is proved by the fact that, despite the
exposed conditions, only eighteen shots were fired during the entire night, and
seventeen bullet holes were found in the three J aps.
Early the next morning the infantry occupied the town of Kabacan and, as this
was the head of navigation for landing craft, the tactical phase of the river operation
was concluded.
The planners in Eighth Army had predicted 14-30 days would be necessary to
dislodge the J aps from the Mindanao River Valley and secure the critical Kabacan
area. The job had been done in six. Any analysis of the map on page 165 cannot
fail to indicate the strategic importance of the move upstream. The progress of the
rgth Infantry along the road was hampered not only by Jap resistance but also by
*It is amusing to note that the unofficial history of the 24th Division, Children qf Yesterday by Jan Valtin, gives entire
credit for this advance up the Mindanao River to "scouts of the 34th Infantry Regiment" and states that they constructed
their own gunboats!
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demolished bridges often at intervals of a few hundred yards, and at times promised
to be delayed indefinitely by lack of bridge materials and equipment and too few
engineer troops. The comparison of the progress of the amphibian column and the
road column speaks for itself. The Japs in western Cotabato Province were a disorganized, ineffective rabble largely because they had neglected one obvious avenue of
attack, and that avenue had been decisively exploited by a force that was outnumbered ten or twenty to one.
No account of the river operations would be complete without mention of the
magnificent performance of the communications personnel who, in addition to handling organic traffic efficiently, provided the only reliable communications between
infantry units in the river valley during the first days of the operation.
The Boat Battalion was charged with local security of the river route, and during
the succeeding weeks deployed its gunboats at intervals along the stream. These
boats not only checked convoys against their schedule, but made patrols in their
sectors in an effort to prevent any Jap stragglers from crossing the river by native
canoes. The only contact with the enemy came in the vicinity of the river junction
on April 30, when seven armed Japs were discovered in a bamboo thicket. After an
intense bombardment of the thicket, a patrol, hurriedly assembled from crews of
passing LCMs, went ashore and after a brief fire fight in a waist-deep swamp, killed
six of the seven Japs.
The delay in clearing the road, and the large scale destruction of bridges, put
the bulk of the burden of reinforcements and supplies on the river. The channel was
too narrow and some places too shallow to risk the use of LCTs, so the entire task fell
to the Boat Battalion. For this, after providing for lighterage at the main b eachheads, there was available one and two-thirds boat companies (C and 2 platoons of
B), with an effective strength of fifty-five LCMs of which nine operated continuous
ferries. The boats worked night and day, plying principally between Cotabato and
Fort Pikit, with only sufficient time between trips to refuel and reload. During the
period April 2 o to April 2 8, three RCTs, plus a division headquarters and an extra
b attalion of field artillery were ferried the 68 miles from Parang to Pikit, together
with three to six days of supplies.
At first the trips on the river were a pleasant novelty - fascinating scenery,
cheery greetings from each barrio, and dead calm, but a little went a long way. The
heat was the most oppressive the men had experienced overseas, night runs were a
terrific strain on the helmsmen, and snags and flotsam caused much damage. The
worst job of all was that of ferry boat at any of the busy points like Cotabato, Pikit, or
Carmen Ferry (Kabacan) . After the roads were completed to these points, the ferries
ran 10-12 trips an hour 24 hours a day. Ramp mechanisms and clutches soon collapsed under such strain, but repairs were made on the spot and service kept up.
An F Company detachment with a couple of dozers improved the landing sites
upstream and kept them and the nearby roads in as good shape as possible. The flow
of cargo over these points rivaled that of salt sea beaches with tonnage averaging
better than 300 tons a day at Pikit and exceeding 500 on peak d ays. In the first
twenty days of the campaign 313,920 ton-miles were chalked up on the river alone.

SERVICE OF SUPPLY ON THE
MINDANAO RIVER
Top: Loading ammunition by roller
conveyor.
Center: The busy ferry landing just
above Cotabato.

Right: Ammunition loading point in
Cotabato.
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Throughout May the river commerce continued under high pressure and under
increasing difficulty as the water level dropped and the boats available for work on
the river were reduced to those of C Company alone. But with its base at Cotabato
and ingenuity at licking the river currents and shoals, the flow of supplies was kept
above requirements of the troops slugging up the Sayre Highway toward Del Monte
and those moving eastward to Davao.
By June bases opened at Davao and Bugo, and highway traffic became impossible
on account of the rains, and so the stock piles at Pikit and Kabacan and the service
troops in that area had to be brought downstream again. Civilian government work,
patrols into the Lake Buluan area and miscellaneous missions of all sorts kept at least
one platoon of C Company on the river until the end of the War.

Operations at Parang
While a small minority of the regiment was having its novel excitement on the
Mindanao River, plenty of hard routine work was the lot of most of the companies.
The period from R+2 to R+g was one ofvirtual inactivity at Red Beach. The
shipping discharged in this period included only three LSTs and three LSMs. An
average of a hundred tons cargo per day for Green Beach was backloaded on LCMs.
During the succeeding week, R+g to R+ I5, one Liberty ship was discharged of
equipment for airfield construction and supplies for the Marine Air Group. Company D organized fifteen skeleton hatch crews, which were supplemented by combat
troops. Thirty trucks were available for twenty-four hour service, and approximately
ten B Company LCMs worked around the clock during this period. The average
daily discharge was 8oo tons. Upon completion of the Liberty ship, Red Beach was
closed down, and its shore party then moved to Parang by LCMs.
Green Beach at Parang was worked initially byE Company, and over it flowed
all the supplies needed for the rapidly advancing Corps. The combination of steep
grades, reasonably heavy rainfall, and unstable soil rendered imperative extensive
road construction in the immediate beach area. F Company was therefore employed
exclusively on this work. A total of 2. 7 miles of road was constructed in the first
5 days, in addition to the ponton jetties and clearing of large ammunition and fuel
dumps. No engineer equipment, other than bulldozers, cranes, and dump trucks,
was available until the arrival of the turnaround shipping on R +I I, yet the shore
facilities were developed sufficiently to handle the traffic and tonnage brought ashore.
During the initial stages of the operation, available lighterage in the Green
Beach area consisted of twelve LCTs, A Company's thirty-six LCMs, and, after R+ 5,
one DUKW company with an average effective strength of thirty DUKWs. The
naval task force commander's natural concern for a prompt discharge of LSTs
caused him to retain complete operational control of all lighterage in the harbor until
the last echelon ofLSTs was discharged on R +I 7. This control, which was exercised
from a command vessel afloat (through army liaison officers insofar as LCMs were
concerned) undoubtedly did provide maximum lighterage for ramp-to-ramp dis-

Green Beach, Parang, flooded by a high run of tides (above) and during and after the
feverish efforts to raise its level (below).
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The beach1naster's
command post built
on the hill above
Green Beach after
the latter had been
widened and raised.

charge of LSTs, but seriously hampered the effective dispatch of lighters to liberty
ships, which commenced discharging on R + 3·
The damage caused to LCMs during early emergency attempts to use the beach
at other than high tides, reduced the operable percentage by R + 2 to so%. With the
establishment of A Company's bivouac and boat repair base at Quidama Bay on
R + 3 this situation was rapidly remedied, and thereafter over So% of the LCMs were
available for lighterage, but only for approximately twelve hours out of each twentyfour during the periods of high tide. LCTs lost much valuable time waiting empty
on the beach for succeeding high tides. As soon as the major LST echelons were
discharged, holes were cut in alternate cubes in the pontonjetty, and these were filled
with water, thus reducing the freeboard of the jetty to approximately eighteen inches,
and enabling LCTs to land ramp-on and work intensively around the clock. At
about the same time, a tidal schedule was set up, under which the LCMs worked
mobile loading six or seven hour shifts around the high tide, and all DUKWs worked
during the lo~ water period. Since the bulk of the tonnage consisted of rations and
ammunition, and the shortage of labor was extremely acute, this arrangement constituted the most efficient use of available facilities.
The necessity for water shipment of the bulk of the supplies going to the two
infantry divisions imposed a severe backloading burden on the beach (averaging 430
tons per day) with a proportionate reduction of off-loaded tonnage.
Tonnage handled despite handicaps was not inconsiderable. A total of I 26
LSTs were discharged in the first r8 days, and 9 Liberty ships were simultaneously unloaded. At no time was the task force short of required levels of supply ashore, and
no convoy failed to meet its predicted departure date. Total tonnage over this beach
for the period was 38,488 mobile and 54,698 bulk, or an average of 1924 tons mobile
and 2735 tons bulk per day.
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•
LCMs left high and
dry at Green Beach,
Parang.

Early in May Company D and two platoons of Company C of the 54 3d EB&SR
moved from Zamboanga to Parang to fill the gap left by the departure of B and F
Companies of the 533d for Davao Gulf. With the tapering-off of shipping arrivals,
the month's work was handled with no particular difficulties. A succession of spring
tides coupled with heavy rains inundated the beach for several days; consequently a
major construction project was undertaken whereby the level of the beach was raised
several yards and the surface graded and stabilized. When completed, Green Beach,
which had been one of the worst unloading points ever operated by the Regiment,
became a show spot and almost a pleasure to work on.
Meanwhile an engineer construction
battalion was slowly repairing the old
jetty to enable it to take small steamers,
and at the same time driving piles so that
the ponton jetty built by the Shore Battalion could be converted into a floating
Liberty ship dock.
As the fighting moved farther and
farther away to Davao and the Bukidnon
Plateau, the usefulness of Parang as a
base dwindled. But not until bitter experience proved that the 31st Division
strung out from Silae to Del Monte
could not be supplied by truck over the
bottomless quagmire called the "Sayre
Highway," did Corps finally decide to
pull up its stakes and shift its base to
Macajalar Bay on the north side of
the island. By the time orders for this
move came through, there was such
a shortage of shipping for the move
and so many tons of stores to be backloaded that the task of closing out Parang
A typical Moro - reputedly a fierce warrior,
certainly a lazy, indifferent worker.
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dragged wearily on into July. Boat Battalion Headquarters, A, and E Companies
moved out on May 30 enjoying a pleasant 400-mile boat ride via Zamboanga.
Regimental Headquarters followed on June 19, leaving Shore Battalion Headquarters
and D Company to preside over the dying port of Parang.

PARANG
Regimental CP as seen from Shore
Battalion motor pool.

Radio shack viewed from the movie
theatre.

Regimental Headquarters Company
barber shop.

Colonel Moore outside his tent.
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Davao Gulf
The progress of the Igth Infantry southeastward along Highway No. I from
Kabacan to the shore of Davao Gulf was extremely rapid. Except for minor skirmishes with unenthusiastic Jap rear guards, and delays incident to repairing demolished bridges, the doughboys moved as rapidly as their feet would take them
along this 75-mile track. By April 26, nine days after the landing at Parang, the
infantry points stood only ten miles from the shore ofthe gulf at Santa Cruz. Naturally, as soon as they reached the sea, it was essential that supplies be brought directly
to them by water in order not only to expedite their attack against the Japanese in
and around Davao, but also to relieve as much of the strain on the Mindanao River
traffic as possible.
It was the wish of the 53 3d to greet the doughboys as they came out of the jungle
on to the beach at Santa Cruz with an LCM convoy load of rations and ammunition,
and to be able to assist their advance up the gulf shore from the outset. The Navy,
however, was extremely concerned about the presence of mines and coastal batteries
in the whole gulf area, and procrastinated for several days. Finally the 533 d decided,
with the approval of the corps and division commander to move a boat platoon
ofB Company on their own initiative to Santa Cruz, a total distance of well over 300
miles. News of this reached the navy flagship, and in accordance with his authority,
the Admiral flatly forbade such a move and insisted that the opening of Davao Gulf
be accomplished by a naval task force. This force included a group of LSMs, a
command ship, and an escort of a cruiser and three destroyers. In order to save time,
the LCMs departed on April 30 and proceeded alone, protected only by LCMGs, to
Sarangani Bay, where they made contact with a company of guerrillas and awaited
the passage of the naval task force .
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B Company convoy
moving into Davao
Gulf May 3, 1945.
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B
Company LCMs
moving
the
tanks
from Santa Cruz

to Talomo
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the
fascination
the inhabitants.

Shortly after sunset on May 2 the LCMs fell in astern of the naval convoy northeast of Sarangani Island, and moved up into the Gulf during the night. At daybreak
on the 3rd the LSMs and LCMs landed on Santa Cruz beach where the 24th Division
had been awaiting them for several days. Under pressure of the Navy's insistence
that its landing ships move out ofDavao Gulf prior to dark, a rapid job ofunloading
the LSMs was accomplished by Company F.
After the naval ships had departed, a group of LCMs embarked four medium
tanks, with orders to move 20 miles northward to Talomo, to which point the Igth
Infantry had that day advanced. The landing at Talomo was not actively opposed,
but the elaborate J ap defenses erected along the beach were a considerable obstacle,
and served as a reminder of the wisdom of GHQ in not ordering the original assault
to be made on Davao Gulf.
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Early the next morning 4 LCMs, accompanied by 2 LCMGs proceeded along
the coast to Davao and went up the shallow, tricky Davao River a mile and a halfto
establish a ferry so that the 1 gth Infantry could bring up heavy equipment and
weapons to bolster its assault on the ruined city of Davao. This ferry, which was
operated for several weeks, came under intermittentjap small arms, mortar, and artillery fire for several days. Continuous infiltration by the Japs throughout the period
required the boat crews to stand vigilant security watch. On May 6 the Division
established Talomo as its main base of operations, and F Company and the platoon of
B Company established permanent bivouacs on that beach, closing down for good the
beach at Santa Cruz.
The Davao River with its wide entrance almost blocked by obstacles (upper left) has a
treacherous channel, but a ferry service was established to replace the demolished bridges
leading into Davao.

MINDANAO

BLACK BEACH,
TALOMO

LCMs in front of B
Company's bivouac.

LSMs bring ammunition and fuel from
Parang.

The monument to
Rizal adds something
not found on the
beaches
in
New
Guinea.
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It was soon apparent that the Japs, who had been putting up surprisingly ineffective resistance to our drive across the island of Mindanao, had at last determined
to make one of their typically fanatical stands in the hills immediately north and west
ofDavao. Though they did not attempt to dispute control of the shore line with our
forces, they dug in such a short distance inland that for several weeks the shore and
anchorage were within range of their light artillery and improvised rockets. In addition, they resorted to their customary tactics of night raids both by sea and by land.
The remainder of Company B, reinforced by all of the regiment's LCMGs, moved
from Cotabato to Talomo in the middle of May, and such equipment ofF Company
as had been left behind in its initial move was forwarded at the same time. The
unexpected intensity of the fighting required a far greater tonnage of ammunition
and supplies than had been anticipated, and F Company put in an extremely strenuous two months. Not only did it virtually alone handle the cargo unloaded across
the beach, but in addition it was called upon to reinforce the Division's 3d Engineer
Battalion. F Company's equipment operators found themselves building supply and
access roads on ground taken by the rifle companies but a few hours before. Each
dozer was naturally a prime target for Jap snipers, who infested the 10-foot high grass
in the area, and operators learned to run their machines with one hand and two feet
while keeping a carbine ready for instant use in the other hand.
The Navy insisted, in view of the menace of Q boats and human torpedoes, that
all ships move to the open sea at sunset each night, so only half the normal number of
hours were available to discharge the ships. Even so, one FS boat was sunk, and
several times the shipping was driven out of the anchorage by accurate field artillery
fire from the hills.
One night in particular in the middle of May will not soon be forgotten by men
of B and F Companies. Taking advantage of a heavy rain storm, a substantial body
of J aps armed with large loads of picric acid, swarmed down to the beach and attempted to demolish gunboats, dozers, and LCMs. After a wild free-for-all, most of
the Japs were killed, but a few escaped by swimming. Not much equipment was
destroyed, and by a miracle the 533d suffered no casualties, although other troops in
the same area had several killed and wounded. LCMG MB1 had the closest escape:
a J ap swimmer hung 40 pounds of picric acid over a bitt and swam away, holding on
to a string tied to a hand grenade as a detonator. Fortunately the string was a bit
weaker than the grenade pin, so morning found the boat serenely at anchor with the
high explosive harmlessly bobbing against its frail skin.
Tactical support ofthe infantry by the boats was somewhat limited by theJaps'
reluctance to hold any position within range of the gunboats' automatic weapons.
The presence of the boats, however, was in no small measure responsible for this
refusal of the enemy to stand near the water's edge. Soon after Davao was secured, a
shore-to-shore landing was made on the island of Samal, using LVTs, LCMs, and
2 LCMGs. TheJap garrison of the island had retreated to its rugged interior and had
to be hunted down by the doughboys.
From Davao the Division fanned out, with the I gth Infantry working northeast
to the head of the gulf, which was held by a regiment of guerrillas, and the 34th and
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2 rst Infantry worked northwest into the mountains back ofTalomo. In order to give
the guerrillas the wherewithal to resist the Japs so they could not retreat indefinitely
up the valley above the head of the gulf, supplies were run by LCMs through Pakiputan straits. For several days this mission required running the gauntlet of small arms
and light artillery fire. As the rgth Infantry moved northeast, its long lines of communication became strained so thin that trucks and ambulances were frequently
ambushed. As a result, the land line of communications was temporarily abandoned,
and the infantry were furnished all necessary supplies and evacuation by boats operating through the straits. In this way their advance to a junction with the guerrillas
along the Tagum River was materially expedited, and the Jap forces north ofDavao
cut off from the valley leading to the headwaters of the Agusan River.
Point Piso on the eastern shore of the gulf was the principal J ap Q boat base.
These Q boats, tiny speed boats about 20 feet long with high-explosive bows, were
concealed by day in caves and bunkers, protected by concentrations ofjap automatic
cannon, and they constituted the most serious threat to the shipping in the gulf.
Attempts to wreck this base by air attack, long-range naval bombardment, and night
strafing attacks by PTs were not wholly successful, and the LCMGs and rocket boats
were called upon to make daylight attacks on this point. In addition, all-night patrols
in the straits and around the anchorage were maintained by LCMGs for several weeks.
Toward the end ofMay the Navy decided to clean out the threejap radar stations around the mouth of the gulf. A small task force, consisting of a destroyer, DE,
PTs, LCMs, LCMGs, and an LCM rocket plus Company K of the I 62d Infantry
of the 41st Division, was established under the senior naval officer in the area. This
force assembled in Malalag on the afternoon of May 3 I, and during the night made
an 85-mile run to Luayon Point, on the southwest of Davao Gulf. After a brief skirmish, the J ap garrison was killed or dispersed to the hills, and the entire installation
destroyed. The force re-embarked that afternoon and proceeded during the night
85 miles around to Glan, where guerrilla guides were picked up for the assault on
Balut Island. Two landings had to be made on this island, one of which was made
by the infantry, and the other was made by a body of 533d personnel who were convinced from a previous visit to the island and discussion with guerrillas that the objective was not accessible from the original landing point. This latter beach turned out
to be the right one, yet despite the fact that the amphibians had been there for a
couple of hours, the task force commander ordered them withdrawn so he could lay
down a one-hour bombardment before permitting the infantry to make its landing
and destroy the radio and radar installations on the hill in back of the beach. After
considerable difficulty in embarking and withdrawing the boats over the coral reef
at low tide, the task force departed at sundown June 4 for a 7o-mile run across the
mouth of the gulf to Cape San Augustin. The landing there took place the following
noon and was unopposed, but yielded a rich prize in radio equipment, ammunition,
and fuel dumps, all of which were destroyed. This five-day raiding party, covering
400 miles of sea, concluded tactical water-borne operations in Davao Gulf.
On June rg B Company dispatched a platoon ofLCMs plus an escort ofLCMGs
on a 500-mile run up the east coast of Mindanao, through Surigao Straits to the mouth
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of the Agusan River to join with A Company in offensive operations up that river,
which are described later. This run was made against a strong current and extremely
heavy seas, and without any possibility of refueling other than from oil drums carried
on the decks of the boats. In addition the craft were well loaded with supplies for
the guerrillas on the northern tip of Mindanao. After unloading these supplies at
Placer, they embarked a battalion of guerrillas for use in the coming river operation.
These boats returned in July by the same route.
F Company departed from Talomo on July 10 enroute to its staging area for the
invasion of Japan. Its two months at Talomo had demonstrated its capacity to perform the work and assume the responsibilities normally given to an entire shore
battalion.
B Company remained at Talomo until October 15, at which time it departed
with the 24th Division to participate in the occupation of Japan. In July this company played a major role in the final amphibian operation of the entire War- the
invasion ofSarangani Bay. As soon as theJap resistance around Davao was broken,
and the remainder oftheir forces were driven into the impenetrable mountains north
of Mt. Apo, the 24th Division was able to spare a reinforced battalion to help clean
out the lastJap garrison in the southern part ofthe island. Coordinated with troops
moving overland from Lake Buluan in the upper Mindanao valley, this battalion,
to be landed at the head of Sarangani Bay, constituted the southern prong of a pincers
movement. The landing itself, on July 12, was reasonably uneventful, but the two
days' reconnaissance preceding the landing, which was carried out by guerrillas and
gunboat elements ofB Company, had its moments of excitement. The total distance
run as well as the importance of the objective and the smooth manner in which the
operation was carried out, made it serve as a fitting climax to the assault operations
of the 533d.
The remainder of the summer at Talomo was relatively quiet. A long trip of
1000 miles to Batangas on Luzon was made in September to obtain replacement
boats, but aside from this the months of August and September produced nothing
worthy of note.

Macajalar Bay
The Bukidnon plateau in north central Mindanao, through which runs the
Sayre '·Highway" was one of the principal objectives in the main Mindanao campaign. As the 31st Division worked northward along the "Highway," running into
moderately serious Japanese opposition, Eighth Army on May 10, launched an assault
at Bugo on the shore ofMacajalar Bay, using the 108th RCT of the 4oth Division and
a battalion of the Americal Division, and including a boat platoon and a shore company of the 542d EB&SR. This landing met virtually no opposition, and the infantry pushed rapidly southward to a junction with the 31st Division in the vicinity of
Malaybalay. The miserable condition of the Sayre "Highway" made it imperative
that the 31st Division change its line of communication from the Mindanao RiverSayre "Highway" route to one running south from Bugo.
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As the elements of the 542d who had landed there were too small to handle a
major base, the 533d was ordered to move a battalion headquarters and a boat and a
shore company to Bugo early in June. This move, which has been mentioned before,
shifted Boat Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Company A, and
Company E from Parang via Zamboanga to Bugo the first of June. When X Corps
itself displaced from Parang to Del Monte, Regimental Headquarters moved on
June 19 overland via the Lake Lanao road to Bugo. These elements of the Regiment
found an almost ideal bivouac site here in a palm grove with a steeply sloping, surfless
beach, and entered upon normal unloading functions immediately.
The Lake Lanao road, over which most of the vehicles previously used at Parang
had been moved, was impassable beyond Initao, 30 miles west of Bugo, so a largescale ferry service, using LCMs and LCTs was inaugurated to bring these to the Bugo
area. In addition, the necessity of getting the supplies southward over the Sayre
"Highway" called for substantial road improvement on the gorge-scarred Bukidnon
plateau. Equipment operators of E Company, in conjunction with their colleagues
of the 542d and the 1 o6th Engineers went far inland, filling washouts and removing
large landslides. In addition, many hundreds of feet of bridges were installed or
repaired to take the heavy traffic.

Bridge on the Bugo-Cagayan road built byE Company.
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The Agusan River
When the 108th RCT and gist Division joined forces, the Jap garrison was at
last cleared from all major port and highway centers of the island of Mindanao. For
the most part the J aps were scattered in the ragged jungle-dad mountains in groups
too small to constitute a serious threat. However, one large group which still maintained its cohesion was observed by aerial reconnaissance to be heading eastward
through various mountain passes to the fertile valley around the headwaters of the
Agusan River. If these forces could have concentrated there, they would have been
able to live indefinitely and would have remained a potential threat. To pursue them
and destroy them in their retreat would have been unthinkable, because the narrow
defiles through which they were withdrawing would have enabled a handful of men
to hold up a regiment for days at a time. Consequently the corps commander, with
the example of the Mindanao River fresh in mind, determined to beat the retreating
Japs to this area by moving an infantry regiment IOO miles up the Agusan River and
securing the outlets from the passes before the Japs arrived there.
The Agusan River was a far cry from the broad, deep Mindanao. For most of its
length it averaged barely 40 yards in width, was lined with steep banks rising from
I o to 6o feet, had a depth that barely exceeded three feet, and a current that ran close
to 5 knots. The inhabitants, the most primitive people in the Philippines, were known
to be either friendly to the J aps or in such a low state of savagery as to be useless as
guides or sources of information to our troops. Despite the hazards, the operation
was ordered, and as related above, the necessary additional boats were moved all the
way from Davao. The I55th RCT was embarked at Bugo and moved 75 miles
eastward to Butuan in the mouth of the river.
The initial movement upstream was made by a small advance scouting force
of gunboats, followed by a reinforced battalion in 20 LCMs. Aside from the delays
caused by the strong currents and damage to boats by floating logs, the movement
was uneventful until the force arrived at Lapaz. After considerable difficulty, the
convoy moved another thirty miles upstream to Sagunto and established a strong
perimeter at that point. On June go the river was at last high enough to enable
them to push on to Langasian, where guerrillas were in contact with the enemy. As
the boats neared Langasian, the guerrillas fell back under superior fire from the J aps.
The LCMGs and rocket boats opened up and laid down an effective rocket barrage
which dispersed theJaps and enabled the infantry rapidly to reoccupy the ground lost.
The infantry in the next few days fanned out and occupied key positions denying
the entire area to the retreating Japs, while the waterway approaches were guarded
by 2 LCMGs and an LCS(S). Although this ended the tactical phase of the river operation, the succeeding days and weeks of resupply and reinforcement of the garrison
IOO miles from the sea were a sore strain on the boats and boatmen. Two full days
of high speed running - and sometimes three - were required to make the trip
from the mouth of the river to the landing point at Langasian. Flotsam, snags, and
shifting shoals wreaked heavy damage on all boats involved and made the task of
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A Company's maintenance section, located in a mud hole at Butuan, a heartbreaker.
Nevertheless the job was accomplished and the strategic objective achieved with a
minimum of casualties and fatigue for the infantry elements.
This task dragged on for Company A for two months, and the presence of J ap
stragglers along the densely overgrown banks made even the routine trips nerveracking. It was on one of these runs, long after the Japs had surrendered, that
a member of Company A engaged in a skirmish withJaps who did not know the War
was over, and became one of the last Americans to be killed in action in the Pacific
War.
With the departure of the Shore Battalion and Regimental Headquarters from
Mindanao in mid-July, the Boat Battalion became, to all intents and purposes, independent. As stated before, B Company remained attached to 24th Division at
Talomo, and A Company and Battalion Headquarters were based at Bugo operating
lighterage there and on the Agusan River 75 miles to the east. Company C, during
most of this period, was split, with part of it at Bugo and part still at Cotabato engaged
in evacuating no longer needed supplies down the Mindanao River. One of its
missions took an LCMG and 2 cargo LCMs all the way to Morotai and back - the
only time during the War that the Celebes Sea was crossed from New Guinea to Mindanao by craft as small as LCMs.
Runs to Leyte, Cebu, and Batangas Bay on Luzon were made from time to time
principally for the purpose of obtaining new boats for the occupation. These runs
extended the operations of the boats to every major island in the Philippine Archipelago. With tactical operations finished and a distinct reduction in lighterage
commitments, all hands turned to improving. the bivouacs and making them show
places. The Bugo encampment with its marine railway, theatre, chapel, baseball
Boat Battalion Camp at Bugo after VJ day -
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park, and huts of all sorts turned out to be so impressive that the corps commander
labeled it a model for all troops in the Corps and required all company commanders
and r st sergeants to model their post-V -J Day bivouacs on it.
The Mindanao campaign, which had been looked forward to by many with
foreboding, had turned out to be a magnificent opportunity for the Regiment.
Probably in no other campaign of the War had a single amphibian regiment played
such a decisive part, both tactically and logistically, as had the 533d in the operations
of X Corps. It is safe to say that without the use of landing craft on rivers, the campaign would never have been concluded, as it was, in a brief ten weeks.

The marine railway at Bugo, built by A Company under the direction of T / 3 Henry Moeller
with the 50-ton 63-foot regimental command boat getting a new coat of paint.

CHAPTER XIII

Japan

T

HE conquest of the Japanese home islands by traditional methods of ground warfare was planned, if necessary, for the fall and early spring of 1945-46. Though
it was apparent that the B-29 and carrier task forces were raising havoc with japanese
war industries and cities, the effective secrecy surrounding the development of the
atomic bomb led inevitably to the belief that the Japanese would not surrender until
decisively defeated in ground combat on their home islands. The proposed strategy
consisted of a two-phase assault: a preliminary attack by a full army of approximately
I4 divisions on the southern tip of Kyushu on November I, I945, and a landing in
the early spring of I 946 by 3 full field armies on the plains of Honshu north and east
ofTokyo. The first assault, to be made by the veteran Sixth Army, had two primary
objectives: one, to secure airfields from which our light and medium aircraft could
range over the vital southern halfofjapan; and two, to draw the japanese defending
forces southward, thus making easier the task of the final assault forces. The parallel
between this and the strategy used in the Philippines and elsewhere in the Southwest
Pacific is obvious.

Operation a 0 lympic''
The attack on Kyushu was labeled "Operation Olympic." Sixth Army was to
consist of four full corps : the V Amphibious (Marine), I , IX, and XI. The Marine
Corps was to land on the southwestern face of the island, I and XI Corps on the southeast face, and IX Corps on the extreme southern tip at Kamondake.
All three amphibian brigades were assigned to this Army, with the 2d and 4th at
full strength with XI and I Corps respectively. The 3d Brigade was assigned to IX
Corps, but the 593d, which was still involved in the Borneo campaigns, was not included. Furthermore, IX Corps being carried partially by Fifth Fleet could only
employ one boat battalion because Fifth Fleet had not employed army landing craft
in its Central Pacific operations. This meant that the Boat Battalion of either the
543d or the 533d would not participate in this operation.
IX Corps was to consist of the veteran 77th and 8 I st Divisions and the 98th
Division, which had seen no action. Sixth Army directed that the 533d, as the most
experienced amphibian regiment, be attached to the green 98th Division. Though
this decision amounted to a nice compliment, the fact that the 98th Division was to
stage from Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands and be carried by Fifth Fleet transports
meant that the 533d Boat Battalion was the one to be passed over. By the time the
Regiment received its first inkling of the proposed plan, the matter had been decided
beyond argument, and all efforts, even though supported by Sixth Army, to have
GHQ include the Boat Battalion in the IX Corps troop list were unsuccessful. It
later turned out that in the course of redeployment the 532d's Boat Battalion was so
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drastically weakened that the 533d Boat Battalion would have been employed as part
of the XI Corps landing force at Ariakawan.
The Regiment received its first warning orders on June 25, and immediately
laid plans to concentrate its scattered companies other than those of the Boat Battalion at Bugo. Headquarters Company Shore Battalion and Company D moved from
Parang to Bugo by LSMs on July 8, and F Company loaded out of Talomo the next
day. A small group of the regimental staff left for Oahu by plane on July 15. In
view of the probable non-employment of the Boat Battalion, the Shore Battalion
transferred to the Boat Battalion all personnel with over 85 points, and received in
return enough men with less than 85 points to bring it up to full strength. These high
point men, nearly I 5% of the Regiment, departed for their homes, the first group in
mid-July and the balance a month later.
Movement of the Shore Battalion and Regimental Headquarters Company to
Oahu produced the weirdest and most inexcusable snafu of the whole war. Less than
goo men were involved, and because the bulk of the equipment was not in good
enough condition to justify its movement to the rear staging area, a relatively small
tonnage had to be moved. It was soon apparent that this little nontactical shipping
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problem was more than the combined brains of Eighth Army, GHQ, and Pacific
Fleet could handle. It was first decided that this move would have to commence at
Leyte, which was an official USASOS base, and so preparations were made to move
200 miles northward by landing ships. Instead oflanding ships, however, the transport Lew Wallace arrived at Bugo. This meant many hours of hold loading and
unloading for a trip requiring less than a day's running time. Consequently permission was requested, and soon granted, to use the Lew Wallace for the entire trip, and
she was rationed and outfitted accordingly. As soon as she was,allloaded and ready
to sail, the Regiment received a message that since she was assigned to the SWPA she
could not go into Central Pacific waters and she would, therefore, have to discharge
at Leyte. No amount of logical argument could overcome this technicality, and on
July 16 the troops and equipment debarked and went into bivouac in a miserable
swamp back of Dulag, Leyte. The 533d was advised that its stay would be only a
matter of hours or a few days, and that GHQ had arranged for a large transport
which would arrive almost immediately.
The large APA President Hayes was currently due in Leyte Gulf, and the appropriate army authorities at Manila and Leyte assigned her to carry the 533d troops,
plus Company C of the 262d Medical Battalion to Oahu, on her way back to the
States. Meanwhile the Liberty ship Bowditch was loadedwith the bulk of the equipment. Three days later Base headquarters at Leyte directed the troops to embark
aboard the President Hayes next morning. An early morning tour of the anchorage
disclosed no Hayes, and a check at the port director's office produced the information
that she had sailed under Navy orders during the night - empty!
After 24 hours of frantic radio messages to half a dozen different headquarters,
the Navy was prevailed upon to send orders to the Hayes, now goo miles at sea, to
return and pick up the stranded troops. She duly returned to Leyte, and the 533d's
bivouac was struck for the second time and the troops marched to the beach to await
her boats. Once more she could not be located and was found to have sailed for the
U.S. again empty on orders issued by a junior naval officer on duty at the port director's headquarters. When, after more appeals to Army authorities, the Hayes was
again ordered to backtrack, her skipper just plain ignored the orders and proceeded
dead-head to San Francisco.
At this turn of events the Base and Eighth Army movement officers washed their
hands of the problem and referred it to GHQ Manila, where the best that could be
offered was the little AKA Artemis capable of carrying only 200 men. The Regiment
was in addition, gratuitously informed that this was its "last substitution." Regimental Headquarters Company and the Medical Company embarked on the Artemis and
sailed July 30, leaving the 750 men of the Shore Battalion still squatting in the dismal
swamps back of Dulag Beach.
Against the advice of Eighth Army's Chief of Staff, who did not wish to antagonize GHQ, a long radio plea was sent to Manila, and at last things clicked. The APA
Montrose embarked the Shore Battalion and sailed on August 4· The delay of three
full weeks was not only exasperating to all ranks, but prevented the 533d's participating in the practice landings held by the g8th Division, on which it counted so heavily
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to produce the essential teamwork required in the difficult assault landing that lay
ahead. It also gave an insight into the local conditions that caused the tragically
high toll when, a few weeks later, the sinking of the Indianapolis went unnoticed in
Leyte for several days.
Meanwhile, at Fort Hase on Oahu the regimental planning group was busily
analyzing the forthcoming operation. IX Corps was to land at Kamondake with
two divisions abreast on a 2;!/z-mile beach. The 81st Division with the 543d EB&SR
as the nucleus of its shore party was to be on the right and the 98th Division with the
533d attached on the left. The 77th Division in floating reserve was to land as
needed. The grimmest feature of the proposal was Mt. Kamondake, which reared
its densely wooded and doubtless cave-pocked mass 3000 feet almost perpendicularly
from the water's edge on the right flank of the beach. Until its last defender was
burned or blasted from his cave, no spot on the beach would be safe from direct
plunging machine gun or 25 mm fire. Moreover, the initial objectives of the 98th
Division were two airfields several miles inland; so the shore party would have
another major perimeter defense problem. This time every man would have to
assume that every inhabitant was a potential infiltrator ready to blow himself to
kingdom come if in so doing he could take an American or a pile of American ammunition or fuel with him.
Altogether it looked like a "rough go." But the lessons of previous operations
had been well learned by higher headquarters, so that at last the shore party was
made large enough to handle its logistical tasks. The following breakdown of the
98th Division shore party is interesting to compare with those set up for the 533d's
previous operations,
Number
Number
Unit
of Men of Vehicles
533d EB&SR (Less Boat Battalion)
194
936
186
259th Engineer Combat Battalion
637
Detachment 294th Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO)
150
30
328th Quartermaster Battalion (3 Service Companies)
666
15
Quartermaster Battalion (to be designated) (3 Truck Companies)
180
429
1128
199th Port Battalion (5 Port Companies)
53
Company C, 262d Medical Battalion
130
15
Company A, 6o8th MP Battalion
156
17
180
492d DUKW Company
s6
1st Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
7
3
-

Total

4419

-

749

This shore party, all attached to the 533d, constituted 20% of the reinforced
98th Division, whereas at Lingayen the shore party troops (exclusive of the boat
elements) numbered less than 2300 or only w% of the reinforced 43d Division- a
significant commentary on senior commanders' mounting emphasis on auxiliary
beach troops. The strength and vehicle figures alone do not indicate the full expan-
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sion in the capacity of the shore party, for newly developed equipment and adequate
quantities of standard cranes and dozers were available for the first time. To take a
single example, the 533d had had 5 cranes when it landed at Lingayen and was to
have 23 cranes and r8 tractors with crane attachments on the Kyushu beachhead.
Despite the obvious implications ofthe news of the atomic bombing ofHiroshima
and Russia's entry into the Japanese War, the report on August ro that the Emperor
of Japan had thrown in the sponge was at first incredible. As the Boat Battalion at
Bugo clustered around company radios and the Shore Battalion, ploughing through
the mid-Pacific, listened to ships' loud speakers, hardly a man could avoid thinking
of the many false reports of Germany's surrender he had heard. But this time there
was no mistake. By the 14th of August when Japan accepted President Truman's
conditions, all hands were completely mentally demobilized. At Bugo, realization
that a big job remained of bringing the thousands of J ap stragglers and defeated
small remnants out of the interior kept the Boat Battalion from too wishful dreams of
immediate departure for home. But aboard the Artemis and Montrose hopes soared.
How easy it would be for these ships to skip the Hawaiian Islands and proceed directly to the Golden Gate! Labor Day at home or at least attendance at the opening
of the football season were the fond hopes of nearly every man aboard those transports.
As they realized their ships would definitely dock at Oahu, they merely anticipated
a brief Hawaiian rest-cure before being homeward bound.

Oahu- Wakayama
Planning for Operation Olympic gave way to watchful waiting when the Japs
first sued for peace, but less than 24 hours after President Truman announced that
the War was over, orders arrived from Manila designating the g8th Division and the
533d as components of the occupation force. This was a bitter pill for the men of
Regimental Headquarters Company, who debarked on August 14, and of the Shore
Battalion who landed four days later. Resignation followed annoyance, however,
when it became apparent that the units ordered to Japan included many whose men
had seen far longer and more arduous service than had the 533d.
The scant fortnight spent on Oahu was a hectic one particularly for those in the
supply sections. The vehicles and other equipment which had been pronounced
serviceable and brought from Mindanao were condemned outright by officers of
Central Pacific Base Command who had never even imagined the kind of equipment
with which the Southwest Pacific forces had struggled along throughout their campaigns. In fact one driver was arrested as a menace on the highway for operating a
jeep that was considered one of the prize vehicles of the Regiment! Thus with the
war over replacement equipment without stint was at last received - from blankets
to bull dozers, tents to twenty-ton trailers, Regimental Headquarters and the Shore
Battalion were virtually roo% re-equipped.
Never had men of the 533d enjoyed such luxurious billets. Quadrangle C of
Schofield Barracks and the surrounding recreational facilities of the post put even
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Fort Ord to shame. Honolulu with its fabulous prices and total lack of legitimate
sources of liquor was a disappointment, but all hands made the most of their limited
freedom in civilization for the first time in 20 months.
Though the Japanese surrender was taken at face value, the chance of a ruse
could not be completely ignored; therefore all divisions moving into Japan for the
initial occupation were ordered to arrive "combat loaded" and prepared, if necessary,
for an assault landing. Thus the plans differed little from those made for previous
operations and more recently for "Olympic". The shore party was reduced drastically in size, but still included the 25gth Engineer Combat Battalion, the DUKW company, and, for purposes of beach labor, three rifle companies and a field artillery battalion.
Loading out from the unheard of luxury of a macadamized beach at Iroquois
Point commenced exactly seven days after the Shore Battalion arrived. With the
exception of a few D-7 dozers and a handful of personnel on APAs, the entire shore
party embarked on six LSTs and three LSMs. The LST convoy sailed on August 31,
but the vessel carrying F Company threw a propellor and had to go into drydock for
repairs. On September 4 this LST and the LSMs got under weigh, and were followed
two days later by the large transports.
Four solid weeks on the LSTs were pretty grim, for they had three times as many
passengers as bunks and the ponton causeways they carried forced water constantly
over the weather deck. A stop at Saipan with a chance to stretch a leg helped a bit,
and ideal weather favored the voyage. The destination was Wakayama, Honshu, a
minor port on the eastern entrance to the Inland Sea. The g8th Division was to
occupy Osaka, but fields of American pressure mines prevented shipping from reaching that port. Just ahead and landing at the same beach were I Corps troops and
the 33d Division destined for Kyoto and Kobe. There were no decent maps or photos
and no orders more explicit than to get ashore and get the convoy unloaded expeditiously.
.
On the cold morning of September 27 through fog and a misty rain the 533d had
its first sight of Japan. At 0730 the advance reconnaissance elements of the shore
party landed and quickly appreciated that it was in for more than the usual snafu.
All the good part of the beach was pre-empted by the 33d Division's shore party, and
the only jetty at which LSTs could land was theirs by Sixth Army order. Back of the

First CP in Japan on Wakayama
Beach, Septen1ber 27, 1945.

LCTs crowd the beach west of W akayama during the second day of the occupation.

g8th Division beach the land consisting of swampy, feces-fertilized gardens, was
impassable for vehicles and useless for bivouac sites. Thus the shore party was confined to the immediate beach I ooo yards long and 50-7 5 yards wide with only a
single narrow lane leading off it.
At 0830 (H hour) troops commenced landing and immediately marched to the
railroad station at Wakayama for transportation inland. At ogiO vehicles started
coming ashore, but many of these had to be towed out of the surf by four shore party
dozers. LCMs and LCVPs sometimes grounded on the bar 8o yards off shore and

Temporary roadway
of cyclone wire fencing is laid over the
dunes to part of the
dump area.
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Vehicles~of the 98th
Division ·1 start to
jam up the limited
beach.

LSMs grounding
some distance off
shore wait for low
tide before discharging vehicles.

Lack of trucks
causes piling of
stores just above the
high water mark.
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never got nearer dry land than 25 yards. A vehicle assembly area was established
at the extreme right flank of the beach near the only road available for egress. Since
I Corps denied g8th Division permission to move over the roads, all vehicles were
left in the assembly area on the beach until ogoo on the second day. This effectively
blocked nearly one-third of the suitable beach-dump area.
Refusal to allow the LSTs carrying the 533d equipment to land during the first
day and inability of vehicles to wade ashore from the LSMs on the outer bar until

A battalion of heavy
tanks adds to the
congestion on the
beach.

the afternoon's low tide left the shore party desperately short of vehicles, cranes, and
even manpower. Meanwhile the transports pushed bulk cargo on to the shore in
small craft, and these had to be painfully unloaded by human chains stacking the
supplies just above the high tide line, which further congested the beach. Just before
dark the LSMs disgorged a complete tank battalion into the melee. Added to the
griefs was the miserable weather - 1 5 degrees colder than the coldest the Regiment
had been exposed to in nearly two years, and a driving rain which soaked and numbed
after a softening month afloat. The sum total made the first night in Japan about the
most miserable the unit had ever experienced.
Largely because things could get no worse, the second day saw considerable
improvement in the condition of the beach. The 533d's LSTs at last got their turn
at the jetty and discharged the trucks and cranes so badly needed. Corps opened the
roads to g8th Division vehicles, so they moved out of the way. The 533d took over a
not too badly damaged iron foundry and set up a crude temporary bivouac in it.

Jap jetty, extended by strings of
ponton cubes, is used to discharge
LSTs at first three at a time, later six
at once.

On the third day of the occupation, the beach was still badly crowded but there was a
semblance of order.

Beach labor was put on a shift basis after 24 hours of steady work for all hands, and
those off duty followed some much needed sleep with a visit to the ex-city of Wakayama which constituted a completely sufficient lesson in the effectiveness of the
B-2g's fire-bomb raids.
The second night ashore was far more comfortable than the first, and the progress
of unloading was fairly satisfactory. But a typhoon warning, quoting wind velocities
of over Ioo m.p.h. in 48-6o hours, required that all the bulk stores be rehandled from
the lower part of the beach to the top of the dunes. Despite this extra work and the
other difficulties mentioned, the first 48 hours showed all I 2 APAs unloaded and 4
AKAs two-thirds unloaded, a total of over I 4000 tons of which 8ooo was bulk.
About mid-afternoon of the third day as the shore party was at last confident that
it would complete the job before the typhoon struck, Admiral Noble, commander of
all naval forces in the area, casually inquired if the 53 3d would be ready to load on
214

Regimental Headquarters Company's
bivouac at Wakayama in the shell
of a gutted steel mill.

schedule. Puzzled at his meaning, the regimental commander was startled to find
that the Admiral had orders to supply 12 LCTs, 5 LSMs and 3 APDs to move the
Regiment 300-odd miles to Kure commencing that very night! Though a Sixth
Army officer had dropped a hint of a move "early in October" to Kure to rejoin
X Corps, the casual inquiry of the Admiral was the first and only " order" received
for this move.
A hectic scramble ensued during the evening as trucks and DUKWs were
rounded up and reloaded, and hasty plans made to squeeze into the limited shipping
space allotted. By instinct the 12 LCTs were loaded at the midnight high tide and
the LSMs at the early morning low. A small rear echelon to watch over the equipment for which there was no room remained in the factory for ten days, while the
rest of the troops, after less than 72 hours ashore, re-embarked and headed back out to
sea. The few thousand tons of g8th Division supplies on landing ships and LCTs not
yet discharged were left for the 25gth and the 544th EB&SR to handle, and it was
a joy to be rid of one of the worst unloading problems ever thrown at the 533d.
The unseemly haste of the departure was followed by three full days at anchor
in the lower bay, while the typhoon that devastated Okinawa approached and then
veered out to sea. At last on October 4 the convoy worked its way against high winds
and steep seas westward around the outside of Shikoku and into the other end of the
Inland Sea, where it joined forces with the transport squadron bearing the 41st Division, X Corps, and the 533d's Boat Battalion from Mindanao.

Hiro - Kure
In the week following the Japanese surrender, Sixth Army alerted X Corps with
the 41st and 24th Divisions for movement to western Honshu and Shikoku as part of
the occupation force. The 533d Boat Battalion received orders attaching it to X
Corps for this job on August 24. The attention of 3d Brigade headquarters was
immediately directed to the serious understrength ofthe Battalion and the thoroughly
worn out condition of most of its boats. 310 low-point replacements were soon shipped
to the Battalion at Bugo, and during the second week of September it obtained 6o
215
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brand new LCMs from the 52 I Ith Steel Hull Battalion's new plant at Batangas and
rushed them to Mindanao.
Company C moved to Zamboanga on September I 3 and in the succeeding days
loaded the 4ISt Division aboard Transport Squadron I6. This squadron then moved
up to Bugo where Company A and Boat Battalion Headquarters Company embarked
with X Corps Headquarters. A rear echelon had to wait until October 7 before
embarking in LSTs. B Company at Davao embarked with the 24th Division and
left Mindanao on October I5.
The convoy with all of the Boat Battalion except B Company left Mindanao

The trip around Shikoku through the tail end of a typhoon was a wet thrash especially for
those aboard LCTs and LSMs.

September 20 and after a brief stopover at Leyte proceeded to Buckner Bay, Okinawa.
During the typhoon that wrecked that place, the convoy maneuvered at sea and
suffered no material damage. It finally resumed its voyage on October 3 and two
days later, in conjunction with the little group oflanding vessels bringing the rest of
the 533d from Wakayama, entered the Inland Sea between Shikoku and Kyushu.
Pressure-type mines sowed in july by B-2gs prevented the ships from proceeding
all the way into the harbor of Kure, where the bulk of the occupation force was to be
stationed. So the transports anchored in Hiro Wan and prepared to lighter some
troops and supplies through the narrow shallow Ondo Seto channel to the docks of
Kure and to unload all vehicles and most of the bulk at the Hiro seaplane base.
Not only did the 533d's shore elements join the landing force without orders,
maps, or data of any sort as to the troops and materiel to be debarked, but in addition
their arrival was a complete surprise to the corps and division commanders. Since
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a provisional shore party had already been organized from 4rst Division troops, it
was agreed that the 533d would merely support that shore party during the initial
landing.
To insure a smooth handling of the beach, the shore party, including the 533d,
was put ashore at Hiro during the afternoon of October 6 to get things organized
prior to the debarkation of troops the next morning and to the unloading of vehicles
and supplies the next afternoon. The physical landing site was ideal: a 450' wide

LCT
and
LSMs
beached on the concrete ra1np of the
Hiro Naval Air
Station.
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concrete seaplane ramp sloped down to water deep enough to float an L S M; the end
of the main runway provided a made-to-order landing point for LSTs. By nightfall
the shore party was all set with cranes, control points, parking areas, and storage
facilities spotted and ready. At long last it looked as though the 533d were to see a
really smooth amphibious operation.
This hope, however, failed to reckon with the Commodore of the transport
squadron- appropriately nicknamed "Terrible Terry" McGovern. Though he
had agreed to the plan of landing, he could not bear to "waste" the night, and so
without notifying the shore party or any of the army authorities, he ordered his
transports to send in all the vehicles. The as yet unlighted ramp suddenly was
assaulted shortly before midnight by hundreds of truck- and j eep-bearing landing
craft, and the vehicles stampeded all over the air base. Order was restored reasonably
quickly, and the vehicles massed on the airstrip.
At dawn the troops came in, and by 0700 boat loads of bulk were waiting to be
unloaded - eight hours ahead of schedule. By the time enough trucks were sorted
out of the mess on the airfield, unloaded, and pressed into service at the water's edge,
there was a regular log jam of LCVPs and LCMs loaded to the gunwales with stores.
Though his own hasty actions had caused the mess, Terrible Terry, against the advice
of his own navy beachmasters and over the protests of the army shore party com-

I

The principal dignitaries land at Hiro - Facing camera in center left to right: Rear
Admiral Rogers, Major General Doe (41st Division) , Major General Sibert (X Corps);
extreme right: Brig. Gen. Willey (Kure Base).

mander, ordered working parties from the ships' crews brought ashore, and had them
unload supplies by hand on an inaccessible rock bulkhead where, before they could
be rescued, many hundreds of tons were engulfed in the rising tide and destroyed.
Meanwhile unloading progress on the beach had actually set new records, with
cranes handling cargo by the netload and trucks delivering stores directly to their
ultimate destinations in conveyor-equipped, covered warehouses. Despite the extra

Kure Ho, the part
of the Inland Sea
near Kure as seen
from the 1nountains
behind the devastated city.
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work involved in untangling the snarls caused by the Commodore's interference, the
twenty-one transports were discharged in less than 48 hours, and the 24, I 20 tons of
cargo, including I 7,ooo tons of bulk, had almost all come over a "beach" less than
I 50 yards wide.
The 533d boatmen took a bad beating working for this transport squadron, for
they were made to do all the dirty work, were given no maintenance by their parent
ships, and frequently were bossed by green and incompetent navy coxswains who
delighted in banging up the army craft. Altogether this operation did much to undo
the fine spirit of teamwork which the Regiment had built up in two years with the
Seventh Fleet.
The Boat Battalion set up its base and bivouac in the torpedo-and-mine portion
of the Kure Naval Base. A convenient stone-walled boat basin and overhead cranes
to lift boats out onto the quai for repairs made this area desirable, but a thorough
working over by B-2gs, carrier-borne dive bombers, and army medium bombers from
Okinawa had left most of the buildings a shambles. Yet it was no worse to clean up
Top left: The shore of Ondo Seto channel; top right and bottom left: portions of the highway
leading from Hiro to Kure; bottom right: part of the water front of Kure.
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than a mucky piece of virgin jungle, and so the men cleared away the baka bombs,
war heads, and twisted girders and set up their last billets in a leaky steel shed.
Regimental Headquarters joined the Boat Battalion at Kure three days after
landing, but the Shore Battalion had to remain a few days in the flooded tent camp
they had first set up at Hiro. By October 15 the bulk of the Regiment at Kure was
concentrated for the first time since Luzon, and all men except those of B Company
r

The parking area by the
small boat basin in the
Kure Mine Base.
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The inner harbor of Kure
seen from the outer wall of
the small boat basin.
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LCMs tied up outside the
small boat basin. Note the
ruins of the steel mill in
the background and the
large hammer-head crane
used to lift out LCMs for
repair.
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The Shore Battalion's
Shower Room (above) with
2400 gallon hot water heating system cons tructed out
of ponton cubes.

The Kure Mine Base. Top left: Shore Bn motor pool with kitchens, dormitory and huge
building roofed by the Battalion in rear; top right: chow line; bottom left: hundreds of 25mm
guns laid out for destruction in front of Boat Battalion Headquarters Company building;
bottom right: ruins of steel mill blasted by Third Fleet dive bombers. Below: Shore Companies' orderly rooms.
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Part of the Kure Naval
Base demolished by Third
Fleet dive bombers.

Harbor at Yeta Shima.

were within casual walking distance of each other for the first time in two years.
B Company arrived with the 24th Division on October 22 and unloaded without
incident at Mitsuhama, Shikoku where a tent camp was set up, and a freight service
inaugurated to Kure, 20 miles to the north.
During the rest of the stay in Japan there is little noteworthy to report as to
activities of the 53 3d. The Regiment functioned under X Corps for a few weeks and
then passed to control of Kure Base. The boat companies lightered cargos from
Hiro Wan through the Ondo Seto to the docks at Kure, and moved occasional patrols
and recreation parties around the scenic waterways. The Shore Battalion, in addition
to its normal functions ofbeach operation, worked cranes on the Kure docks and performed tasks appropriate to any engineer construction outfit. Whole blocks of the
most thoroughly devastated parts of Kure were cleaned off and leveled by their bulldozers to assist Jap reconstruction. A huge warehouse in the naval base was given a
new tin roof - 1% acres of it, and the base officers' club and post office were built by
men of the 533d.

,'

Hiroshim~ a -

two months after the Bomb.

Aside from normal work and trying to keep warm with no wool clothes or stoves,
the principal memories of Japan include the impressions of Hiroshima's appalling
devastation and of "fraternization" with the little yellow people, as to which let each
man be his own raconteur.

Disintegration
The War Department's announcement while the Regiment was enroute to japan
that all men with 8o V-J Day points would be homeward bound by November I,
and all men with 70 points by December I, applied to 8 out of every IO men in the
533d. No sooner was the area at Kure well settled than the topic on every tongue
was-would the War Department's word be kept? For a while the bets were against
the commitments being met. Sweeping the pressure mines from Nagoya took much
longer than expected. Ships promised by the Navy did not show up, and confusion
and recrimination reigned. To make matters worse, Yokohama, which had been
224
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occupied in August, was doing a rushing business forwarding men of Eighth Army
units home, while Sixth Army troops had to wait in jealous rage.
At last the log jam broke. October 23 brought the word that all officers with
83 points and men with 73 points were to be moved by train to Nagoya by November
3· Amidst general rejoicing the first trainload, including 232 men from the 533d,
pulled out the next night, and two days later another 100 men departed. Then
something went wrong, and a painful delay ensued.
Meanwhile, with the Regiment due to lose three-fourths of its men in ten days,
drastic steps had to be taken to get rid of its $I 5,ooo,ooo worth of equipment and at
the same time insure that the essential functions it was performing for the Corps were
assumed by other units. Fortunately, two harbor craft companies with relatively lowpoint men had arrived and to them in the last days of October the 53 3d turned over
its fleet of 100-odd craft and the shop trucks and other auxiliary boat equipment,
along with the 300 low-point replacements who had joined the Boat Battalion at
Mindanao. No authority for this transfer was obtained from higher headquarters,
but it was so obviously the only thing to do that they, after considerable blustering,
finally ratified it. Engineer heavy equipment, radios, arms, vehicles and all other
types of equipment were turned in progressively so that the companies would not find
themselves so short handed as to be unable to maintain and move any item.
Strenuous representations were made to Sixth Army and GHQ to have the
Regiment inactivated by the end of November so that responsible personnel could
close its career. These headquarters were agreeable, but repeated radio messages
Queens of the Imperial Navy blasted in their hiding places near Kure by planes of the
Third Fleet squat ignobly on the bottom.
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signed by MacArthur could not expedite procedures in Washington enough to secure
the necessary War Department authority.
Between the 5th and 14th of November the exodus of men resumed, with 7Ipoint men and go-point officers finally departing. This group used up all the transports that put into Nagoya, and many had to wait there two to three weeks before the
Navy sent more ships. Meanwhile before the very eyes of eligible men, hungry for
the sight of home, APAs and AKAs were sailing empty from Hiro for the States-a
bitter proof of the disadvantages of divided command.
The remnants ofthe Regiment, only 30 officers and about 400 enlisted men, had
no equipment to work with and little with which to endear themselves to the Base
commander. So on November 2 3 they were ordered to clear out of the Kure Naval
Base, which by then had been turned into a fairly comfortable camp with hot showers
and other little luxuries, and trek northward 8 miles to Koyama where they took over
an attractive Jap barracks on a terrace overlooking the sea.
Hardly had they settled there when on November 28 orders arrived sending
homeward another large number of point groups. This was the end. By the 4th of
December every officer in the Regiment, and all but 40 low-point enlisted men who
had been retained to act as a care-taking group, were on their way to Nagoya and
the U.S.A.
The Base commander directed that the platoon of men, representing all that
was left of what had been 2000 six weeks before, be attached for all purposes to the
1874th Engineer Aviation Battalion, and the care-takers of the boxes of regimental
records moved back to Kure. Not until December 31, 1945 did official inactivation
orders put an end to this ignominious existence, and bring to a close, after three and a
half years of vigorous life, the career of the 53 3d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment.

